tioned, to settle a certain annual revenue on his Majesty, his heirs and successors, subject to the control of Parliament, and to satisfy all damages done to the East India Company.

This our idea of settling a revenue arises from a sense of duty to our Sovereign, and of esteem for our mother country. We know and have felt the benefits of a subordinate connexion with her. We neither are so stupid as to be ignorant of them; nor so unjust as to deny them. We have also experienced the pleasures of gratitude and love, as well as advantages from that connection. The impressions are not yet erased. We consider her circumstances with tender concern. We have not been wanting, when constitutionally called upon, to assist her to the utmost of our abilities; insomuch that she has judged it reasonable to make us recompenses for our overstrained exertions; and we now think we ought to contribute more than we do to the alleviation of her burthens.

Whatever may be said of these proposals on either side of the Atlantic, this is not a time either for timidity or rashness. We perfectly know that the great cause now agitated, is to be conducted to a happy conclusion only by that well tempered composition of counsels, which firmness, prudence, loyalty to our Sovereign, respect to our parent state, and affection to our native country, united, must form.

By such a compact, Great Britain will secure every benefit that the Parliamentary wisdom of ages has thought proper to attach to her. From her alone we shall continue to receive manufactures. To her alone we shall continue to carry the vast multitude of enumerated articles of commerce, the exportation of which her policy has thought fit to confine to herself. With such parts of the world only as she has appointed us to deal, we shall continue to deal; and such commodities only as she has permitted us to bring from them, we shall continue to bring. The Executive and controlling powers of the Crown will retain their present full force and operation. We shall contentedly labour for her as affectionate friends, in time of tranquillity, and cheerfully spend for her as dutiful children, our treasure and our blood, in time of war. She will receive a certain income* from us, without the trouble or expense of collecting it—without being constantly disturbed by complaints of grievances which she cannot justify, and will not redress. In case of war, or in any emergency of distress to her, we shall also be ready and willing to contribute all aids within our power; and we solemnly declare, that on such occasions, if we or our posterity shall refuse, neglect, or decline, thus to contribute, it will be a mean and manifest violation of a plain duty, and a weak and wicked desertion of the true interests of this Province, which ever have been, and must be, bound up in the prosperity of our mother country. Our union, founded on mutual compacts and mutual benefits, will be indissoluble, at least more firm, than an union perpetually disturbed by disputed rights and retorted injuries.

Secondly. If all the terms above mentioned cannot be obtained, it is our opinion that the measures adopted by the Congress for our relief, should never be relinquished or intermitted, until those relating to the troops; internal legislation; imposition of taxes or duties hereafter; the thirty-fifth of Henry the Eighth, chapter the second; the extension of Admiralty Courts; the port of Boston and Province of Massachusetts Bay, are obtained. Every modification or qualification of these points, in our judgment, should be inadmissible. To obtain them, we think it may be prudent to settle some revenue as above mentioned, and to satisfy the East India Company.

Thirdly. If neither of these plans should be agreed to in Congress, but some other of a similar nature shall be framed, though on the terms of a revenue, and satisfaction to the East India Company; and though it shall be agreed by the Congress to admit no modification or qualification in the terms they shall insist on, we desire your Deputies may be instructed to concur with the other Deputies in it; and we will accede to and carry it into execution as far as we can.

Fourthly. As to the regulation of trade, we are of opinion, that by making some few amendments, the commerce of the Colonies might be settled on a firm establishment, advantageous to Great Britain and them, requiring and subject to no future alterations, without mutual consent. We desire to have this point considered by the Congress, and such measures taken as they may judge proper.

In order to obtain redress of our common grievances, we observe a general inclination among the Colonies of enter

