they do? The Restoration took place, and a legal Parliament would not doubt but it had as extensive a right as an illegal one. The Revolution succeeded, and with it methods for blending together the powers of King and people in a manner before unknown. A new political alembick was fixed on the great principle of resistance, and in it severe experiments were to be made on every other principle of the Constitution. How the boldness of Ministers and con-tempt of the people have increased since that period, not a man the least acquainted with English history can be ignorant. The Colonies were in a state of infancy—still in a state of childhood. Not a single statute concerning them is recollected to have been passed before the Revolution but such as related to the regulation of trade. "Precedents" were afterwards made, that, when they grew up, the authority of a master might succeed that of a parent.

Precedents, it is apprehended, are no otherwise regarded in the English laws than as they establish certainty for the benefit of the people—according to the maxim—"Miserable is the servitude when the laws are uncertain." Precedents militating against the welfare or happiness of a people, are inconsistent with the grand original principle on which they ought to be founded. Their supposed sanction increases in proportion to the repetitions of injustice. They must be void. In subjects of dispute between man and man, precedents may be of use, though not founded on the best reason. They cause a certainty, and all may govern themselves accordingly. If they take from an individual one day, they may give to him the next. But precedents, to overthrow principles, to justify the perpetual oppression of all, and to impair the power of the Constitution, though a cloud of them appear, have no more force than the volumes of dust that surround a triumphal car. They may obscure it: they cannot stop it. What would the liberties of the people of England have been at this time if precedents could have made laws inconsistent with the Constitution? Precedents, tending to make men unhappy, can with propriety of character be quoted only by those beings to whom the misery of men is a delight.

"If the usage had been immemorial and uniform, and ten thousand instances could have been produced, it would not have been sufficient; because the practice must likewise be agreeable to the principles of the law,* in order to be good: whereas this is a practice inconsistent with, and in direct opposition to, the first and clearest principles of the law"†—to those feelings of humanity, "out of which mankind will not be reasoned, when power advances with gigantick strides threatening dissolution to a state—to those inherent though latent powers of society, which no climale,‡ no time, no constitution, no contract, can ever destroy or diminish."||

A Parliamentary power of internal legislation over these Colonies, appears therefore to us, equally contradictory to humanity and the Constitution, and illegal.

As to the second head, a power of regulating our trade, our opinion is, that it is legally vested in Parliament, not as a Supreme Legislature over these Colonies, but as the Supreme Legislature and full Representative of the parent state, and the only judge between her and her children in commercial interests, which the nature of the case, in the progress of their growth, admitted. It has been urged with great vehemence against us, and seems to be thought their fort by our adversaries, "that a power of regulation is a power of legislation; and a power of legislation, if constitutional, must be universal and supreme in the utmost sense of the words." It is therefore concluded, that the Colonists by acknowledging the power of regulation, have acknowledged every other power. On this objection we observe, that according to a maxim of law, "It is deceitful and dangerous to deal in general propositions." The freedom and happiness of states depend not on* artful arguments, but on a few plain principles. The plausible appearance of the objection consists in a confused comprehension of several points, entirely distinct in their nature, and leading to consequences directly opposite to each other. There was a time when England had no Colonies. Trade was the object she attended to, in encouraging them. A love of freedom was manifestly the chief motive of the adventurers. The connection of Colonies with their parent state may be called a new object of the English laws. That her right extinguishes all their rights—rights essential to freedom, and which they would have enjoyed, by remaining in their parent state, is offensive to reason, humanity, and the Constitution of that state. Colonies could not have been planted on these terms. What Englishman, but an ideot, would have become a Colonist on these conditions? to mention no more particulars, "That every shilling he gained might rightfully be taken from him—trial by jury abolished—the building houses, or making cloths with the materials found or raised in the Colonies, prohibited—and armed men set over him to govern him in every action?"

Had these Provinces never been settled—had all the inhabitants of them now living been born in England and resident there, they would now enjoy the rights of English-men; that is, they would be free in that Kingdom. We claim in the Colonies these and no other rights. There no other Kingdom or state interferes. But their trade, however important it may be, as the affairs of mankind are circumstanced, turns on other principles. All the power of Parliament cannot regulate that at their pleasure. It must be regulated not by Parliament alone, but by treaties and alliances formed by the King without the con-sent of the Nation, with other States and Kingdoms. The freedom of a people consists in being governed by laws, in which no alteration can be made, without their consent. Yet the wholesome force of these laws is confined to the limits of their own country. That is, a Supreme Legislature to a people, which acts internally over that people, and inevitably implies personal assent, representation, or slavery. When an universal Empire is established, and not till then, can regulations of trade properly be called acts of Supreme Legislature. It seems from many authorities, as if almost the whole power of regulating the trade of England was originally vested in the Crown. One restriction appears to have been, that no duty could be imposed without the consent of Parliament. Trade was little regarded by our warlike ancestors. As commerce became of more importance, duties and severities were judged necessary additions to its first simple state, Parliament more and more interfered. The Constitution was always free, but not always exactly in the same man-

* This is a maxim of law, that—"A bad usage ought to be abolished."

† Letter on general warrants.

‡ 1 Blackstone, p. 245.

|| "Equal distribution of justice, and free enjoyment of property, are the great objects of society; and no time, precedent, statute, or institution, should deter men from keeping these uppermost in their thoughts."—Mr. HUME's History of England.

"The jurisdiction of the Star Chamber, martial law, imprisonment by warrants from the Privy Council, and other practices of a like nature, though established for several centuries, were scarce ever allowed by the English to be parts of their Constitution: the affection of the Nation for liberty still prevailed over all precedent and over all political reasoning: The exercise of these powers, after being long the source of secret murmurs among the people, was, in fulness of time, solemnly abolished, as illegal, at least as oppressive, by the whole Legislative authority."—Id.

To these instances may be added, the late practice of general warrants, that had the sanction of precedents, even since the Revolution.

* Our chance of success would be slight indeed if it depended on subtleties of reasoning. Who can resist the skilful and courageous attacks of those Britons who have not long since distinguished them-selves in the polemical fields? Have they not proved to the satisfaction of thousands, the non-existence of matter—the necessity of human actions—consequently the innocence of them—the comfortable mortality of the soul—that virtue is a name—-rice a jest—liberty a non-entity—Christianity an imposture—and, with due detestation be it mentioned, that we have no idea of power, nor of any Being endowed with any power, much less of one endowed with infinite power?

With explosions of learning and flashes of wit, these well trained troops would keep up a terrible fire of artillery and small arms against us undisciplined Americans. We must not meet them in the shock of battle. That would be madness in the extreme. We must make the most of our natural advantages. There we are safe; and all the forces that can be brought to the assault, will never be able to prevail against us. To drop the metaphor. "Inquiry ceases to be rational, and becomes both whimsical and pernicious, when it advances as far as some late authors have carried it, to controvert the first principles of knowledge, morality, religion, and consequently the fundamental laws of the British Government, and of all well regulated society."—Mr. BEATTIE on Truth.

It has been asserted by some men distinguished as historians, that the zeal of the reformers in religion engaging them to think liberally on that subject, led them to think with like freedom in civil affairs, whereby the Government of England received its greatest improvement. If the sentiment is just, may it not be inferred, that contempt for religion must necessarily introduce an indifference for all the just rules of Government and the principles of the Constitution?