it, that we shall be subject, not according to Mr. Locke, to “one” but to two supreme Legislative powers. Your quotation from Acherley is more pointed: “The supreme power in every Government and Nation is the Legislative power of making and altering those laws of it by which every man is to be bound, and to which he is to yield obedience.” Is not every man in Pennsylvania bound by, and is he not to yield obedience to such laws as the Legislature of the Province shall enact? Every man will answer affirmatively; if so, is not this Legislative power of. Pennsylvania, according to the express words of the above quotations, the supreme power in this Government? Can we then be subject to two supreme Legislative powers? But let us see whether you will not yourself prove sufficient for my argument. Page 43 you say, “Each Colony in the present Constitution, is capable, by its own internal Legislature, to regulate its own police within its particular circle of territory; but here it is confined: thus far, and no further can its authority extend.” This, I hope, is sufficient to show that, each Legislature is supreme within its own circle; and that this is all that is required to satisfy the principle on which you have benevolently endeavoured to build your system of tyranny.

You proceed next to a perplexed, inaccurate, and defective delineation of the English Constitution, and of the different capacities of the King, in order to point out the absurdity (as you call it) of the Colonies in acknowledging allegiance to the King, and denying obedience to the laws of Parliament. In this also, I apprehend, you are equally wrong. Let us attend to your argument. “To the King, in his representative capacity, and as supreme executor of the laws, made by a joint power of him and others, the oaths of allegiance are taken; and by him, that obedience in the subjects to the laws, which entitle them to protection in their persons and properties, is received. Is it then to him, as representative of the State, and executor of its laws, that the Americans profess their allegiance? This cannot be; because it would be owing an obedience to the laws of the State which he represents. It would be easy to prove that your idea of allegiance is totally defective; but as I intend only to expose the fallacy of your arguments, without advancing any plan of my own, it will perhaps be more satisfactory to refute you from your own words.

We Americans can, then, it seems, owe no allegiance to the King without involving in it a submission to the laws of the supreme Legislature of Great Britain, of which he is representative. Strange, indeed, that even our allegiance shall be drawn in as an argument in favour of Parliamentary power! But, Sir, let me, as a Pennsylanian, address you and examine your, argument. “The allegiance I owe to the King is due to him in his representative capacity, as supreme executor of the laws made by a joint power of him and others.” Agreed, Sir, for argument’s sake; but is not the King vested with the Executive power of this Government? Is he not the representative of our whole State, to see that our laws are duly carried into execution? And is not (on your principles) an oath of allegiance by a Pennsylvanian to the. King, made to him as supreme executor of the laws of Pennsylvania? And if, Sir, an oath of allegiance, taken by a subject in England to the King, is to him as representative of the supreme Legislature of Great Britain I ask, where is the absurdity of supposing an oath of allegiance taken by a Pennsylvanian, to be taken by him to the King, as the representative of the Legislative power of Pennsylvania, which is the supreme power of the. Government in which he lives? There can be none. But further, Sir; does not every American acknowledge that he is bound by the common law of England, and such statutes as were made before the settlement of the Colonies, and which are applicable to our situation? Is not the King supreme executor of these laws? And where is the impropriety of supposing the oath of allegiance to relate to him as supreme executor of these laws, which we acknowledge do bind us, and at the same time rejecting the absurd and dangerous idea of its including an obligation to be bound by every law that the British Parliament has, or may make?

I have sufficiently destroyed, I trust, the two main pillars of your system. But not content with endeavouring to prove the Americans subject to the uncontrolled power of the British Parliament, you are for reducing the Legislatures of the several Colonies to the degrading situation of mere corporations. “The original intent of the prerogative, under which the inhabitants of particular districts of territory have been incorporated into bodies politick, was to enable the representative of the State to form inferiour communities, with municipal rights and privileges; this prerogative is very ancient; William the Conqueror granted to London two Charters,” &c.

If we examine into the nature of corporations erected by the prerogative, we shall find you are still unhappy in the application of your principles. That the King, by his prerogative, may erect the inhabitants of particular districts into inferiour communities, with “municipal rights and privileges,” is readily granted. But it requires more than this to show that the Colonies are mere Corporations. After granting all you call for, your conclusions do not follow; for though, as you say, the King may incorporate inferiour communities with municipal rights, yet it does not follow that the King can grant to mere corporations full Legislative power. Let any one consider what is the object of corporations, and the purpose for which they are granted, and the comparison must vanish, But, Sir, is not the King visiter of all corporations? And has not the Court of King’s Bench a power to inquire into, and correct all the irregularities that have arisen in any of them? And is this, Sir, one of the “solid foundations” from which you have deduced the rights of Americans? Certainly you will have the thanks of the British Ministry for going further than even they have dared, They contend only that we are subject to the power of Parliament: You, Sir, go further, and meritoriously endeavour to prove that we not only are subject to Parliament,” but to the Court of King’s Bench, where that friend to liberty, Lord Mansfield, now presides.

Let us next examine your favourite position, that the rights of the Commons to a share in legislation is derived from, and represent the lands within the Realm. Having, as you think, fully shown this, you proceed (no doubt, with “ineffable pleasure”) to show that, by necessary consequence, the Americans have lost, not the right, but the exercise of the right of being represented in the British Parliament, though they still continue subject to all its laws. What does this amount to? Why, you have a right, but it is impossible you can derive any advantage from it. You have, a right, but it is impossible you can exercise it. Want of right and want of remedy, is said, in law, to be the same. What an insult to an oppressed people, to tell them they have a right, but that it is impossible they can either exercise it, or derive any advantage from it. But let us next examine your position, and see if it is well founded. I apprehend it is not, and that your idea of representation is partial and inadequate. That the landed interest is represented in part, is granted and you might have saved yourself the trouble of several tedious pages to prove what every man would immediately assent to. But is the landed the only interest that is represented? Or, does representation arise from land only? I answer both in the negative; and thus I prove it: The Commons is the Democratick part of the English Constitution. In small Democracies, the people should, and in many (in Greece) they did exercise the Legislative power in their aggregate capacity. In so large a State as England such a tumultuous meeting would be attended with danger and inconveniences; and, therefore, it is provided by the English Constitution, that the people shall exercise this power by their Representatives, which it would be inconvenient should be done in their collective capacity. This, Sir, is the principle of representation, and by which every man of property in England has a voice in Parliament, It is upon this principle that the landed interest is represented by their Knights of the Shire. This, Sir, is not the origin, but the consequence of representation. Are not the Citizens and Burgesses chosen by the Mercantile or Trading interest of the Nation? Has not every man who is free of a Borough a vote, and consequently, is he not represented in Parliament, although he has not a foot of land? In short, the whole of representation, according to the English Constitution, is this: in all free Governments a branch of the Legislative power should reside in the people. In so large a Government as England, this is not