On the other hand, the Lords possessed of immense wealth, transmitted to them by their ancestors, and born (if I may be allowed the expression) with silver spoons in their mouths, might be lavish of the national treasures, without duly considering with what anxiety, difficulties, and dangers the bulk of the people have acquired the small share of it they possess. Again, a supply granted to the Crown, which, with respect to the enormous fortunes of the nobility, would scare deserve the name of liberality, might amount almost to a confiscation of the estates of the lower ranks of the people, and reduce thousands of their fellow-subjects to distress, poverty, and ruin. On the other hand, it is difficult to suppose that the Representatives of the labouring or trading part of the Nation, would, or could, be so extravagant in their supplies as to injure the estates of the nobility; and if such an unnatural case could exist, the House of Lords, by exercising their right of rejecting, would effectually ward off the blow. But if they had a power of even altering a Money Bill, they might model it in such a manner as to exonerate, in a great measure, their own estates, and lay the whole burthen upon the Commons, or at least it would be a constant source of feuds and dissensions between the two Houses, which would offer, to an enterprising Monarch, such opportunities of ingratiating himself occasionally with each as might endanger the Constitution.*

From this state of the English Constitution it is obvious to the most common observer, that if any one of its branches encroached upon the rights of another, it became the interest of the other two to unite in repelling the aggressor, since if either branches are annihilated, or even weakened, the other must necessarily fall a prey to the victor. If the Commons attacked the Lords, the Crown necessarily interposed its authority to support the injured rights of the nobility; for, if they succeeded in destroying the rights of the nobility, such an acquisition of power as would then devolve on them, would soon enable them to weaken, if not destroy, the prerogatives of the Crown. If the Lords encroached upon the privileges of the Commons, our history afforded too many instances of the dreadful consequences of the overgrown power of the Barons to suffer the King to be an idle spectator whilst his nobles, by crushing the Commons, would arrogate to themselves the power of petty Princes, and endanger the safety of the Kingdom with internal commotions. If the King attacked the privileges of either of the other branches, or either of the others encroached upon the prerogatives of the Crown, the third branch was too much interested in the dispute to stand neuter, but readily assisted the injured party, sensible that the only method of preserving the true equilibrium of Government was to suffer neither branch to oppress or even weaken the other.

Thus constituted, thus mutually interested, to support each other, the King, Lords, and Commons of England, formed the wisest system of legislation that ever did, or perhaps ever will, exist; for the three favourite forms of Government, viz: Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, possessed of their distinct powers, checked, tempered, and improved each other. Nor was this excellence confined to forms alone. The characteristick principles of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, viz: honour, moderation, and virtue, were here so happily blended as totally to exclude fear, that despicable slave of despotism and arbitrary sway. The honour of Monarchy tempered the impetuosity of Democracy, the moderation of Aristocracy checked the ardent aspiring honour of Monarchy, and the virtue of Democracy restrained the one, impelled the other, and invigorated both. In short, no Constitution ever bid so fair for perpetual duration as that of England, and none ever half so well deserved it, since political liberty was its sole aim, and the general good of mankind the principal object of its attention. Had this happy state but recurred a little oftener to its first principles it would have remained the envy—the admiration of the whole world, and the delight of its most distant Dominions, till time shall be no more. But, alas! all human institutions are subject to decay; the very vitals of this amiable Constitution are wounded, the glorious fabrick already totters, and the time is approaching when it may be said of this beautiful Byzantium:

"That down the precipice of fate she goes,
And sinks in moments what in ages rose."

To trace the steps of this disorder, and point out what is likely to occasion this ever to be lamented misfortune, shall be the subject of my next,

I shall conclude this with a word of advice to my fellow-citizens of Virginia: Since my last the writs have issued for choosing your Representatives, returnable the 11th day of August next. Postpone your meeting in Williamsburg till that day, so short a delay will be attended with little inconvenience. If the Governour should then meet you in Assembly, you will have a constitutional opportunity of declaring the sentiments, and of vindicating the rights, of those you represent. But be not deceived. It is to be feared that the Governour will not, cannot, call the Assembly together till he receives letters from the Minister in England, and that it will be prorogued before the 11th of August. If it should, still let the new Representatives of the, people meet at that time; though they cannot as a legislative, yet they may as a collective body, declare the sentiments of their constituents, and it is necessary, not only that our Sovereign, but that the British Parliament should know those sentiments as soon as possible, otherwise an artful Minister may impose upon them, and induce' them to believe you have actually submitted to a measure which I am convinced you never will submit to, because you ought not.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM LONDON, DATED JULY 1, 1774.

I am sorry to learn, by late letters from Philadelphia, that you are likely to have an Indian war, by the imprudence of some of the back inhabitants. I most sincerely wish that steps may be taken to prevent it; for you may be assured the people in power here wish for it. They say it will be the means of humbling and reducing the rebellious Americans to obedience. This they are determined to do, let the consequence be what it may. I am much grieved to hear that the unjust and tyrannical steps taken by Government here, against the Massachusetts Bay, are not, by the other Colonies, looked upon as an attack upon all America, but intended only against that Province. The policy of this country is to divide and conquer; and if the other Colonies sit quiet and suffer the people of New England, for want of their uniting and making it one common cause, to be reduced to the necessity of subscribing to such terms as Government here shall hold out to them, they will attack the other Colonies, and then farewell to the liberties of America; for the Americans will be soon as absolute slaves as the Frenchmen. The infamous Quebeck Bill, which establishes popery and arbitrary power through a country capable of maintaining more people than England, France, and Spain, is intended.

* I have read other arguments against the House of Lords exercising a right of altering Money Bills, but, I confess, they were hot to me so convincing as the above. For instance, one was, that the wealth of the Lords compared to that of the Commons of England, was but as a drop of water to the Ocean. Suppose this to be true, (though, by the by, it is a very large drop, and which, by their intermarriages with the rich heiresses of the Commons, is constantly increasing,) yet a single drop, when incorporated with, becomes as much a part of the Ocean as any other drop, and by the same parity of reasoning, the whole Ocean might drop by drop be excluded till it ceased to be even a rivulet. I am induced to make this remark from having read a similar argument in a late pamphlet of a Reverend author, who, after observing that each member of the House of Commons, when chosen, becomes the Representative of the whole Kingdom, he has the following note: "Surely the Nation might have expelled Mr. Wilkes, or have struck his name out of the list of the Committee, had it been assembled, or had it thought proper so to do. What then should hinder the Deputies of the Nation from doing the same thing? And which ought to prevail in this case, the Nation in general or the County of Middlesex?" Let it be observed that if the whole body of the people had been assembled upon the National Councils, no such Committee could have existed; the case thus supposed is, therefore, a nonentity. But admitting it otherwise, even a Committee of the House of Commons cannot exclude any member of that Committee, but must apply to the House who constituted them a Committee to make such exclusion. That the House of Commons have a right, by expelling any member, to appeal to the people who sent him whether such member is unworthy to represent them, there can be no doubt, but if, after such an appeal, the people reelect him, they are surely bound to receive him. In such an Assembly as the Reverend author speaks of, there can be no doubt but a majority of the whole Kingdom may exclude the inhabitants of the County of Middlesex from any share in the National Councils, but from that instant they cannot exercise a constitutional right, either of legislation or taxation, over the County of Middlesex; and just so great a power as a majority of the Nation can exercise over the inhabitants of a single county, a majority of the Representatives of the Nation may exercise over the Representatives of a single county. But the consequence must be the same in both cases.