Indian country, since which, one of the chiefs has been here with a string of wampum, and desired me not to fail sending smiths in their country, (I having had no orders from the honourable Congress to send any, it is yet omitted, ) as they have for these many years past constantly had them, both from former Commissioners and Sir William; and if possible that they may have some powder, as, without that, they cannot support themselves and families.

As they are now well disposed towards us, I think it expedient to exert ourselves in maintaining that harmony, which I have and always will endeavour to cultivate and maintain, to the utmost of my power, but it will be certainly attended with expenses.

As I have no interpreter, (and frequent occasions for one, ) I beg the honourable Congress will appoint or give me authority to appoint one.

I am, Sir, your most obedient and humble servant.

VOLKERT P. DOUW.

To the Honourable John Hancock, Esq., President of the Continental Congress, at Philadelphia.

GENERAL SCHUYLER TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

Ticonderoga, November 6, 1775.

DEAR GENERAL: Your Excellency’s favour of the 26th ultimo I had the honour to receive on the 3d instant.

I have long since signified to Congress the necessity of a delegation from them to this place, and in their last to me, of the 12th ult., they (unfortunately for me) say that it did not appear necessary then. I took the liberty to lament that they were not in sentiment with me on the subject, and to add that I thought it absolutely necessary that one should be sent, so that I hope soon to see some of the gentlemen here. A variety of regulations are necessary to be made in this quarter; a task to which I feel myself greatly inadequate, but which, if I had even judgment enough to arrange with propriety, the shattered condition of my constitution is such that matters so momentous as these should not be left to so precarious an event as that of my being able to support the fatigue; for General Montgomery, though endowed with shining abilities, will have his time so totally engrossed with other matters, that he will not be able to attend to these.

Should success crown our endeavours at St. John’s, of which there seems to be little doubt, the entire reduction of Canada will, in all probability, be the consequence; an event which will open new scenes. An army to be formed and properly disposed of in that quarter; provisions, ammunition, and every necessary to be procured for it; preparations to be made for the next campaign; proper places to be determined on, and fortifications to be erected to defend that Province against any attacks that may be made on it in the ensuing year; small craft to be constructed here, that a re-enforcement may be speedily sent into Canada, in case it should be found necessary to support what troops may be stationed there; galleys, carrying heavy artillery, to prevent vessels of force from coming up the St. Lawrence; a mode of government to be adopted in a country where all will be anarchy and confusion without it; and probably a variety of other interesting regulations to take place, that do not just now occur to me.

Your Excellency will do me the justice to believe that I feel, in the most sensible manner, the favourable opinion you are pleased to entertain of me; and I am confident General Montgomery will not be less affected on what you observe of him. I do myself the pleasure, this day, to write that gentleman, and shall convey to him your best wishes and respects.

The vast benefit that would result from a successful conclusion of the campaign, in this quarter, has been so deeply impressed upon me, that I have often regretted that the operations were not commenced at an earlier period, and, when commenced, that so much tardiness prevailed in sending up the necessary stores and troops. That you, my dear General, should feel an anxiety to induce you to ask those questions which you have done in so polite and friendly a manner, is what I can easily suppose.

The difficulties under which General Montgomery has laboured have been in the extreme, and which he most pathetically laments in a letter to me of the 13th ult., an extract of which I do myself the honour to enclose your Excellency, together with the opinion of a Council of War held on that day, and which I forgot to transmit you in the hurry with which I sent off my last. And in his letter of the 23d ult. he says: “Our re-enforcements not yet arrived. At this instant I have not in my camp above seven hundred and fifty men, and I wish much to send a strong detachment to the Island of Montreal;” a manoeuvre which would have taken place sooner, had it been in his power, or been prudent to have gone into, neither of which I think it was, and shall beg leave to make the following observations in support of this opinion.

At no period, until this, has it appeared to me that it would have been prudent to have passed St. John’s, although a sufficient force could have been left for forming a blockade; for previous to the reduction of Chambly, and the success of our troops in repulsing the attack of Monsieur Regouville, who was sent from Montreal with two hundred and forty men, and expected to be joined by the inhabitants of three of the most populous parishes on the south side of the St. Lawrence, in which he was disappointed to a man, and which has in some measure evinced the temper of the Canadians towards us, and given us better assurances than any we have had of their friendly disposition, for until then their real sentiments were problematical; and about this time, too, we sunk their best armed vessel, so that we can now spare more men for an attack upon Montreal, which, if not prevented by other obstacles, was General Montgomery’s intention, as soon as the re-enforcement above alluded to should arrive, which took place on the 26th or 27th, and consisted of General Wooster’s, of three hundred and thirty-five, and Major Tuthill, of Colonel Holmes’s, with two hundred and twenty-five, officers of both included. In the numbers, however, he will be disappointed, as Gen. Wooster had returned four hundred and eighty-four effectives from Albany, hut discharged ninety-nine between this and Albany, and left fifty-one sick here; and the others, too, fell greatly short of what I expected.

If a blockade had been formed before the abovementioned events took place, it must have been sufficiently strong, not only to have guarded against the danger of a sortie, but to have prevented the enemy’s armed vessels, which greatly surpassed ours in strength, from getting to the southward of us, and thereby effectually cut off every possibility of retreat; which, if they had been able to accomplish, the Canadians, I do firmly believe, would immediately have joined Mr. Carleton. But if a sufficient body-had been left, that to make the attempt on Montreal, would have been too weak for such a service; and if they had met with a repulse, the Canadians, in that case, would not have hesitated one moment to have acted against us, (as Colonel Allen, in his report to me, observes, ) and all our hopes in Canada would have been at an end. But another difficulty presented itself, and which I do not know bow the detachment which General Montgomery proposed to send, or has sent, will even now surmount—the want of craft to convey a body of troops, sufficient to promise success, to the Island of Montreal, across the St. Lawrence, (which is deep, rapid, and wide, ) as no craft can pass the fort at St. John’s, to go down the Sorel; which obstacles would be immediately removed on the reduction of that fortress, which I hope has taken place by this time, and then I shall have the fullest confidence that our labours will be at an end in this quarter, except from what difficulties may arise from the intemperate desire our people have to return to their habitations; my fears on which account I have expressed to Congress.

If we had passed it wholly, and could have got to and succeeded against Montreal, St. John’s would undoubtedly have fallen. But what a vast risk! No less than that of the loss of the whole Army, the command of Lake Champlain, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point; for no retreat could possibly have taken place; the dependance on the Canadians uncertain. And if they had found us incapable of passing to Montreal for want of boats, or of retreating on the same account, it is certain we should have found them opposed to us.

In this view of things, I hope it will be thought that either attempt would have been injudicious.

I do myself the honour to enclose you sundry extracts of my letters to Congress, with extracts of their answers, by which your Excellency will perceive that I have hinted