* The train of officers employed by Great Britain, consume a very large part of what she takes from us. She therefore increases our distresses to make up for that consumption. They will hereafter grow more and more oppressive; we more and more uneasy; she more and more disturbed. We could raise the some sum in a much more easy, equal, and cheap manner, than she can do. The attention of small States extends much more efficaciously and beneficially to every part of the Territories, than that of the administration of a vast Empire. The Representatives in Assembly, who are taxed when the People are taxed, and accountable to them, will have double motives to take care that the raising and expending money is managed in the best way. The House of Commons would not bear to examine every particular relating to the just taxation of every county on this Continent, and to settle all the accounts fairly. If they could go through the immense labour, it would be impossible for them to do any other business. In short, by not doing it, they would be unjust; by doing it, they would be useless. Equity and reason demonstrates that such a power belongs not to them. We have had some remarkable instances on this Continent, some few years ago, of the Crown being, according to all the forms of business, charged with articles that never went to the use of the Crown. These were perquisites; and who could be so puritanical as to blame the civil word? It is said our barracks cost about eight thousand pounds of this money; and that the barracks at another place, not deserving a comparison with ours, cost forty thousand pounds sterling. We built our own ourselves, and were as saving and careful as we could be, it may be supposed. If money is raised upon us by Parliament; of one thousand pounds taken out of our pockets, not one hundred, in all probability, will be usefully applied to the service of the Crown. Deficiencies will ensue—they must be supplied; other Acts are made (still others, till our* "unrepresented blades of grass, too frequently and closely cut down and exposed to the burning heat of an unsetting sun, ever "in its meridian, perish to their deepest roots.

"There is not upon earth "says the excellent Gordon, "a Nation, which, having had unaccountable Magistrates, has not felt them to be crying and consuming mischiefs. In truth, where they are most limited, it has been often as much as a whole People could do to restrain them to their trust, and to keep them from violence; and such frequently has been their propensity to be lawless, that nothing but a violent death could cure them of their violence. This evil has its root in human nature; men will never think they have enough, whilst they can take more; nor be content with a part, when they can seize the whole.†"

"That the business of most Kingdoms has been ill managed, proceeds from this; it imports the lower rank of men only, and the People (whose cries seldom reach the Prince till it is too late, and till all is past remedy) that matters should be frugally ordered, because taxes must arise from their sweat and labour. But the great ones, who heretofore have had the Prince's ear and favour, or who hoped to have him in their possession, were swayed by another sort of interest; they like profusion, as having had a prospect to be gainers by it, they can easily set their account even with the state; a small charge upon their land is more than balanced by a great place, or a large pension."*

See the Lord Keeper North's account of abuses in the conduct and disposal of the publick money, in the time of King Charles the Second. Those who, in our times, are the conductors of the same kind of dirty work, may compare the modern ingenious ways and means with those of their worthy predecessors.

Among others, pretended want of money in the Treasury, in order to have a pretence for giving an exorbitant price for necessaries. Lending the Crown at eight per cent., money which was raised at five and six. Paying with the publick money, pretending it to be private, and taking interest. Depreciating the publick debts and funds; buying them of the holders at half their worth, and afterwards, by interest, getting them paid in full. Pretending to give up all power in recommending to places for a consideration, and then insisting on recommending still; and so getting both ways. Rolling over losses upon the Crown or publick, while the gain was to sink into private pockets. A father stopping a large sum in his own hand, which was to have been paid the publick creditors. Before he can be brought to account he dies; the money sinks into the pocket of his heir; he obtains a pardon of all his father's debts. Gross frauds in office found out; then new officers and salaries set up as checks. The new prove as great knaves as the old, and form a scheme of collusion and mutual understanding. But the publick pays for all, and the power of the Court is strengthened. An old placeman begs leave to sell; pockets the money, and by and by, through interest, gets a new place gratis. Extravagant men squander their own money in their publick employments of Ambassadors, Governours, &c., and charge the publick with more than they really spent; while what they really spent was ten times more than necessary. The business of old offices transferred to new; but the profits of the old still kept up, though become smecures. An old servant of the publick retires upon a pension; he who succeeds him, by interest, gets it continued to him. Another gets an addition to his salary, and then sells his place for a great deal more than it cost him, and so an additional load is laid on the publick; for the addition must be continued, because the place was bought. An annual sum is granted by the publick for a publick use, as keeping up a harbour, or the like; a private man, by interest, gets a grant of the job; the publick concern is neglected, and the publick pocket picked. Crown lands perpetually begged and given away to strengthen the Court interest. The Crown constantly kept in debt, and Parliament solicited to pay those debts occasioned by the voracity of the Court. Commanders of fleets order a superfluous quantity of stores; by collusion between them and the store-masters, this superfluous quantity is sold again to the King, and the money sunk in their pockets. Sometimes the store-masters gave

* Speech of Lord Camden.

† Cato's Lett. 111.78.

* Daven. 11, 252.

† Dalrymp. Mem. 11, 84.