Never. When the Crowns of England and Scotland were united in the person of James the First, who made England the seat of empire, did the Parliament of England ever think of taxing Scotland? Or, in Queen Anne's reign, when the Scotch were averse to a union, were they ever told that the English Parliament could do the business if they were refractory; for that Scotland was represented in the Parliament of England, though all the property on the other side of the Tweed did not constitute one vote towards constituting one member of that assembly? No man ever dreamed of such a thing. Did Henry the Second, or any of his successors, ever attempt to tax Ireland in the English Parliament, though conquered, and not very distant? No, you confess. But the Judges, you say, have mentioned a distinction to account for this exemption, viz: that Ireland had a Parliament of her own. But why was a Parliament given to her? Because no man thought at that time that the English Parliament was a constitutional or adequate Legislature in ordinary, for Dominions beyond Sea. Nor can I believe that the Judges grounded their decision merely on the trisyllable "Parliament;" or that they had any other idea than that Ireland, having a Legislature, by whatever name, competent to taxation, it was not fitting that she should be taxed by the English Parliament, in the constituting of which the property of Ireland had no share. Now this holds equally as to the Provincial Assemblies, and to the Legislatures or states of every Kingdom or Province which I have before mentioned; and therefore it is clear that this universal practice was founded on a universal principle, that the Parliament of England ought not to tax any part of the Dominion, the property of which had not its due share in constituting that assembly. But there is an instance more precisely in point, and that is, the practice of Parliament with respect to these very Colonies. From their origin till the commencement of this dispute, the Parliament of England never attempted to tax them. It is confessed to have been a new idea, and as such principally, it has been gloried in by Mr. Grenville and his friends. Will nothing convince men? I know, however, there are persons who will be ready to contradict this, and to mention that the Post Office is a tax. To this I answer, first, that it does not bear the letter and form peculiar to a Tax Law; and was not intended on the one side, nor received on the other as such, and therefore can be no precedent; at least, if it were intended so by you, the intention was masked. There was concealment in the transaction enough to destroy it in a court of equity; and if you set the example of ligitiousness, and of little over-reachings to your Dependencies, you will make them afraid of you in every part of your dealing, which will increase your difficulties without end, and will begin with universal contention, as it will terminate in universal chicane. Next, I answer, that the Post Office was an undertaking first carried on by individuals at their private hazard; since adopted by the state, which stands in the place only of those individuals as to the Dependencies; and that it is now as an establishment maintained at the sole expense of Great Britain. She therefore has a right to say to any man, that if he makes use of that convenience he shall pay for it. It is a matter of compact, not of legislation, either in letter or in spirit. The Americans can send their letters by other conveyances. They have done so; and if they generally do otherwise, it is because they prefer the publick vehicle to any other, not because they are confined to it; that is, they pay postage for the carriage of their letters as they would pay a stage-coach for the carriage of their persons. I deny, therefore, that there is a single instance in which the British Parliament has taxed the Colonies; and you cannot deny that the British Parliament has acknowledged that the Provincial Assemblies can tax the Provinces, and that, in fact, they have exercised that right in a manner the most meritorious towards this country. You cannot, therefore, contest their power of granting money, nor their inclination to grant reasonably; but you fear that they will not grant unreasonably. You want, therefore, to deprive them of a negative, and to extort what you please by threatening that you will tax them here, if they do not implicitly tax themselves in America. Not content with a reasonable resource in an application to their choice, you want to establish a boundless resource in their fears. Like our arbitrary Princes, you are straining the prerogative of this country, that under the terrour of it, you may obtain what you do not choose from an unconstitutional pride, or what, from its unreasonableness, you are afraid to ask. Your apprehensions that the Colonies might, by Provincial grants, render the Crown independent, unless Parliament had a right to interpose, is only a pretence? Why have you ever let them make grants then? And is not your complaint that they have granted too little, not too much? But if that be your real fear, you can remedy it without a civil war. Pass an Act of Parliament declaring that it shall not be lawful for the Crown to give the royal assent to any Provincial grant without the approbation of Parliament. America will not refuse you a negative on her grants, but she will not relinquish a negative on your demands. I repeat, that the English Parliament has never taxed the Colonies; and if I could not, I should say, what all the world must acknowledge, that neither they, nor any body of people on earth, could defend their freedom for half a century, if a desultory and a questionable instance could overthrow it. It is not one problematical precedent that can be of any weight against a people. It must be by the general current of rational, unequivocal, and unoccasional practice that the Constitution of any country is to be tried.

And may not the Colonists well say that it would be wonderful indeed if our Parliament had been designed to be an universal Legislature to the ends of the earth, and as to all points? That our forefathers must have been not only wise men, which they were, but prophets, which they were not, if they could have foreseen our American acquisitions? And that no conclusion can be more certain than that our Parliament, in fact, was not originally intended to tax them, because when it was formed there was no such thing in being. May they not say that the only equity advanced in favour of the British claim, is, that the Americans are exactly in the same case with the non-electors of Britain? And may they not maintain that nothing can be more dissimilar? For that, first, the British non-elector has a strong influence upon the elector by habits of personal intercourse and connection; but that the American has none. Next, that the British non-elector may at any time acquire a vote by money or industry, but that the American never can. And lastly, that the British Representative cannot tax the non-elector of Britain without taxing his constituents equally and himself; whereas, every tax that he lays on America is, in the first instance, a gain and exoneration to his constituents and himself, in the same manner exactly in which it is a burden to America. May they not say, that men may be much more safely trusted in imposing taxes which they are to pay, than in imposing taxes which they are to receive? That the former is fairly a legislative act of taxation; but that the latter is an arbitrary imposition of tribute? May they not ask whether the people of Great Britain would think themselves as safe in being taxed by virtual Representatives in America, as in being taxed by their actual Representatives in Great Britain? And whether they would not esteem such levies to be a fine, rather than a tax; and an enaction, rather than an impost? May they not say, with some reason, that they wish you would know your own minds, and what would content you, and that you would decide for once, whether the possession of the Colonies, upon the old terms, would be an advantage to you, or not? For that if it would not, you are doubtless at liberty to relinquish it; and that if it would, you have no right to be paid for it. Have they not some reason to say that you are paid for it already, according to your original requsition? That the profits of their commerce, not taxes, were your object in colonizing; and that, possessing that, you have no right to a further payment by way of taxation? And that if they shall be able, and shall consent to contribute taxes also, that you should receive them rather as an overpayment, and as so much clear gain, than as a strict debt, or as a grounded demand? May they not say that it is rather hard that you should charge them with being a burden and a grievance to you if they choose your protection; and accuse them of being rebels if they are content to be without it? May they not observe, perhaps, that you call your connection with them by different names, according to the ends which you have to carry? That if you want taxes from them, you call it protection; and that if