and a second one, they now remain in possession of the house from Limeburner's Wharf, in the lower town, to the second barrier, where they now maintain themselves, with between three and four hundred men; and it is extremely difficult to support them till dark, when I shall hope to draw them off; for which purpose, I sent Colonel James Livingston, with some of his regiment, and Major Dubois, of the Third Yorkers, with upwards of two hundred men, down to the General Hospital, to endeavour to throw themselves in, between this and night, or get Lieutenant-Colonel Green and his party out.

The other attack was with Colonel Livingston and his Canadians, to endeavour burning St. John's Gate with prepared faggots of combustible matter, which was not effected, owing to an early alarm in town. And the last was by another storm attack, from Major Brown's detachment, on Cape-Diamond, commanded by Capt. Brown.

Thus you have the four attacks that were concerted between the dear deceased General Montgomery and Colonel Arnold, which was, is many respects, hurried, from the circumstance of the inlistment of the troops under Colonel Arnold, whose service expires this day. Our whole loss, as far as I can collect without returns, does not exceed fifteen or twenty men, killed and wounded, yet I think a reinforcement of two hundred men, immediately, from Montreal, would be very proper; at the same time, I leave it to you to judge of the propriety of disarming the Tories of Montreal, and, at the same time, to assure you, it is no pleasure to me to enjoy the command which falls on me from the death of the General, and Colonel Arnold's keeping his bed; therefore, I request you will set out for this place as instantly as you can, as your presence is essential, on many accounts. I shall order every care of the troops, and disposition that may occur to me necessary. I must remind you of cash, as there is not above three or four hundred pounds here, from my recollection of what the General said a few days ago; but I have not yet examined any thing, and it is unfortunate, in a particular manner, that both are gone who had the charge of it. The great consumption of powder from the garrigon is an object which the General had much at heart, and may be worthy of remark to the Congress, as well as full of force for this country, as you must be convinced the Canadians will never be so firmly on our side as when they are convinced we hold the scales. I hope the last affair will not strike them in the light it does me. I shall not make any alterations in commissions or officers, till I have the pleasure of seeing you here, though application has been made. The remaining Aid-de-camp, Mr. Aaron Burr, I would gladly recommend to you, for the memory of the deceased General, as well as his own personal bravery and good conduct.

I thought to have sent Mr. Melchior's express with this, but the bearer, Mr. Edward Antill, appointed by the General as Engineer, (whom I recommend to your favour and attention,) being well acquainted on the road, I prefer him, for sake of despatch, as I consider every moment important, and to whom I refer you to correct this hurried scroll, and give you particulars he was eye-witness to. My love to all friends and acquaintance, that inquire for me, and believe me to be, with love and esteem,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

DONALD CAMPBELL.

To General Woosler.

COLONEL ARNOLD TO GENERAL WOOSTER.

General Hospital, December 31, 1775.

DEAR SIR: I make no doubt but General Montgomery acquainted you with his intentions of storming Queheck, as soon as a good opportunity offered. As we had several men deserted from us a few days past, the General was induced to alter his plan, (which was, to have attacked the upper and lower town at the same time,) thought it most prudent to make two different attacks upon the lower town; the one at Cape-Diamond, the other through St. Roque's. For the last attack I was ordered, with my own detachment and Captain Lamb's company of Artillery. At five o'clock, the hour appointed for the attack, a false attack was ordered to be made upon the upper town. We, accordingly, began our march. I passed through St. Roque's, and approached near a two-gun battery, picketed in, without being discovered, which we attacked; it was bravely defended for about an hour, but, with the loss of a number of men, we carried it. In the attack, I was shot through the leg, and was obliged to be carried to the Hospital, where I soon heard the disagreeable news that the General was defeated at Cape-Diamond, himself, Captain Macpherson, his Aid-de-camp, and Captain Cheeseman, killed on the spot, with a number of others not known. After gaining the battery, my detachment pushed on to a second barrier, which they took possession of; at the same time the enemy sallied out from Falace-Gate and attacked them in the rear. A field-piece, which the roughness of the road would not permit our carrying on, fell into the enemy's hands, with a number of prisoners. The last accounts from my detachment, about ten minutes since, they were pushing for the lower town. Their communication with me was cut off. I am exceedingly apprehensive what the event will be; they will either carry the lower town, be made prisoners, or cut to pieces. I thought proper to send an express to let you know the critical situation we are in, and make no doubt you will give us all the assistance in your power. As I am not able to act, I shall give up the command to Colonel Campbell. I beg you will immediately send an express to the honourable Continental Congress, and his Excellency General Washington. The loss of my detachment, before I left it, was about two hundred men, killed and wounded. Among the latter is Major Ogden, who, with Captain Oswald, Captain Burr, and the other volunteers, behaved extremely well. I have only to add, that I am, with the greatest esteem, your most obedient and very humble servant,

B. ARNOLD.

To General Wooster, Montreal.

P. S. It is impossible to say what our future operations will be, until we know the fate of my detachment.

GENERAL GREENE TO SAMUEL WARD.

Prospect-Hill, December 31, 1775.

You entreat the General Officers to recommend to the Congress the giving of a bounty. But his Excellency, General Washington, has often assured us that the Congress would not give a bounty, and before they would give a bounty they would give up the dispute.

The cement between the Northern and Southern Colonies is not very strong, if forty thousand lawful, will induce the Congress to give us up. Although I do not imagine that the necessity of allowing a bounty would have broken the Union, yet it was a sufficient intimation that the bare mention was disagreeable. Can you think we should hesitate a moment to recommend a bounty, if we thought ourselves at liberty to do so? We should then have an opportunity of picking the best men, filling the Army soon, keeping up a proper discipline, and preserving good order and government in camp; while we are now obliged to relax the very sinews of military government, and give a latitude of indulgence to the soldiery incompatible with security of either camp or country.

What reason have you to think that a proposition of that sort, if it came recommended by General Officers, would be acceded to by the Congress? Most of the Generals belong to the Northern Governments; if the Congress refuse to hear their Delegates, I apprehend they would the Generals also. The Congress cannot suppose that the Generals are better acquainted with the temper and genius of this people than the Delegates are from these Provinces; and why they should refuse to hear you, and not us, I cannot imagine.

A good politician will always have an eye to economy; but, to form an extensive plan, and not provide the means for carrying it into execution, betrays either a defect in counsel, or want of resolution to prosecute.

There is nothing that will encourage our enemies, both external and internal, like the difficulties we meet in raising a new Army. If we had given a good bounty, and raised the troops speedily, it would have struck the Ministry with astonishment to see that four Colonies could raise such an army in so short a time. They could not expect to conquer a people so united, firm, and resolutely determined to