Commissary-General, Quartermaster-General, and paying off the arrearages, will very soon require.

Your esteemed favour of the 29th ultimo, is just come to hand; it makes me very happy to find my conduct hath met the approbation of Congress. I am entirely of your opinion, that should an accommodation take place, the terms will be severe or favourable, in proportion to our ability to resist; and that we ought to be on a respectable footing to receive their armaments in the Spring; but how far we shall be provided with the means, is a matter I profess not to know, under my present unhappy want of arms, ammunition, and I may add, men, as our regiments are very incomplete. The recruiting goes on very slow, and will, I apprehend, be more so, if for other service the men receive a bounty, and none is given here.

I have tried every method I could think of to procure arms for our men; they really are not to be had in these Governments, belonging to the publick; and if some method is not fallen upon in the Southern Governments to supply us, we shall be in a distressed situation for want of them. There are near two thousand men now in camp without firelocks. I have wrote to the Committee of New- York this day, requesting them to send me those arms which were taken from the disaffected in that Government. The Congress interesting themselves in this request, will doubtless have a good effect. I have sent officers into the country with money to purchase arms in the different towns; some have returned, and brought in a few, many are still out; what their success will be I cannot determine.

I was in great hopes that the expresses resolved to be established between this place and Philadelphia, would ere now have been fixed; it would in my opinion rather save than increase the expense, as many horses are destroyed by one man coming the whole way. It will certainly be more expeditious, and safer than writing by the post, or private hands, which I am often under the necessity of doing.

I am, with great respect, sir, your most obedient, humble

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

To the Honourable John Hancock, Esq.

Cambridge, January 30, 1776.

SIR: I have it in command from the honourable Continental Congress, to propose an exchange of Governour Skene for Mr. James Lovett, and family. If the proposition is agreeable, you will please to signify as much to me, and Mr. Lovell, that he may prepare for his removal, whilst I cause Mr. Skene to be brought to this place.

I am, sir, your most humble servant,

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

To General Howe.

Boston, February 2, 1776.

SIR: In answer to your letter of the 30th ultimo, which was delivered with the seal broken, I am to acquaint you, that having lately discovered a prohibited correspondence to be carried on by Mr. James Lovell, the liberty, which I fully intended to have given him, cannot take place.

I am, sir, your most humble servant,

W. HOWE.

To George Washington, Esq.

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

[Read February 22__Referred to a Committee of the Whole.]

Cambridge, February 9,] 1776.

SIR: The purport of this letter will be directed to a single object. Through you I mean to lay it before Congress, and at the same time that I beg their serious attention to the subject, to ask pardon for intruding an opinion, not only unasked, but in some measure repugnant to their resolves. The disadvantages attending the limited inlistment of troops is too apparent to those who are eye-witnesses of them, to render any animadversions necessary; but to gentlemen at a distance, whose attention is engrossed by a thousand important objects, the case may be otherwise. That this cause precipitated the fate of the brave and much to be lamented General Montgomery, and brought on the defeat which followed thereupon, I have nor the most distant doubt of, for had he not been apprehensive of the troops leaving him at so important a crisis, but continued the blockade of Quebeck, a capitulation, from the best account I have been able to collect, must inevitably have followed; and that we were not obliged at one time to dispute these lines, under disadvantageous circumstances, (proceeding from the same cause, to wit: the troops disbanding of themselves before the Militia could be got in,) is to me a matter of wonder and astonishment, and proves that General Howe was either unacquainted with our situation, or restrained by his instructions from putting any thing to a hazard till his reinforcements should arrive. The instance of General Montgomery, I mention it because it is a striking one—for a number of others might be adduced— proves that instead of having men to take advantage of circumstances, you are in a manner compelled, right or wrong, to make circumstances yield to a secondary consideration.

Since the 1st of December, I have been devising every means in my power to secure these encampments, and though I am sensible that we never have, since that period, been able to act upon the offensive, and at times not in a condition to defend, yet the cost of marching home one set of men, bringing in another, the havock and waste occasioned by the first, the repairs necessary for the second, with a thousand incidental charges and inconveniences which have arisen, and which it is scarce possible either to recollect or describe, amounts to near as much as the keeping up a respectable body of troops the whole time, ready for any emergency, would have done. To this may be added that you never can have a well disciplined army. To bring men well acquainted with the duties of a soldier, requires time; to bring them under proper discipline and subordination, not only requires time, but is a work of great difficulty, and in this Army, where there is so little distinction between the officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To expect then, the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits, as from veteran soldiers, is to expect what never did, and perhaps never will happen; men who are familiarized to danger meet it without shrinking; whereas, those who have never seen service often apprehend danger where no danger is. Three things prompt men to a regular discharge of their duty in time of action: natural bravery, hope of reward, and fear of punishment; the two first are common to the untutored and disciplined soldier, but the latter most obviously distinguishes the one from the other. A coward, when taught to believe that if he breaks his ranks, and abandons his colours, will be punished with death by his own party, will take his chance against the enemy; but the man who thinks little of the one, and is fearful of the other, acts from present feelings, regardless of consequences. Again, men of a day's standing will not look forward; and from experience we find, that as the rime approaches for their discharge, they grow careless of their arms, ammunition, camp utensils, &c., nay, even the barracks themselves have felt uncommon marks of wanton depredation, and lays us under fresh trouble and additional expense, in providing for every fresh set, when we find it next to impossible to procure such articles as are absolutely necessary in the first instance. To this may be added the seasoning which new recruits must have to a camp, and the loss consequent thereupon. But this is not all; men engaged for a short, limited time only, have the officers too much in their power; for, to obtain a degree of popularity, in order to induce a second inlistment, a kind of familiarity takes place, which brings on a relaxation of discipline, unlicensed furloughs, and other indulgences, incompatible with order and good government, by which means the latter part of the time for which the soldier was engaged is spent in undoing what you were aiming to inculcate in the first.

To go into an enumeration of all the evils we have experienced in this late great change of the Army, and the expense incidental to it, to say nothing of the hazard we have run, and must run, between the discharging of one army and inlistment of another, (unless an enormous expense of Militia is incurred,) would greatly exceed the bounds of a letter.

What I have already taken the liberty of saying, will serve to convey a general idea of the matter, and, therefore, I shall, with all due deference, take the freedom to give it as my opinion; that if the Congress have any Tea