Halifax, upon the junction of the Sixty-Fifth, will be ordered here; and, as I apprehend the other parts of that corps would be more essentially employed with the Army than where they now are, shall therefore give directions accordingly, unless I receive your Lordship’s orders to the contrary, or in the mean time some assurance of the necessity of their remaining to the southward.

For the blockade of this harbour, if such a measure is judged expedient, I would propose the intrenching one Battalion at a place where ships of war can securely winter; it being, as I am informed, better situated for the object required than Castle William, which will be totally destroyed, agreeable to His Majesty’s orders, by mines, which are ready to be loaded upon the evacuation of this Town.

The next object I would mention is the taking hold of Rhode-Island with ten Battalions, under the command of Major-General Clinton, having a fleet adapted to this service, with directions to push forward for Providence.

There will then remain sixteen Battalions for New-York, according to the enclosed distribution, the Sixth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Regiments not included—the latter being stationed in West-Florida, and the Sixth not likely to arrive until late in the campaign.

But this Army, though complete in the spring, must have between six and seven thousand recruits, and of the worst kind; if chiefly composed of Irish Roman Catholicks, certain to desert if put to hard work; and, from their ignorance of arms, not entitled to the smallest confidence as soldiers.

To obviate this real grievance, I would most humbly propose that one hundred men, hired from the Hanoverian and Hessian armies, be incorporated, without officers, into each of the twenty-seven Battalions of Foot—the Forty-Second Regiment, esteemed equal to two Battalions, and the Marines, not being included. Such of these men as remain, after the service is at an end, to be returned to their respective States.

That one hundred men be also added to each Battalion, to be volunteers from the substitutes of the English Militia, and to serve no longer than the existence of this most unnatural rebellion.

The Regiments might then want, to complete them, about seven hundred recruits in the spring, making a small allowance for casualties that may happen in the winter, by sickness, desertion, and service.

In this state, the Army would be respectable for the number it would consist of, and may be kept up in future, without difficulty, by the two additional Companies per Battalion. But unless this or some better considered plan be adopted, the increase of the King’s troops by recruits, for the ensuing campaign, which in its consequences may be exceedingly important, will give little or no superiority over the Rebel bands, who, though raw as soldiers, are nevertheless accustomed to the use of arms.

I beg leave further to add my opinion, that this force will not be adequate to an active offensive campaign on the side of New-York and Rhode-Island, paying no other regard to this place than the blockade of the harbour. The numbers, as aforementioned, will not amount to more than five thousand fighting men for Rhode-Island, and eight thousand for New-York; out of which last division, not less than two thousand should be left for the defence of the Town and posts necessarily to be occupied. I would therefore humbly propose a re-enforcement of four thousand Russians, of which fifteen hundred to join General Clinton, and two thousand five hundred the corps to act at New-York.

To combat these armies, I apprehend the Rebels would not have less than ten thousand men on the side of Rhode-Island, and perhaps twenty thousand in the Province of New-York, to act against General Carleton on one hand, and the New-York corps on the other. The last may probably begin the campaign by the siege of New-York, as recent accounts from thence mention a body of four thousand men being ordered by the Continental Congress from Philadelphia, to proceed thither immediately as a garrison; and it is to be expected that they will fortify it in the best manner they are able, from the infinite consequence the possession of it is to them.

By Mr. Secretary Pownal’s letter of the 8th September, I am informed that the removal of the effects and merchandise from hence, belonging to the enemies as well as friends of Government, has occurred to the King’s Ministers to be an advisable measure; but the commands for the effects of the ill-disposed not being positive, I am to beg your Lordship’s further directions, lest Government, by my determinations, may be engaged in future disputes and expense. I am particularly led to this, as Mr. Pownal, in his letter, mentions, “that he is directed to say, I must in this, and every case of the like kind, be the best judge, and must therefore use my own discretion.” At the same time, I beg leave to remark the great convenience and relief such goods and merchandises would be to the Rebels taking possession of this Town; upon which ground, I humbly apprehend the measure might be justified, as a distress to the enemy.

Your Lordship having been pleased to signify the King’s pleasure to me, that I should, if I found occasion, appoint an Adjutant-General and a Quartermaster-General to this Army, I shall pay the utmost attention to His Majesty’s service, in the appointment I am so unworthily intrusted to make.

A letter from Major Rogers, at New-York, to General Gage, being directed to the Commander-in-Chief, came to my hand since the General’s departure, wherein he has made offers of his services; to which I have given encouragement, by desiring him to make his proposals, and by giving an assurance that I am well inclined to do every thing in my power to afford him an opportunity of recommending himself to His Majesty’s future favour. I find, from Governour Tryon, that the Rebels have made considerable overtures to him.

I beg leave to assure your Lordship, that I am truly sensible of the confidence the King has been pleased to repose in me, by intrusting the important command of this Army, for the ensuing campaign, to my direction; in which distinguished situation, every means will be exerted to forward His Majesty’s intentions.

General Burgoyne, having received the King’s leave to return to Britain, will deliver these despatches; and it is needless for me to add, that he can give to your Lordship the fullest information relative to His Majesty’s service in this part of America. If His Majesty has not more essential service for him, and it should be his’ inclination to return to this Country, I hope I may not be deprived of an officer of his experience and ability for the ensuing campaign.

Boston, November 27, 1775.

Return of Tonnage necessary for transporting the Troops, Artillery, Stores, and Inhabitants, &c., &c., &c.

Boston, November 26, 1775.

A Distribution of thirty-one Battalions, intended for the Army in AMERICA, under the command of Major-General HOWE, for the Campaign 1776, humbly submitted.

BATTALIONS.

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third,