with foreigners is regulated by Parliament. Colonists may "surely" be acknowledged to speak with truth and precision, in answer to the "elegantly" exprest question— "What King it is," &c., by saying that "his most gracious Majesty George the Third" is the King of England, and, therefore, "the King" they—profess themselves to be "loyal subjects of."

We are aware of the objection, that "if the King of England is therefore King of the Colonies, they are subject to the general legislative authority of that Kingdom." The premises by no means warrant this conclusion. It is built on a mere supposition, that the Colonies are thereby acknowledged to be within the Realm, and on an incantation expected to be wrought by some magick force in those woods. To be subordinately connected with England the Colonies have contracted. To be subject to the general legislative authority of that Kingdom, they never contracted. Such a power as may be necessary to preserve this connection she has. The authority of the Sovereign, and the authority of controlling our intercourse with foreign Nations form that power. Such a power leaves the Colonies free. But a general legislative power is not a power to preserve that connection, but to distress and enslave them. If the first power cannot subsist without the last, she has no right even to the first—the Colonies were deceived in their contract—and the power must be unjust and illegal; for God has given to them a better right to preserve their liberty, than to her to destroy it. In other words, supposing King, Lords, and Commons, acting in Parliament, constitute a sovereignty over the Colonies, is that sovereignty constitutionally absolute or limited? That states without freedom should, by principle, grow out of a free state, is as impossible as that sparrows should be produced from the eggs of an eagle. The sovereignty over the Colonies must be* limited. Hesiod long since said, "half is better than the whole;" and the saying never was more justly applicable than on the present occasion. Had the unhappy Charles remembered and regarded it, his private virtues might long have adorned a throne, from which his publick measures precipitated him in blood. To argue on this subject from other instances of Parliamentary power, is shifting the ground. The connection of the Colonies with England, is a point of unprecedented and delicate nature. It can be compared to no other case; and to receive a just determination, it must be considered with reference to its own peculiar circumstances† The common law extends to Colonies; yet Mr. Justice Blackstone says, "such parts of the law as are neither necessary nor convenient for them, as the jurisdiction of the spiritual courts, &c., are therefore not in force." If even the common law, in force within the Realm of England when the Colonists quittted it, is thus abridged by the peculiar circumstances of Colonies, at least equally just, and constitutional is it, that the power of making new laws within the Realm of England, should be abridged with respect to Colonies, by those peculiar circumstances.*

* "Nec regibus infinita aut libera potestas, was the Constitution of our German ancestors on the Continent, and this is not only consonant to the principles of nature, of liberty, of reason, and of society, but has always been esteemed an express part of the common law of England, even when prerogative was at the highest."—1 Black. 233.

† The learned Judge [in Vol. 1. page 107.] says this country was not "uninhabited when discovered and planted by the English, &c., but ought to be considered as a conquered, ceded, or infidel country. Our American plantations are principally of this latter sort, being obtained in the last century, either by right of conquest and driving out the natives (with what natural justice, I shall not at present inquire) or by treaties: and therefore the common law of England, as such, has no allowance or authority there, they being no part of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent) Dominions. They are subject however to the control of the Parliament."

According to this doctrine, the Colonists are considered in a legal view by the parent state, "as infidels or conquered people," not as her children, with her consent, establishing societies for her benefit. Though not a single man of the "infidels or conquered" people, should now be found to reside in each Colony; yet a political contagion is communicated to Englishmen in secula seculorum, because Indians once fished in the rivers, and hunted in the woods. If this be their "condition," then, according to the law laid down by the Judge, "they are subject not only to the control of Parliament, but the King may alter and impose what laws he pleases."*

It is not known what the learned Judge means by the word "principally." Perhaps he alludes to the ill directed humanity and justice of the first settlers of some Colonies, who purchased the lands from the natives, for valuable and satisfactory considerations. It was a very useless exercise of their virtues, for their posterity. If they had by accident settled an "uninhabited" country, the invaluable rights of the common law would have attended them; but when they dared to obtain a settlement by humanity and justice, they forfeited all rights of the common law, to the latest succeeding ages. Can this be law? Every case quoted by the Judge, it is humbly apprehended, makes a distinction between states or societies composed of English subjects, and those composed of "conquered" people, &c., and that this is the only distinction warrantable by those cases. That the conquerors should be considered as the conquered, the expellers of the natives as the expelled natives, and the Christian possessors and owners by fair purchases from those who had a right to sell, as the infidels no longer possessing or owning, seems to involve a confusion of ideas, little agreeing with the strength of reason that informs the common law.

