authority cannot extend. For all these laws are* "grounded on reason, full of justice, and true equity," mild, and calculated to promote the freedom and welfare of men. These objects never can be attained by abolishing every restriction on the part of the Governours, and extinguishing every right on the part of the governed.

Suppose it be allowed, that the line is not expressly drawn, is it thence to be concluded there is no implied line? No English Lawyer, we presume, will venture to make the bold assertion. "The King may reject what bills, may make what treaties, may coin what money, may create what Peers, and may pardon what offences he pleases."‡ But is his prerogative respecting these branches of it, unlimited? By no means. The words following those next above quoted from the "Commentaries on the Laws of England," are—"unless where the Constitution hath expressly, or by evident consequence, laid down some exception or boundary; declaring, that thus far the prerogative shall go, and no farther." There are "some boundaries then," besides the "express exceptions;" and according to the strong expression here used, "the Constitution declares there are." What "evident consequence" forms those "boundaries?"

The happiness of the people is the end, and, if the term is allowable, we would call it the body of the Constitution. Freedom is the spirit or soul. As the soul, speaking of nature, has a right to prevent or relieve, if it can, any mischief to the body of the individual, and to keep it in the best health; so the soul, speaking of the Constitution, has a right to prevent or relieve, any mischief to the body of the society, and to keep that in the best health. The "evident consequence" mentioned, must mean a tendency to injure this health, that is, to diminish the happiness of the people—or it must mean nothing. If, therefore, the Constitution "declares by evident consequence;" that a tendency to diminish the happiness of the people, is a proof, that power exceeds a "boundary," beyond which it ought not to "go;" the matter is brought to this single point, whether taking our money from us without our consent, depriving us of trial by jury, changing Constitutions of Government, and abolishing the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, by seizing and carrying || us to England, have not a greater tendency to diminish our happiness, than any enormities a King can commit under pretence of prerogative, can have to diminish: the happiness of the subjects in England. To come to a decision upon this point, no long time need be required. To make this comparison, is stating the claim of Parliament in the most favourable light: for it puts the assumed power of Parliament, to do, "in all cases whatsoever," what they please, upon the same footing with the acknowledged power of the King, "to make what Peers—pardon what offences, &c., he pleases." But in this light that power is not entitled to be viewed. Such is the wisdom of the English Constitution, that it "declares" the King may transgress a "boundary laid down by evident consequence," even by using the power with which he is expressly vested by the Constitution, in doing those very acts which he is expressly trusted by the Constitution to do—as by creating too many or improper persons. Peers; or by pardoning too many or too great offences, fee. But has the Constitution of England expressly "declared," that the Parliament of Great Britain may take away the money of English Colonists without their consent, and deprive them of trial by jury, &c? It cannot be pretended. True it is, that it has been solemnly declared by Parliament, that Parliament has such a power. But that declaration leaves the point just as it was before: for if Parliament had not the power before, the declaration could not give it. Indeed if Parliament is really "omnipotent,"* that power is just and constitutional. We further observe that the Constitution has not expressly drawn the line beyond which, if a King shall "go," resistance becomes lawful. The learned author of those Commentaries, that, notwithstanding some human frailties, do him so much honour, has thought proper, when treating of this subject, to point out the "precedent" of the Revolution, as fixing the line. We would not venture any reflection on so great a man. It may not become us. Nor can we be provoked by his expressions concerning Colonists; because they perhaps contain his real, though hasty sentiments. Surely, it was not his intention to condemn those excellent men, who casting every tender consideration behind them, nobly presented themselves against the tyranny of the unfortunate and misguided Charles's reign; those men whom the House of Commons, even after the Restoration, would not suffer to be censured.

We are sensible of the objection that may be made, as to drawing a line between rights on each side, and the case of a plain violation of rights. We think it not material. Circumstances have actually produced, and may again produce this question: What conduct of a Prince renders resistance lawful? James the Second, and his father, violated express rights of their subjects, by doing what their own express rights gave them no title to do, as by raising money, and levying troops without consent of Parliament. It is not even settled, what violation of those will justify resistance. But may not some future Prince, confining himself to the exercise of his own express rights, such as have been mentioned, act in a manner, that will be a transgression of a "boundary" laid down by "evident consequence," the "Constitution declaring he should go no further?" May not this exercise of these his express rights, be so far extended, as to introduce universal confusion and a subversion of the ends of Government? The whole may be oppressive, and yet any single instance legal. The cases may be improbable; but we have seen and now feel events once as little expected. Is it not possible, that one of these cases may happen; if it does, has the Constitution expressly drawn a line, beyond which resistance becomes lawful? It has not. But it may be said, a King cannot arm against his subjects—he cannot raise money without consent of Parliament. This is the constitutional check upon him. If he should, it would be a violation of their express rights. If their purses are shut his power shrinks. True. Unhappy Colonists! Our money may be taken from us—and standing armies established over us, without our consent—every expressly declared constitutional check dissolved, and the modes of opposition for relief so contracted, as to leave us Only the miserable alternative of supplication or violence. And these it seems, are the liberties of Americans. Because the Constitution has not "expressly declared" the line between the rights of the mother country and those of her

* Parl. Deb. 7, 409. "What of that? Shall not we give judgment, because it is not adjudged in the books before? We will give judgment according to reason, and if there be no reason in the books, I will not regard them."—Speech of ANDERSON, Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, in the reign of ELIZABETH.—GOULDSB. Rep. 96 edit., 1653.

† "It seems to me, that the natural justice, which is a duty of man, ought to be styled the parent and nourisher of every other virtue: and assuredly without this habit, a man can neither moderate his desires, nor be brave, nor wise. For, it is a harmony and peace of the whole soul; with a full concert of words and actions: and the dominion of such a habit may be rendered more conspicuous, if we examine the other habits of virtue. For the good of these is private, respecting the individual; but the good of natural justice respects whole systems, and throughout the universe."

"In the celestial system of the world, as it marshals out the universal rule of things, which are thus decreed by God; it is providence, and harmony, and right. In a civil state, it is justly called peace and good order. In a domestic state, it is the like mindedness of husband and wife towards each other; the good will of subordinate members. In the body, it is health and symmetry of parts, which are principal things, and much beloved by every living creature. In the soul, it is wisdom; that wisdom which ariseth amongst men, from the knowledge of causes, and from natural justice.

"Since therefore, this habit doth thus instruct, and preserve, the whole and every part; rendering all the same, in heart, and in tongue, why may it not be saluted by the universal voice, the parent and nourisher of every virtue?"—POL. PYTH. LUC. apud. STOBÆEUM, p. 105 edit. Tiguri, 1559.

‡ 1 Blackst. Com, 250.

|| "Of great importance to the publick is the presentation of this personal liberty: for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest Magistrate, to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper, (as in France it is dairy practised by the Crown) there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities."—"A natural and regular consequence of this personal liberty is, that every Englishman may claim a right to abide in his own country so long as he pleases, and not to be driven from it unless by the santence of law. Exile or transportation is a punishment unknown to the common law." "The King cannot constitute a man Lord Lieutenant of Ireland against his will, nor make him a foreign ambassador. For this might in reality be more than an honourable exile."?1 Blackstone, 135 to 138.

"These precedents collected by the reverend and learned Judge, Chief Justice Anderson, and all written with his own hand, do fully resolve for the maintenance of the ancient and fundamental point of liberty of the person, to be regained by habeas corpus, when any one is imprisoned,"—Parl. Hist. 7. 418.

* 1 Blackstone, 161.