and foundation is virtue, will not every sober man acknowledge it better calculated to promote the general happiness than any other form?

Fear is the foundation of most Governments; but it is so sordid and brutal a passion, and renders men in whose breasts it predominates so stupid and miserable, that Americans will not be likely to approve of any political institution which is founded on it.

Honour is truly sacred, but holds a lower rank in the scale of moral excellence than virtue. Indeed, the former is but a part of the latter, and consequently has not equal pretensions to support a frame of Government productive of human happiness.

The foundation of every Government is some principle or passion in the minds of the people. The noblest principles and most generous affections in our nature, then, have the fairest chance to support the noblest and most generous models of Government.

A man must be indifferent to the sneers of modern Englishmen to mention in their company the names of Sidney, Harrington, Locke, Milton, Nedham, Neville, Burnet, and Hoadley. No small fortitude is necessary to confess that one has read them. The wretched condition of this country, however, for ten or fifteen years past, has frequently reminded me of their principles and reasonings. They will convince any candid mind that there is no good Government but what is Republican; that the only valuable part of the British Constitution is so; because the very definition of a Republick is, "an empire of laws, and not of men."That, as a Republick is the best of Governments, so that particular arrangement of the powers of society, or, in other words, that form of Government which is best contrived to secure an impartial and exact execution of the laws, is the best of Republicks.

Of Republicks there is an inexhaustible variety, because the possible combinations of the powers of society are capable of innumerable variations.

As good Government is an empire of laws, how shall your laws be made? In a large society, inhabiting an extensive country, it is impossible that the whole should assemble to make laws. The first necessary step then is, to depute power from the many, to a few of the most wise and good. But by what rules shall you choose your Representatives? Agree upon the number and qualifications of person?, who shall have the benefit of choosing, or annex this privilege to the inhabitants of a certain extent of ground.

The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be employed in constituting this Representative Assembly. It should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be the interest of this assembly to do strict justice at all times, it should be an equal representation, or in other words, equal interest among the people should have equal interest in it. Great care should be taken to effect this, and to prevent unfair, partial, and corrupt elections. Such regulations, however, may be better made in times of greater tranquillity than the present, and they will spring up themselves naturally, when all the powers of Government come to be in the hands of the people's friends. At present, it will be safest to proceed in all established modes, to which the people have been familiarized by habit.

A representation of the people in one Assembly bring obtained, a question arises whether all the powers of Government, legislative, executive, and judicial, shall be left in this body? I think a people cannot be long free, nor ever happy, whose Government is in one Assembly. My reasons for this opinion are as follow:

1. A single Assembly is liable to all the vices, follies, and frailties of an individual; subject to fits of humour, star; of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities or prejudice, and, consequently, productive of hasty results, and absurd judgments. And all these errors ought to be corrected and defects supplied by some controlling power.

2. A single Assembly is apt to be avaricious, and in time will not scruple to exempt itself from burdens, which it will lay, without compunction, on its constituents.

3. A single Assembly is apt to grow ambitious, and after a time will not hesitate to vote itself perpetual. This was one fault of the long Parliament, but more remarkably of Holland, whose Assembly first voted themselves from annual to septennial, then for life, and after a course of years," that all vacancies happening by death or otherwise should be filled by themselves, without any application to constituents at all.

4. A Representative Assembly, although extremely well qualified, and absolutely necessary as a branch of the legislative, is unfit to exercise the executive power, for want of two essential properties—secrecy and despatch.

5. A Representative Assembly is still less qualified for the judicial power; because it is too numerous, too slow, and too little skilled in the laws.

6. Because a single Assembly, possessed of all the powers of Government, would make arbitrary laws for their own interest, execute all laws arbitrarily for their own interest, and adjudge all controversies in their own favour.

But, shall the whole power of legislation rest in one Assembly? Most of the foregoing reasons apply equally to prove that the legislative power ought to be more complex; to which we may add, that if the legislative power is wholly in one Assembly, and the executive in another, or in a single person, these two powers will oppose and encroach upon each other, until the contest shall end in war, and the whole power, legislative and executive, be usurped by the strongest.

The judicial power, in such case, could not mediate, or hold the balance between the two contending powers, because the legislative would undermine it. And this shows the necessity, too, of giving the executive power a negative upon the legislative, otherwise this will be continually encroaching upon that.

To avoid these dangers let a distinct Assembly be constituted, as a mediator between the two extreme branches of the Legislature—that which represents the people and that which is vested with the executive power. Let the Representative Assembly then elect by ballot, from among themselves or their constituents, or both, a distinct Assembly, which, for the sake of perspicuity, we will call a Council. It may consist of any number you please, say twenty or thirty, and should have a free and independent exercise of its judgment, and consequently a negative voice in the Legislature.

These two bodies thus constituted, and made integral parts of the Legislature, let them unite, and by joint ballot choose a Governour, who, after being stripped of most of those badges of domination called prerogatives, should have a free and independent exercise of his judgment, and be made, also, an integral part of the Legislature. This I know is liable to objections, and if you please you may make him only President of the Council, as in Connecticut; but, as the Governour is to be invested with the executive power, with consent of Council, I think he ought to have a negative upon the legislative. If he is annually elective, as he ought to be, he will always have so much reverence and affection for the People, their Representatives and Counsellors, that although you give him an independent exercise of his judgment, he will seldom use it in opposition to the two Houses, except in cases the publick utility of which would be conspicuous; and some such cases would happen.

In the present exigency of American affairs, when by an act of Parliament we are put out of the Royal protection, and consequently discharged from our allegiance, and it has become necessary to assume Government for our immediate security, the Governour, Lieutenant-Governour, Secretary, Treasurer, Commissary, and Attorney-General, should be chosen by joint ballot of both Houses. And these and all other elections, especially of Representatives and Counsellors, should be annual, there not being in the whole circle of the sciences a maxim more infallible than this, "Where annual elections end, there slavery begins."

These great men, in this respect, should be, once a year,

"Like bubbles on the sea of matter borne,

They rise, they break, and to that sea return."

This will teach them the great political virtues of humility, patience, and moderation, without which every man: in power becomes a ravenous beast of prey.

This mode of constituting the great offices of state will answer very well for the present, but if, by experiment, it