It is very remarkable, how our ablest antagonists are perplexed in framing their arguments against us. Even the learned Judge does not express himself with his usual perspicuity: but the want of it is well atoned, if we, Colonists, can be thereby deprived of the benefits of the common law, and be absolutely subjected to the King; for these courtly tenets are the only consequences deducible from the curious argument that tends to involve these Colonies in the misfortunes of "conquered, ceded, or infidel countries." The "control of Parliament" is asserted to be supreme, in every case. Whether the Colonies were settled in "uninhabited countries," or in "conquered, ceded, or infidel countries," makes no difference as to that point.

Another learned gentleman has discovered, that we "are not entitled to as great a degree of freedom as Ireland." Why? "Because Ireland was a conquered country." This remark does not seem to remove the difficulty. Let us hear the point a little more explained. "Ireland it is true, was conquered, but certain concessions were made to the people. These were the terms granted them, but England is obliged to keep no terms with the Colonists." At every step these gentlemen take, those writers, who have contributed so much to the glory of their country, turn upon them, and directly oppose them. They at first shrink before these venerable advocates for liberty and humanity, but recollecting themselves, they distinguish and refine, in order to take away the substance of every argument, and to whittle down a Hooker and a Locke into a Lestrange and a Filmer. After taking these liberties, they at length grow bold enough to arraign the authority of any man, even Mr. Locke himself, if his writings cannot, by all this art, be turned to their purpose.

We need not be surprised after this, that every Colonist who ventures honestly to assert, as well as he can, the cause of his native land, should be treated with little respect. The Colonies have always been on the defensive. It is hoped they will always continue so. But the author of "The Controversy" charges them with great cunning, a left handed wisdom that must disgrace any people, because they have not resisted, in places where they were not immediately attacked. "It is the artifice of the managers, on the part of the Colonies, to avoid general questions, and to keep back and conceal consequences, lost the unsuspecting people of England should too soon catch the alarm and resolve to withstand their first attempts at independency."* That is, they have acted just as the "unsuspecting people of England" have done in their controversies with the Crown. They confined themselves from time to time, to a demand of redress for the injuries offered them. This behaviour of the Colonists would, by some persons, be deemed modest and respectful. Now indeed the conduct of Administration demonstrates to us, that we must enlarge our views, and endeavour to take a prospect of all the mischiefs necessarily attending a claim of boundless power with an unbounded inclination to exercise it. The gentleman may perhaps call for fire and faggots to extirpate our political heresy; but we trust, and trust firmly, that the sense and generosity of the good people of England will discover and defeat the present plan against their liberties, as they have already so many other schemes of that tendency—that they will behold their dutiful children with compassionate love, and with just indignation, those unrelenting enemies from whom they can expect no other favour, but that England "shall be the last they will devour."

* The author of "The Controversy," in page 31 of his work, argues thus concerning the legislative power of Great Britain over the Colonies: "The lands in all the Colonies having therefore been clearly shown to be part of the Dominions of Great Britain, and the possessors of them to hold them under authorities and titles derived from the British state, Mr. Locke would require no other proof of the right of the Legislative power of Great Britain to the obedience of the possessors of those lands; for speaking of the manner by which a man tacitly makes himself a subject of any country or Government, ha says,"—

"It is commonly supposed, that a father could oblige his posterity to that Government of which he himself was a subject, and that his compact held them; whereas it being only a necessary condition annexed to the land, and the inheritance of an estate, which is under that Government, reaches only those who will take it on that condition, and so is no natural tie or engagement, but a voluntary submission; for every man's children being by nature as free as himself or any of his ancestors ever were, may, whilst they are in that freedom, choose what society they will join themselves to, what Commonwealth they will put themselves under; but if they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors, they must take it on the same terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions annexed to such a possession. Whoever (says he in another place) by inheritance, purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the lands so annexed to, and under the government of, that Commonwealth, must take it with the condition it is under; that is, of submitting to the Government of the Commonwealth under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any subject of it." Page 31. The ingenuity of the gentleman is here again remarkable. Mr. Locke, in his eighth chapter on Civil Government, "of the beginning of political societies," immediately before the words above mentioned "whoever by inheritance," &c., speaks of a man who "unites his, person, which was before free, to a society for the securing and regulating of property, and submits to the community those possessions which he has or shall acquire, that do not already belong to any other Government." These words the gentleman not thinking quite to his purpose in this place, separates from the words of his quotation, and so gives Mr. Locke's conclusion without his premises. However, three pages after, he is so candid, as to give the premises without the con-

* 1 Blackstone, 107, and the cases there cited.

* Page 16.