13. As the season is now far advanced, you are to make all possible despatch; but if unforeseen difficulties should arise, or if the weather should become so severe as to render it hazardous to proceed, in your own judgment and that of your principal officers, whom you are to consult, in that case you are to return, giving me as early notice as possible, that I may give you such assistance as may be necessary.

14. As the contempt of the religion of a Country, by ridiculing any of its ceremonies or affronting its Ministers or votaries, has ever been deeply resented, you are to be particularly careful to restrain every officer and soldier from such imprudence and folly, and to punish every instance of it. On the other hand, as far as lies in your power, you are to protect and support the free exercise of the religion of the Country, and the undisturbed enjoyment of the rights of conscience in religious matters, with your utmost influence and authority.

Given, &c, 14th September, 1775.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

[No. 6.]

Cambridge, September 8, 1775.

GENTLEMEN: As I mean to call upon you in a day or two for your opinions upon a point of very great importance to the welfare of the Continent in general, and this Colony in particular, I think it proper, indeed an incumbent duty on me, previous to this meeting to intimate to you the end and design of it, that you may have time to consider the matter with that deliberation and attention which the importance of it requires:

It is to know whether, in your judgments, we cannot make a successful attack upon the Troops in Boston, by means of boats, co-operated by an attempt upon their lines at Roxbury. The success of such an enterprise depends, I well know, upon the all-wise Disposer of events, and is not within the reach of human wisdom to foretell the issue; but if the prospect is fair, the undertaking is justifiable, under the following among other reasons which may be assigned.

The season is now fast approaching when warm and comfortable barracks must be erected for the security of the Troops against the inclemency of winter; large and costly provision must be made in the article of wood for the supply of the Army; and, after all that can be done in this way, it is but too probable that fences, woods, orchards, and even houses themselves, will fall a sacrifice to the want of fuel, before the end of winter. A very considerable difficulty, if not expense, must accrue on account of clothing for the men now engaged in the service; and if they do not enlist again, this difficulty will be increased to an almost insurmountable degree. Blankets, I am informed, are now much wanted, and not to be got. How, then, shall we be able to keep soldiers to their duty already impatient to get home, when they come to feel the severity of winter, without proper covering? If this Army should not incline to engage for a longer time than the 1st of January, what consequences can more certainly follow, than that you must either be obliged to levy new Troops, and thereby have two sets, or partly so, in pay at the same time, or, by disbanding one set before you get the other, expose the Country to desolation, and the cause perhaps to irretrievable ruin? These things are not unknown to the enemy; perhaps it is the very ground they are building on, if they are not waiting for a large re-enforcement; and if they are waiting for succours, ought it not to give a spur to the attempt? Our powder, not much of which would be consumed in such an enterprise, without any certainty of a supply, is daily wasting; and, to sum up the whole, in spite of every saving that can be made, the expense of supporting this Army will so far exceed any idea that was formed in Congress of it, that I do not know what will be the consequences.

These, among many other reasons which might be assigned, induce me to wish a speedy finish of the dispute; but, to avoid these evils, we are not to lose sight of the difficulties, the hazard, and the loss, that may accompany the attempt, nor what will be the probable consequences of a failure.

That every circumstance for and against this measure may be duly weighed, that there may be time for doing it, and nothing of this importance resolved on but after mature deliberation, I give you this previous notice of my intention of calling you together on Monday next, at nine o’clock, at which time you are requested to attend at Head-Quarters. It is unnecessary, I am persuaded, to recommend secrecy. The success of the enterprise, if undertaken, must depend in a great measure upon the suddenness of the stroke.

I am, with great esteem, Gentlemen, &c.,

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

To Major-Generals Ward, Lee, Putnam; Brigadier-Generals Thomas, Spencer, Heath, Sullivan, Green, and Gates.

COUNCIL OF WAR.

At a Council of War held at Head-Quarters, Cambridge, September 11, 1775, present: His Excellency General Washington; Major-Generals Ward, Lee, Putnam; Brigadier-Generals Thomas, Heath, Sullivan, Spencer, and Green.

His Excellency having communicated, by letter and verbally, to the Generals, for their consideration, a proposition of making an attack upon Boston, by boats, assisted by an attempt on the Roxbury lines, assigned the following reasons for such an attempt:

1st. That the winter was fast approaching, when warm and comfortable barracks must be erected for the Troops.

2d. Large and costly provision made in the article of wood, at twenty shillings per cord; and, with the utmost exertions, fences, woods, orchards, and even houses, will probably fall a sacrifice to our necessities in this article, before the expiration of winter.

3d. A considerable difficulty and great expense will accrue for clothing the men now in the service; and if they do not re-enlist at the end of the present term, it will be increased to a great degree. Blankets, in particular, are much wanted, and not to be procured. The soldiery grow impatient to get home already, and we shall find it a very hard task to detain them, when they feel the severity of a northern winter, without proper covering.

4th. If the present Army should not incline to engage for a longer time than the first of January, you must either levy new Troops, and have two Armies, or partly so, on pay at the same time, or, disbanding one before the other is assembled, expose the Country to desolation, and the cause to ruin.

5th. Our powder (not much of which would be consumed in such an enterprise) is daily wasting; and, to sum up the whole, with the utmost economy, the expense of supporting this Army will so far exceed any estimate yet formed, that the consequences may be very fatal.

On the other hand, the hazard, the loss of men in the attempt, and the probable consequences of failure, are to be considered.

After duly weighing the above proposition, considering the state of the enemy’s lines, and the expectation of soon receiving some important advices from England, it was unanimously agreed that it was not expedient to make the attempt at present, at least.

ORDERS BY GENERAL WASHINGTON.

Head-Quarters, Cambridge, September 8, 1775.

Captain Perry, of Colonel Walker’s Regiment, tried at a General Court-Martial, whereof Colonel Alden was President, for “permitting persons to pass the lines on Boston Neck,” is found guilty of the crimes laid to his charge, but, from alleviating circumstances, is sentenced only to be severely reprimanded at the head of his Regiment. The General approves the sentence, and orders it to be put in execution accordingly.

The detachment going under the command of Colonel Arnold, to be forthwith taken off the roll of duty, and to march this evening to Cambridge Common, where tents and every thing necessary are provided for their reception. The Rifle Company at Roxbury, and those from Prospect-Hill, to march early to-morrow morning, to join the above detachment. Such officers and men as are taken from General Green’s Brigade, for the above detachment, are to attend the muster of their respective Regiments to-morrow morning