not remember. Holland and Switzerland, as well as France and Spain, would have called it rebellion; but we only called it tumult and insurrection. But to prevent these from swelling into rebellion, provisionary laws were required; and these your Congress has converted likewise into imaginary links of an imaginary chain to enslave you. Let us see with what justice.
We begin with the Regulations which affected the Town of Boston.
One sure mark of Tyranny is to drive the subjects to despair, that, under the pretence of punishing the effects of that despair, she may get the power of stripping them forever of the power of resistance. Did Parliament act in this manner to the people of Boston? What were the great punishments inflicted, by the atrocity of which the people of that Town were to be driven to draw down greater upon themselves? Two The Custom House was removed. The trade of the Town was suspended. Was a Custom House in safety in a place where the Commissioners had been obliged to take refuge in the King's Ships? Was the trade of England safe in a place where the property of one of her greatest companies was destroyed in the face of day? Tyranny is also to be known by the duration of the marks of her violence. For how many ages was the punishment inflicted on Boston to last? Until those who had committed the outrage should have the honour and honesty to repair it; that is to say, not for an hour, if the people of Boston had reflected that true pride consists in making reparation for injuries, not in committing and persisting in them. That is surely an easy punishment from which the criminal may escape by only doing his duty. Parliament left an open door for reconciliation. If the people of Boston would not enter, who has been in the fault?
The next provisionary Statute complained of, is that which enabled those who should be engaged in the suppression of tumults in Massachusetts Bay, to claim a trial in England, if they were questioned for having done their duty. Those who kill in England after the Mob Act is read, are entitled to an acquittal. But all that the Statute in question did, was to entitle those who were equally entitled to protection, to a trial in their own country. This was a law not of policy, but necessity; for was it proper that those who asserted the authority of the laws in America, should be tried by the very persons who denied the validity of those laws, and the authority of the Magistrates who supported them? Was it just to expose the lives and honours of men to the mercy of Juries who declared that they looked upon them as enemies? The law which knocks at every man's breast, without his going to a law-book to look for it, cries aloud: "Let not the accused party suffer by him who has an interest or a passion to condemn him" This law is called, in inflammatory language, an amnesty for the murderers of America. Yet, it reached only a limited district, in which there were insurrections, and was to last only for a necessary and limited time. Was the American prosecutor afraid that the offender might escape, from the want of evidence against him, at three thousand miles distance? The Statute relieved him of his fears; for it provided that the witnesses whom he called should attend to prove his charge. Did the witness complain of the hardship of his attendance, even in aid of the most sublime of human virtues—justice? The Statute provided that his charges should be borne at the publick expense. In every provision of the Act, the timorous hand of freedom is to be seen, which trembles even in saving a community, lest it should injure an individual.
But our Ministers know that true wisdom lies not in obstinacy; they pretend not to infallibility; if they do, they will be no favourites of ours; and it is in your own power to prevent their asking from Parliament the continuance of a Statute which was so necessary, but with all so unpopular. By a great judicial and legislative arrangement, let a regular administration of Law, Police, and Government, be established among you, worthy of yourselves, and this subject of contest will die of itself; for we shall expect the same justice in your Courts, which you well know you are sure of in ours. We told you we would give you a generous credit, because we expected to receive it from you in return; as a proof of our doing so, we are conscious of no fears that you would abuse our confidence, although in cases of tumults, we should, instead of bringing the prisoners to England, leave the trial to Committees of your own Assemblies, in which we believe, and believe firmly, that sentiments of honour would prevail over those of party in ingenuous minds. If it did not, we should not complain of acquittals, even though founded in prejudice, and the power of the Crown to pardon, would save those whom the injustice of party had condemned.
The next of the late Statutes complained of. is that which altered the Charter of Massachusetts Bay, so far as to give the nomination of the Council to the King, instead of leaving it with the House of Representatives. The great asserter of our liberties, King William, even without Act of Parliament, or legal process, resumed the Governments of Pennsylvania and Maryland into his own hands, because those who possessed them had broke the conditions on which they were granted, by violating the laws, though not in so great a degree as the people of Massachusetts Bay have done. George the First, in the same situation, did the same thing with regard to the Government of South Carolina.* Queen Anne, without Act of Parliament or legal process, took the command of the Connecticut and Rhode-Island Militias from the Governours of those Provinces, in whom their Charters had placed it, and gave the command of the one to the Governour of New-York, and of the other to the Governour of Massachusetts Bay; because it was deemed dangerous and impolitick to commit the power of the sword to the same hand which held that of Government in a Province. The Statute you complain of did not revoke the Charter of Massachusetts Bay; it only brought its Constitution to resemble that of England more nearly than it did. The most perfect idea of Government that ever was framed, is that of a King, a House of Lords, or Great Council, which owes its honours to the King, and a House of Representatives, who owe their honours to the people. But in the Constitution of Massachusetts Bay, there were only two orders, to wit: that of Governour, and of the House of Representatives; seeing the intermediate order, to wit, the Council, was chosen by the House of Representatives, and was therefore no more than one of its Committees: with this advantage on the part of the House of Representatives against the Executive power, that that Committee had all the weight and powers which should have appertained to the intermediate order. The disordered state of the Province called aloud for a Constitution, which in this country is the great security of order. But this approach to the perfection of liberty, your Congress calls slavery. The alteration was indeed not temporary, but perpetual; because it was obvious, that without some such alteration, a perpetuity of tranquillity could not be insured. If you think that the office of Counsellor should be for life, instead of depending upon the pleasure of the Crown, perhaps we agree with you; had you hereditary ranks, we could not differ at all. Instead of pulling down, raise up. Suggest what you want, to make your various Constitutions perfect. Your wishes will not be refused you, if they are what they should be. The dispute about the alteration of the Constitution of one Colony, would be buried in oblivion, if at your own desire, and with your own consent, all bad things were taken from all of them, and all good things put into them.
The last provisionary law of the same Minister, which you complain of, is that which provides for the quartering of the Troops. This law, not of policy, but necessity, and without which, the Troops would be no better in times of disorder and danger than statues, was to last only a few months, that is, while disorder and danger called for it. The Romans, who of all Nations watched the most to preserve the liberties of the low, and the dignities of the great, gave up often, by choosing a Dictator in times of danger, all the honours of both for a while, that they might enjoy them forever. Their Senates, which were rather Assemblies of Gods than of men, went further: for in times of civil commotion, they gave powers even to their Consuls, ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat. Mark these great strokes of great policy, and then ask your own minds, whether a permission to English Troops, acting in the cause of their country, to sleep under cover, instead of the open air, be a violation of American Liberty?
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