Colonists, therefore, the latter have no rights. A logick, equally edifying to the heads and hearts of men of sense and humanity.

We assert, a line there must be, and shall now proceed with great deference to the judgment of others, to trace that line, according to the ideas we entertain: and it is with satisfaction we can say, that the records, statutes, law books, and most approved writers of our mother country, those "dead but most faithful Counsellors," as Sir Edward Coke calls them, "who cannot be daunted by fear, nor muzzled by affection, reward, or hope of preferment, and therefore may safely be believed," confirm the principles we maintain.

Liberty, life, or property, can with no consistency of words or ideas, be termed a right of the possessors, while others have a right of taking them away at pleasure. The most distinguished authors that have written on Government, declare it to be instituted for the benefit of the people; and that it never will have this tendency, where it is unlimited," Even conquest* itself is held not to destroy all the rights of the conquered. Such is the merciful reverence judged by the best and wisest men to be due to human nature, and frequently observed even by conquerors themselves.

In fine, a power of Government in its nature tending to the misery of the people, as a power that is unlimited, or in other words, a power in which the people have no share*

* "But in order to say something more particular concerning this subject, let us observe that the natural state of Nations in respect to each other, is that of society and peace. This society is likewise a state of equality and independence, which establishes a parity of right between them; and engages them to have the same regard and respect for one another. Hence the general principle of the law of Nations is nothing more than the general law of sociability, which obliges all Nations that have any intercourse with one another, to practise those duties to which individuals are naturally subject.

"These remarks may serve to give us a just idea of that art, so necessary to the directors of states, and distinguished commonly by the name of polity. Polity considered with regard to foreign states, is that ability and address by which a Sovereign provides for the preservation, safety, prosperity, and glory of the Nation he governs, by respecting the laws of justice and humanity; that is, without doing any injury to other states, but rather by procuring their advantage, as much as in reason can be expected. Thus the polity of Sovereigns is the same as prudence among private people; and as we condemn in the latter any art or cunning that makes them pursue their own advantage to the prejudice of others, so the like art would be censurable in Princes, were they bent upon procuring the advantage of their own people by injuring other Nations. The reason of state, so often alleged to justify the proceedings or enterprises of Princes, cannot really be admitted for this end; but in as much as it is reconcileable with the common interest of Nations, or which amounts to the same thing, with the unalterable rules of sincerity, justice, and humanity."

"Grotius indeed acknowledges that the law of nature is common to all Nations; yet he establishes a positive law of Nations contradistinct from the law of nature; and reduces this law of Nations to a sort of human law, which has acquired a power of obliging in consequence of the will and consent of all or of a great many Nations.* He adds, that the maxims of this law of Nations are proved by the perpetual practice of people, and the testimony of historians.

"But it has been justly observed that this pretended law of Nations contradistinct from the law of nature, and invested nevertheless with a force of obliging, whether people consent to it or not, is a supposition destitute of all foundation.†

1. For all Nations are with regard to one another in a natural independence and equality. If there be therefore any common law between them, it must proceed from God, their common Sovereign.

2. As for what relates to customs established by an express or tacit consent among Nations, these customs are neither of themselves nor universally, nor always obligatory. For from this only, that several Nations have acted towards one another for a long time after a particular manner in particular cases, it does not follow that they have laid themselves under a necessity of acting always in the same mariner for the time to come, and much less that other Nations are obliged to conform to these customs.

3. Again, these customs are so much the less capable of being an obligatory rule of themselves, as they may happen to be bad or unjust. The profession of a corsair, or pirate, was, by a kind of consent, esteemed a long while as lawful, between Nations that were not united by alliance or treaty. It seems likewise, that some Nations allowed themselves the use of poisoned arms in time of war.‡ Shall we say that these are customs authorized by the law of Nations, and really obligatory in respect to different people? Or shall we not rather consider them as barbarous practices; practices from which every just and well governed Nation ought to refrain. We cannot therefore avoid appealing always to the law of nature, the only one that is really universal, whenever we want to judgo whether the customs established between Nations have any obligatory effect.

4. All that can be said on this subject is, that when customs of an innocent nature are introduced among Nations, each of them is reasonably supposed to submit to those customs, as long as they have not made any declaration to the contrary. This is all the force or effect that can be given to received customs; but a very different effect from that of a law properly so called."—BURLAMAQ. Princ. of Nat. Law, I vol. p. 196—199.

"But I will conclude with that which I find reported by Sir John Davis, who was the King's sergeant; and so, by the duty of his place would no doubt maintain, to the uttermost of his power, the King's prerogative royal; and yet it was by him thus said, in those Reports of his upon the case of tanistry customs: 'That the Kings of England always had a monarchy royal, and not a monarchy signoral; where, under the first,' saith he, the subjects are free men, and have property in their goods, and freehold and inheritance in their lands; but, under the latter, they are as villains and slaves, and have property in nothing. And therefore, saith he, when a royal Monarch makes a new conquest, yet, if he receives any of the Nation's ancient inhabitants into his protection, they, and their heirs after them, 'shall enjoy their lands and liberties according to the laws.' And there he voucheth this precedent and judgment following, given before William the Conqueror himself, viz:

That one Sherborn, at the time of the conquest, being owner of a Castle and lands in Norfolk, the Conqueror gave the same to one Warren, a Norman; and Sherborn dying, the heir claiming the same by descent according to the law, it was, before the Conqueror himself, adjudged for the heir, and that the gift thereof by the Conqueror was void."*—Parl. Debates, 7 vol. p. 384.

