Realm of Great Britain, the Realm of Ireland, and each English Colony in America.

This doctrine of distinct Dominions or States, subject to the same Crown, is not a new doctrine, but was known in the English Nation long before the settlement of the American Colonies, as is well known to all who are acquainted with the English history. One instance of this kind will appear by the following extract from a petition presented to the King of England by the inhabitants of the County palatine of Chester, in the year 1450, wherein they say: “The said County is and hath been a County palatine, as well before the conquest of England as continually since, within which County you and all your noble progenitors, since it came into your hands, have had your High Courts of Parliament, and no possessioners or inheritors within the said County be not chargeable or liable, nor have not been bounden, charged, nor hurt of their bodies, liberties, franchises, lands, goods, nor possessions, within the same County, but by such laws as they have agreed unto; and also, they have no Knights, Citizens, nor Burgesses, nor ever had of the said County to any Parliament holden out of the said County, whereby they might by any way of reason be bounded,” &c. Whereupon the King discharged them from paying a subsidy granted by act of the Parliament of England held at Westminster, notwithstanding that County was expressly named in the act.

Whence, then, doth the Parliament of Great Britain derive the authority it claims to make statutes to bind the people of the Colonies in America, and other Dominions of the Crown not within that Realm, nor represented in that Parliament, but who have Parliaments of their own? Is this claim founded in compact? Where is the evidence of such compact? The landholders in America are not incorporated with those of Britain for the purpose of legislation, nor does their being owners of real estates in America (to any amount) entitle them to a voice in the election of any members of the British Parliament. Should it be said that the Colonists were subjects of the Crown of England, and members of that State before their emigration, and therefore must continue so unless they can show that they are discharged by some express agreement; it may be answered, that their compact as members of that State was, in the nature of it, limited to their continuance in that Realm, and consequently was discharged by their emigration. Should it be farther inquired, how is it that they continue subjects of the Crown of England or Great Britain since their emigration, if their relation to that State was dissolved? I answer, that the people of each Colony, either before or soon after their emigration, entered into particular compacts with the Kings of England to continue in allegiance to them, their heirs, and successors, and also as to their particular forms of Government, which appears by Charters, royal Proclamations, and the laws and regulations in each Colony, made by the mutual consent of the King and the people. But it may be further objected, that the British Parliament hath, from time to time, made laws to bind the Colonies, which have been acquiesced in for more than a century past, by which it appears that it was mutually understood that the Parliament had authority to make such laws. To which it may be answered, that when the Parliament of England first attempted to exercise legislative authority over the Dominions of the Crown out of that Realm, their authority was denied by Ireland, Virginia, and the ancient Colony of the Massachusetts–Bay. The last mentioned Colony refused and neglected to yield any obedience to the acts of Parliament for regulating the Plantation trade in the reign of King Charles the Second, from the year 1660 to 1675, when the King wrote to the Governour and Company of that Colony, requiring their conformity to said acts; to which they returned an answer, that they had not conformed to them because they judged them to be an infringement of their rights, for that the authority of the Parliament was limited by the four seas; but as His Majesty had signified to them that it was his pleasure that they should conform to said regulations, they had enjoined obedience to them by an act of their own; for which the King, in another letter, returned them his thanks. This shows how some of the Colonies understood the Constitution while some persons were living who were active in settling the terms of it. Now, can the conformity of some individuals in the Colonies to acts of Parliament, from motives of necessity or convenience, be construed as the consent of the Colonies to the authority of the Parliament to make laws to bind them? Some suppose there is a superintending power in the British Parliament over the Colonies, resulting from the nature of colonization and their relation to the parent State, especially for regulating and restraining their trade. But how can parental authority be applied to support or illustrate such a principle? A parent has a natural right to govern his children during their minority and continuance in his family, but has no such authority over them after they arrive at full age, and are settled in families of their own. A mutual affection, friendship, and regard to each other’s interests ought always to subsist between parents and children, and likewise between parent States and their Colonies, but no connexion in Government but what founded in mutual compact. Nor can the arbitrary demands or exactions of any parent States from their Colonies, be a foundation to determine what is right in the present case.

It has been urged as a reason why the Colonies should acknowledge a right in the British Parliament to make laws to regulate their trade, that no Colony Legislature is competent for that purpose, their authority being confined to the limits of their respective Colonies. But if the authority of the British Parliament is limited to that Realm, it is no more competent to make a law to extend without the limit of its jurisdiction than a Colony Legislature. But it is further said that Great Britain, by her Navy, has power to enforce obedience to her laws of trade and navigation, therefore the people of the whole Empire must submit to them; and that she protects their trade, and therefore it is reasonable that she should regulate it so as may be most conducive to the good of the Nation. To which it may be replied, that upon the two last mentioned considerations the people of the Colonies have, for about a century past, cheerfully consented to the operation of such acts of the British Parliament as are limited to the regulation of their external commerce for the mutual advantage of Great Britain and her Colonies, and seem still disposed to persevere in the same line of conduct, so that no controversy will be likely to arise on that subject but what may relate to the justice or utility of particular regulations; and the only way to remove that ground of controversy is, for the Legislature of each Colony to confirm, by their own acts, all such laws of trade as are to be executed within their respective jurisdictions; which doubtless they would readily agree to, and by that means the acts of trade would be more strictly observed. But as the present inquiry is, whether the British Parliament hath authority to make laws to bind the people of the Colonies in any case without their consent, it may be well to consider that there is an important distinction between authority to command, and power to enforce submission, and also between an equitable claim in Great Britain to receive a compensation from the Colonies for protecting their trade, and her haying a legislative authority over them to compel them to make that compensation in any particular way without their consent. And why has not the Parliament as good a right to compel them to make such compensation by laws imposing duties on their imports and exports, as by restraining their trade? But if all lawful Government is founded in compact, the Parliament cannot have right in either case to make laws to bind the people of the Colonies without their consent.

According to Lord Somer’s opinion, the right of the people to share in legislation is so necessary for the preservation of the society, that they cannot part with it even by their own consent. Take the opinion of that celebrated author in his own words: “Amongst all the rights and privileges appertaining unto us, that of having a share in the legislation, and being to be governed by such laws as we ourselves shall choose, is the most fundamental and essential, as well as the most beneficial; for thereby we are enabled to make such successive and continual provisions as to the preservation of the society, and the promoting either the temporal or eternal welfare of the subject, as shall be found expedient, &c. No man or society of men have power to deliver their preservation, or the means of it, to the absolute will of any man, and they will have always a right to preserve what they have not power to part with.”