under one common Sovereign with our Mother Country, we could not have reasonably expected fuller proof, at this day, near a hundred and forty years since. Many truths more recent have nothing but habit and usage to stand upon. Evidence, like all other things, wastes by the current of time. It is diminished in passing from one generation to another, in the same proportion as it is removed from those transaction to which it is applicable. That which is certainty in one age (such is the constitution of human affairs in the present imperfect state) may become probability the next, and by a third, dwindle into a bare possibility. It is a maxim, that where a proposition is attended with as much evidence as the nature of the thing will admit, and could reasonably be expected upon supposition of its truth, there the mind ought to yield its assent, and embrace the position.

As on the one hand it must be confessed there are instances where the Nation hath chosen to consider us as subject to her supreme authority, and our predecessors, from an unsuspecting confidence and veneration for their Mother Country, (that authority not being the object immediately in view, or the question under consideration) have inadvertently done, or omitted to do, that which may be construed into a seeming concession. And what rights or privileges are enjoyed by any people under Heaven, which have not been at one time or another invaded? So, on the other hand, there are instances where the Nation has disclaimed this authority; and our ancestors, whenever it has been made a question directly, have declared themselves with spirit, in the strongest terms against it. Supposing, then, for the present, that nothing absolutely conclusive could be inferred from the sense of the Nation, or the sentiments of our predecessors, after the reception of the Charter, it would not materially affect the argument. For had there been a perfect harmony of sentiment, and uniformity of practice, all conspiring to proclaim our union and consequent subjection, it would, indeed, have been circumstantial evidence of a previous connexion; but would not, of itself, have united us or confirmed our dependance, if we were not united before. Such evidence, however cogent, can never invalidate that of a higher nature; nor is it admissible, where we have direct positive proof. In the present case we have the deed of compact, the Charter-rights in our own hands, under the solemnities of seals, and the established formalities of law; we can, therefore, judge for ourselves, and ought to do it from the perceptions of our own minds, and not upon the authority of others.

Admitting, for argument’s sake, that it was the opinion of both parties that this Colony was united to the British Empire in such a sense as to be subject to her supreme Legislative authority, and that the subsequent line of conduct observed by both corresponded with such an apprehension, it only proves them guilty of an egregious mistake, arising from inattention to consequences, or a confusion of ideas.

It is admitted by all; it is an indisputable truth, that our predecessors came to America with the express and notorious design of enjoying, and in the first instance actually declared for a free Government. It is equally true that the British Nation never pretended, nor does she even now pretend, to any authority over us, which she apprehends inconsistent with such a Government. This was what was declared for at the first, and agreed to by all parties as a leading and controlling principle throughout the whole transaction. This was the cardinal hinge on which all their movements were to turn—the broad and permanent basis on which their civil superstructure was to rise. Every transaction, therefore, mutual or partial, abhorrent to this principle, however clear and formal, must be void ab initio, as founded in errour—going upon a mistaken supposition of its compatibility with our general position. Supposing, then, that our Charter proved, and it was clearly the sense of the parties to it, that we were to be bound by British laws in all cases whatever; if it can be shown, that such an agreement was repugnant to their first and common principle, its obligation ceases, as founded on mistake, and void from the beginning. This general agreement that our Government should be free, dispenses with, and voids the obligation of the particular one, that it should be subject to the authority of Parliament, if they are incompatible with each other.

To a fair and impartial consideration of the consistency and possible co-operation of these two principles, let us now afford our close attention. At first blush I confess they strike me as heterogeneous. Let us examine them. The very terms, Free Governments, plainly suppose that there are such sort of creatures in being as Governments that are not free, to which they are opposed. These are ordinarily called, in common parlance, as well as in technical language of the law, absolute, arbitrary, tyrannick, despotick, &c., and the subjects of them are, with equal propriety, said to be in a state of bondage, servitude, vassalage, and slavery.

Tyranny, despotism, and the like, are general abstract terms, expressive of a certain relation subsisting between different communities, or different parts of the same community, similar to that subsisting between master and his servant, from which the term slavery, as applicable to States, probably took its rise. An individual who has the absolute right to direct the conduct, dispose of the property, and command the services of another, is, with propriety, called a master. The person who is under an obligation to obey his commands and submit to his authority, is, in appellation and reality, his servant. It is this right of commanding, and obligation to obey, that constitutes the servitude, and not the actual exercise of it. He is a good master that does not use his right, but still he is a master, and may become a hard—a cruel one, at pleasure.

A community so organized as to have one supreme power, may be resembled to a single person, which speaks and commands by the voice of law. If this community has an absolute right to direct the conduct, dispose of the property, and command the service of another State; or, in other words, to make laws binding upon it in all cases whatsoever, it stands precisely in the same relation to this State that a master stands in to his servant; and, of consequence, it is in a condition of complete servility, and the individuals composing it in abject slavery. The same holds with respect to different parts of the same State. It is of no importance as it regards the relation that the right or authority is not exercised, or is used with lenity. This, indeed, may determine the character of the master State, in point of goodness, but the servile, relation still remains. Soon may it exert itself to its utmost latitude, with un-bounded rigour and accumulated vengeance. Recent facts evince the truth of this observation. Look to your Capital, the head and heart of this Province. Give way to reflection for a moment. There you may learn possible projections from real executions, and argue coming calamities from the power of afflicting. The question for us to determine, my countrymen then is, whether we will be slaves or freemen; for I defy the veriest Tory of them all, the accutest jacobite that ever lived, to difference our case from the above stated ones.

If our positions are then true, and our reasonings upon them unsophisticated, the conclusion is irresistible, not only that we are exempted from the supreme authority of the British Parliament, but also that she is inconsistent with her self in claiming our subjection; as she does not pretend, in profession at least, even now, when nothing but her own power and will bounds her pretensions, to any authority inconsistent with civil liberty, or the rights of Englishmen; and yet assumes a power subversive of their real essence, and very shadows. Such is the conduct of those who sit at the helm, and by the reins of modern policy have practised the Nation into present measures. We hope if common sense, political discernment, and public virtue, have forsaken the mansions of high life, they are still resident in the Island, and will soon unite superiour to opposition.

Perhaps it will be said, as has been often said with little truth and less knowledge, if we were perfectly independent in the first formation of our Government, we have rendered ourselves since dependant by our General Assemblies recognising the authority of Parliament, and submitting to her Acts, in various instances; and by our receiving protection from our Parent State. To which we answer, that it was not in the power of all the Assemblies, from their first commencement to the present day, to have effected this union and consequent dependance.

The authority of General Courts do not extend to the alteration of the fundamentals of Governments, much less to their subversion. This can be done only by the express