See also Puffendorf's Law of Nature and Nations, b. 3, ch. 8, and b. 8, ch. 6.

It is held by the best writers, that a conqueror, in a just war, acquires not a right to the property of those of the subdued country, who opposed him not, nor of the posterity of those who did: nor can the pretence of obtaining satisfaction for the charges and damages of the war justify such a claim.

* See Grotius, rights of War and Peace; Preliminary Discourse, sec. 18. and book 1. chap. 1. sec. 14.

† See Puffendorf. Law of Nature and Nations, book 2. chap. 3. sec. 23.

‡ See Virgil, Æneid, book 10, verse 139, with the fifteenth note of the Abbe des Fentaines.

* "In a free state, every man who is supposed a free agent, ought to be, in some measure, his own Governour, and therefore, a branch, at least, of the Legislative power ought to reside in the whole body of the people. And this power, when the territories of the state are small and its citizens easily known, should be expressed by the people in their aggregate or collective capacity, as was wisely ordained in the petty Republicks of Greece, and the first rudiments of the Roman State. But this will be highly inconvenient when the publick territory is extended to any considerable degree, and the number of citizens is increased. In so large a state as ours, it is therefore very wisely contrived that the people should do that by their Representatives, which it is impracticable to perform in person."—I Blackstone, 158, 159.

The above quoted words are sufficient of themselves to refute the notion of "virtual representation" of Americans in Parliament.

As to the argument drawn from similitude between the case of those in England, not qualified to vote by their property, though possessed of a considerable share, as proprietors of the funds—the East India Company—merchants—manufacturers, &c., and the case of Colonists, the true answer is, that there is no resemblance whatever between the cases. A few propositions will prove it; but it may be proper to premise—First, If representation was intended by the Constitution of England, a complete representation was intended; for the reason of having any, requires having a complete one, as being the best. Second, If a complete representation was intended by the Constitution, every defect in the representation is against the intention of the Constitution. Third, If a respectable part of the people in England is not represented, it is a defect. Fourth, If therefore, the intention of the Constitution is to be regarded as the Constitution, it involves a plain absurdity, to infer a greater defect being constitutional, from a smaller defect which is unconstitutional. Fifth, The intention of the Constitution must be regarded—and practices inconsistent with its design must be amended by it, if the happiness which it means to promote and secure, is to be regarded. Sixth, If there is not such a representation in England, as the Constitution requires there ought to be. As to the resemblance above supposed. First, If many inhabitants of England have not a right to vote in the choice of members of the House of Commons, there are many who have. Second, Not one inhabitant of the Colonies has that right. Third, Some representation is better than none, though a complete one cannot be obtained. The first is a defect of mode, the latter an extinction of the substance. There is, to a nice observer of nature, a perceptible difference between a deformed man and a dead man. Fourth, Proprietors of the funds, &c., though they have no right to such vote, as proprietors, &c., may yet have it under another character as freeholders, &c. Fifth, When acting as freeholders, &c., they may take care of their interests as proprietors, &c. for—Sixth, Their being proprietors, &c., does not disqualify them from acquiring and enjoying a right to such vote by becoming freeholders, &c., but Seventh, By acquiring and enjoying a right to such vote, the Colonists must cease to be inhabitants of the Colonies. Eighth, Their being inhabitants of the Colonies, therefore, disqualifies them from acquiring and enjoying the right to such vote. Ninth, If those not entitled to such vote in England were not bound by statutes made there, they would not be bound by statutes, nor taxed at all, though possessed of great property—but Tenth, The Colonists are bound and taxed by the Acts of their Assemblies. Eleventh, Even those not entitled to such vote in England, and incapable of obtaining it, have this protection, that Representatives and their electors are bound by the laws made, as well as the rest of the people—and the connections between the Representatives, their electors, and the rest of the people, all living together in the same Kingdom, are so many and so intimate, that even the actually unrepresented cannot be affected unless the Representatives and their electors are affected also. Twelfth, Totally different is the condition of Colonists, if bound by statutes generally.—By the Acts of Parliament for raising a Revenue in America, the Commons use the words, "give and grant." Can men give and grant what they have not? Did any of those acts take a single penny out of the pocket of a single giver and grantor? No. So far from it, that if there is any truth in the proverb, And money saved is money got, these "dona ferentes" gentlemen put money into their pockets by their† "loyal and dutiful" generosity. Every individual of them acquired by bestowing. Pretensions thus to give, are such contradictions to fact and sense, that in making them, a sanction of injustice is sought from a principle of the Constitution, and in describing them, a solecism in speech becomes a proper expression. It

* See Davis's Reports, Lend. 1628, p. 41.

† Preambles to Statutes for raising a revenue in America.