by an interdiction of the traffick, to prove very formidable enemies. The interdiction, indeed, is no way likely, yet is possible; and a wise Government should not depend upon strangers for any commodity of consequence, which may be raised in its own territories, and by raising which, instead of relaxing, as is the present case, it must evidently invigorate the sinews of the body commercial. On the Mississippi, therefore, where the plenty of provision enables the Colonist with his Negroes, to work as cheap as in any part of Europe, it would be highly advisable to encourage the cultivation of hemp. It cannot be a question whether a trading people should part with money or manufactures; whether they should employ the subjects of other Nations, or increase the opulence of their own; nor can it be a question which is most eligible, a losing commerce with our neighbours, or a gaining one between themselves.

As this representation is not the exaggerated picture of over-heated visionaries, who colour from report, but the faithful face of fact, drawn from an accurate knowledge of the country, enough is certainly said to prove the advantages resulting from a civil establishment on the Mississippi; yet justice to the publick makes it necessary to add some farther remarks; and first, it may possibly be observed, that, the British Mississippi is already erected into British Government, and is at this moment under the jurisdiction of West-Florida: to this it is answered, that the chief benefit arising from the possession of West-Florida, is the barrier which it forms for the British Colonies against the incursions of their neighbours. As an object of commercial importance, it never has been, nor ever can be thought of, unless some plan similar to the present, is adopted; because those places within the jurisdiction of that Government, which are chiefly calculated for trade, are the very places to which it is wholly incapable of yielding protection; could it protect, the proposal of the new establishment would be impertinent. But Pensacola is at too great and disadvantageous a distance for any settler on the Mississippi to consider it as a protector; in the hour of surprise, he may as well look for assistance from the tower of London—he may be slaughtered long before the least intimation of his danger can be communicated to his defender; and of course few, very few, will attempt to improve a property so precarious, or bestow the efforts of their industry where the fruits are continually liable to be torn from their hands.

Till this Kingdom, therefore, shall think proper to afford settlers on the Mississippi a sufficient protection in a civil establishment of their own, the finest country, perhaps, in the habitable world, will remain utterly useless to its real sovereign may, it will be worse than negatively prejudicial, it will be positively injurious. It will furnish the object of a rival state with endless springs of wealth, and enable them to wrest an exhaustless traffick from the subjects of the lawful proprietary. Whereas, by separating the Mississippi from West-Florida to which, as an appendage, it must be of eternal inutility, and erecting it into a distinct Government, Great Britain will secure the golden harvest for herself; will establish a more effectual barrier against all possible encroachments on her Colonies; maintain the sanctity of her acknowledged dominion; and, instead of fearing inroads from her neighbours, will herself be in a situation to command the repose of America. With the settlement proposed, we shall be able, in any future difference with Spain, to make an easy descent upon the enemy’s hitherto unattempted empire of Mexico. Without it, the Spaniards will be able, in the first rupture, to take the Floridas from us, which are only to be assisted through a tedious passage by Jamaica;* consequently, if the sense of our trading interest does not wake us to the propriety of the measure, we should be roused by the sense of our apparent danger. Apprehension itself should operate in the room of policy, and we should at least guard the advantages we possess, if we are even unwilling to extend the means of our prosperity.

It is universally acknowledged, that the last war chiefly resulted from the influence which the French acquired with the Indians, whom they spirited up to continual ravages of the English settlements. Whatever neighbour possesses this influence must always be in a capacity of annoying, as well as interested to annoy the British Dominions in America; and Government, conscious of the danger, incurs an expense, at this hour, much superiour to the charge of an establishment on the Mississippi, to keep the natives in good humour by little presents among their several tribes; a large present, however, from another Power will make them instantly enemies. Now the Colony proposed will effectually prevent their communication with any other Power, and of course purchase a certain state of tranquillity upon terms more moderate than we now buy a precarious one. This circumstance is in itself an object of the utmost importance to those who are acquainted with the horrours of an Indian war. And surely, if it is prudent to bribe the savages into good order, it must be a greater degree of prudence to incapacitate them from offending. If four thousand pounds a year, for argument sake, is judiciously distributed to keep them peaceable, three thousand pounds a year must be better distributed to remove the possibility of their being otherwise. Should the plan recommended be pursued, every part of British America will be surrounded by a British force; and those Indians who are alone able to be troublesome, precluded from a connection with all interested tamperers. The effect will necessarily cease where the cause is destroyed; and instead, of a temporary calm, we shall not only gain an everlasting security, but the prospect of a revenue, which the people now possessing the trade already find approaching to half a million annually of our circulation. In a political light, consequently, as well as in a commercial view, the proposition must be deemed highly important, especially when it is known that three parts of the Mississippi produce is in favour of the eastern or English side, and that the French, Acadian, German, and native inhabitants can be furnished with manufactures from Great Britain above one hundred per cent, cheaper than from any market which is now accessible to their intercourse.* The benefits of such a traffick, therefore, multiply upon the imagination—for the opulence of a rival is lessened by the very means which increases our own; and the Indians, who now hang like the sword of Democles over our heads, become obviously interested to support that Government which supplies them most advantageously with European commodities. A reduction in the price of any article necessary for their consumption, must act as a perpetual gift; must rivet them eternally to what may be properly called the giver, and, joined to the impossibility of their communicating with the subjects of other states, render the perpetration of those barbarities impossible which kindled the late flame of discord in Europe, and marked every quarter of the globe with a lamentable effusion of blood. Since our first efforts in colonization, no crisis ever offered such a certainty of not only preserving the peace of America on a permanent basis, but of permanently increasing the commerce of this Kingdom. Our genius at this moment seems peculiarly propitious. Let us then eagerly improve the season which courts us to be happy. Empires, as well as individuals, have their fortunate opportunities; and perhaps if we neglect this, now it is in our power, it may be utterly irrecoverable when we wish to call it back.

The facility of navigation on the Mississippi is sufficiently ascertained for all the purposes of commerce; and

* Engineer and Comptroller Mill, who reported upon the British Mississippi to the Commissioners of the Customs at Boston, declares, that without the settlement proposed, the Spaniards, in the first rupture with us, must be in ample condition to deprive us of the Floridas.

*To elucidate this point, it is proper to observe, that the Spaniards buy all their goods necessary for the consumption of Louisiana, at present, from the French. Supposing, therefore, that articles to the amount of one hundred Pounds are bought in France; the expense to the Mississippi settler, through a Spanish channel, will be, first:

Expense attending the same quantity of Goods from ENGLAND: first,

*