proof of your friendship, than by a free, open, and undisguised account of every matter relative to myself or conduct. I can bear to hear of imputed or real errors. The man who wishes to stand well in the opinion of others, must do this, because he is thereby enabled to correct his faults, or remove the prejudices which are imbibed against him. For this reason, I shall thank you for giving me the opinions of the world upon such points as you know me to be interested in; for, as I have but one capital object in view, I could wish to make my conduct coincide with the wishes of mankind, as far as I can consistently; I mean, without departing from that great line of duty which, though hid under a cloud for some time, from a peculiarity of circumstances, may, nevertheless, bear a scrutiny.

My constant attention to the great and perplexing objects which continually rise to my view, absorbs all lesser considerations, and, indeed, scarcely allows me to reflect that there is such a body in existence as the General Court of this Colony, but when I am reminded of it by a Committee; nor can I, upon recollection, discover in what instances (I wish they would be more explicit) I have been inattentive to or slighted them. They could not, surely, conceive that there was a propriety in unbosoming the secrets of an army to them; that it was necessary to ask their opinion of throwing up an intrenchment or forming a battalion. It must, therefore, be what I before hinted to you; and how to remedy it I hardly know, as I am acquainted with few of the members, never go out of my own lines, nor see any of them in them.

I am exceedingly sorry to hear that your little fleet has been shut in by the frost. I hope it has sailed ere this, and given you some proof of the utility of it, and enabled the Congress to bestow a little more attention to the affairs of this Army, which suffers exceedingly by their overmuch business, or too little attention to it. We are now without any money in our treasury, powder in our magazines, or arms in our stores. We are without a Brigadier, (the want of whom has been twenty times urged,) Engineers, Expresses, (though a Committee has been appointed these two months to establish them,) and, by-and-by, when we shall be called upon to take the field, shall not have a tent to lie in. Apropos, what is doing with mine?

These are evils, but small in comparison of those which disturb my present repose. Our inlistments are at a stand; the fears I ever entertained are realized; that is, the discontented officers (for I do not know how else to account for it) have thrown such difficulties or stumbling-blocks in the way of recruiting, that I no longer entertain a hope of completing the Army by voluntary inlistments, and I see no move nor likelihood to do it by other means. In the last two weeks, we have inlisted but about a thousand men; whereas, I was confidently led to believe, by all the officers I conversed with, that we should, by this time, have had the regiments nearly completed. Our total number upon paper amounts to about ten thousand five hundred; but, as a large portion of these are returned "not joined," I never expect to receive them, as an ineffectual order has once issued to call them in. Another is now gone forth, peremptorily requiring all officers, under pain of being cashiered, and recruits, of being treated as deserters, to join their respective regiments by the first day of next month, that I may know my real strength; but, if my fears are not imaginary, I shall have a dreadful account of the advanced month's pay. In consequence of the assurances given, and my expectation of having, at least, men enough inlisted to defend our lines, (to which may be added my unwillingness to burden the cause with unnecessary expense,) no relief of Militia has been ordered in to supply the places of those who are released from their engagements to-morrow, and as to whom, though many have promised to continue out the month, there is no security for their stay.

Thus am I situated, with respect to men. With regard to arms, I am yet worse off. Before the dissolution of the old Army, I issued an order, directing three judicious men of each brigade, to attend, review, and appraise the good arms of every regiment; and, finding a very great unwillingness in the men to part with their arms, (at the same time not having it in my power to pay them for the months of November and December,) I threatened severely, that every soldier who should carry away his fire-lock without leave, should never receive pay for those months. Yet, so many have been carried off, partly by stealth, but chiefly as condemned, that we have not, at this time, one hundred guns in the stores, of all that have been taken in the prize-ship and from the soldiery, notwithstanding our regiments are not half complete. At the same time, I am told, and believe it, that, to restrain the inlistment to men with arms, you will get but few of the former, and still fewer of the latter, which would be good for any thing. How to get furnished, I know not. I have applied to this and the neighbouring Colonies, but with what success, time, only, can tell. The reflection on my situation, and that of this Army, produces many an unhappy hour, when all aronnd me are wrapped in sleep. Few people know the predicament we are in, on a thousand accounts; fewer, still, will believe, if any disaster happens to these lines, from what cause it flows. I have often thought, how much happier I should have been, if, instead of accepting the command under such circumstances, I had taken my musket on my shoulder and entered the ranks; or, if I could have justified the measure to posterity and my own conscience, had retired to the back country and lived in a wigwam. If I shall be able to rise superior to these and many other difficulties which might be enumerated, I shall most religiously believe that the finger of Providence is in it, to blind the eyes of our enemies; for, surely, if we get well through this month, it must be for want of their knowing the disadvantages we labour under.

Could I have foreseen the difficulties which have come upon us; could I have known that such a backwardness would have been discovered, among the old soldiers, to the service, all the Generals upon earth should not have convinced me of the propriety of delaying an attack upon Boston till this time. When it can now be attempted, I will not undertake to say; but thus much I will answer for, that no opportunity can present itself earlier than my wishes. But, as this letter discloses some interesting truths, I shall be somewhat uneasy until I hear it gets to your bands, although the conveyance is thought safe.

We made a successful attempt, a few nights ago, upon the houses near Bunker's Hill. A party, under Major Knowlton, crossed upon the mill-dam, the night being dark, and set fire to and burnt down eight, out of fourteen which were standing, and which we found they were daily pulling down for fuel. Five soldiers and the wife of one of them, inhabiting one of the houses, were brought off prisoners; another soldier was killed; none of ours hurt.

Having undoubted information of the embarkation of troops (somewhere from three to five hundred) at Boston, and being convinced they are designed either for the New-York Government (from whence we have some very disagreeable accounts of the conduct of the Tories) or Virginia, I despatched General Lee, a few days ago, in order to secure the City of New-York from falling into their hands, as the consequences of such a blow might prove fatal to our interests. He is, also, to inquire a little into the conduct of the Long-Islanders, and such others as have, by their conduct and declarations, proved themselves inimical to the common cause. To effect these purposes, he is to raise volunteers in Connecticut, and call upon the troops of New-Jersey, if not contrary to any order of Congress.

By a ship arrived at Portsmouth, New-Hampshire, we have London prints to the 2d of November, containing the Addresses of Parliament, which are little more than a repetition of the Speech, with assurances of standing by his Majesty with lives and fortunes. The captains (for there were three or four of them passengers) say, that we have nothing to expect but the most vigorous exertions of Administration, who have a dead majority upon all questions, although the Duke of Grafton and General Conway have joined the minority, as, also, the Bishop of Peterborough. These captains affirm, confidently, that the five regiments from Ireland cannot, any of them, have arrived at Halifax, inasmuch as, by a violent storm on the 19th of October, the transports were forced, in a very distressed condition, into Milford-Haven, and were not in a condition to put to sea when they left London; and the weather has been such, since, as to prevent heavy-loaded ships from making passage by this time. One or two transports, they add, were thought to be lost; but these arrived some consider-