similar efforts? Without trade, there seem to be but two ways to support the war: emitting paper money, and borrowing, on interest, part of that money so emitted; for, once destroy the credit of your currency, and you render it mere waste paper. Its value depends on its credit, and its credit on the opinion which people at large entertain of our ability to exchange it hereafter for gold and silver. Suppose, for instance, the Continent should emit one hundred millions, who could seriously imagine such a sum would ever be paid off in gold and silver? It follows then, of course, that we are limited in our emissions, because our faculties to redeem those emissions are limited.

To what amount may we emit?

No man, perhaps, can solve this question; the person who should even presume to guess, must have a thorough knowledge of these Colonies; he must be well acquainted with the number of their people, their inclinations, arts, and industry, the product of our soil, its capability of improvement, the fisheries, trade, and manufactories which may be established and successfully carried on. The extent of these emissions will depend, too, in a great degree, on the events of the war. A merchant who prospers in trade, may obtain credit to almost any amount; his credit may exceed, by several hundred thousands, his real capital.

Suppose six millions currency emitted; what part of this emission might be borrowed on interest, and on what interest?

Where the risk is great, the interest must be high; where the circumstances of the borrower are conceived to be desperate, he will not be able to borrow, or must give an extravagant premium. The possibility, then, of borrowing, and the rate of interest, will depend on our good or bad success. If six millions were to be emitted, and our affairs should prosper, perhaps two millions five hundred thousand might be borrowed by the Congress at six per cent, interest. That sum would but barely answer the charge of one campaign; of future expenses, however, a good judgment may be formed from the past. It certainly will not be good policy to rely altogether on the above ways and means of raising money to carry on the war: they will only be found to answer in case of success. If we should have no other resources, the knowledge of this very circumstance may encourage our enemy to protract the war. The quitrents, heretofore paid to the Crown, may be applied to the publick use; but, besides the inability of the people to pay these quitrents, when deprived of the means of payment, they will go but a little way towards the support of the war.

How long is it expected that these Colonies can sit easy under a total stagnation of external commerce, and the almost entire stoppage of the courts of justice?

This situation is surely too constrained to admit of any considerable duration; the feelings of our people and our exigencies point out the necessity of opening a trade to foreign nations. To protect our trade, a marine is wanting. To form one during this war, adequate to the purpose, seems impracticable. We must make it the interest of foreigners to take this burden on themselves; a declaration of independence might, possibly, tempt France and Spain to run the risk of a war with England, provided those powers could be assured of our remaining independent; they would, no doubt, be willing to guarantee our independence, but they may apprehend, and not without good grounds, that their taking a too early part with us in the war would induce Great Britain to make peace with the Colonies. It may, therefore, be the policy of France and Spain not to appear forward and desirous of intermeddling; to suffer the war to continue, that the contending parties, exasperated by mutual injuries, may not again coalesce; secretly to countenance their subjects' commerce with these Colonies, and, perhaps, to assist them with money, arms, and ammunition. Should the British Government direct the war to be prosecuted in the manner it has been, and should every Colony, in turn, experience such horrid ravages, the resentment and indignation occasioned thereby may totally alienate the minds of the Colonists, and wean them from that affection which heretofore bound them to Great Britain; the force of habit will wear off; the remembrance of past benefits will be obliterated by recent wrongs, and the sweets of independence once enjoyed, will effectually preclude a subsequent dependance on Great Britain.

Will not the mischiefs of independence overbalance the benefits?

To determine this question, both must be stated, and dispassionately considered, to form a true judgment. The evils apprehended from independence may be reduced to these three: civil dissensions; the establishment of tyranny, as a certain consequence; and the great expense of fleets and armies to maintain that independence. As a Federal Union of these Colonies will probably ensue, should they separate from Great Britain, it may be presumed that the utmost precaution will be used in drawing the articles of the Union; and, in the formation and settlement of this new Government, every security which human foresight can suggest will be taken for the preservation of the liberties, privileges, and independency of each Colony, and the protection of all. Dissensions can spring only from the ambition of the more powerful Colonies, or from a contrariety of interests. What probability is there that two or three Colonies will unite to subdue the rest? Is it not more probable, should any Colony or Colonies break the Union, and from the ambitions project of conquering the others, that these will immediately unite against the infringers of the publick faith? Foreign assistance would not be wanting to support the weaker confederacy, and this consideration alone would deter the stronger from the attempt.

If ambition should not occasion a civil war, a difference of interests and religion may; the interests of these Colonies are as different as their religious tenets.

This hath often been said, but remains to be proved. Some disputes may arise concerning trade, duties, customs, and impositions on merchandise, or about the limits and boundaries of contiguous Provinces; these disputes must be adjusted and finally settled by the Great Council, or States-General of the United Colonies. Such partial controversies will, for many years at least, give way to the publick safety, which would be endangered by suffering them to grow to too great a pitch; the common enemy might take advantage of such civil discord, and reduce all the Colonies under one yoke. In this tolerating age we have no great cause to apprehend a religious war; the spirit of religious persecution is wearing off in all the civilized nations of Europe, and will still decrease as they become more enlightened and refined. Can we, then, rationally suppose that these Colonies, hitherto eminently distinguished for toleration, and whose Union will be founded on that humane and politick principle, will, from a franlick zeal for religion, plunge themselves into the complicated miseries of a civil and religious war? If neither the ambition of some Colonies, nor a difference of interests, nor religious rancour, are likely to produce a civil war, it follows of course, that the establishment of tyranny (the second evil) is extremely improbable and remote.

But, to preserve our independence, will not a strong fleet and army be necessary? Neither can be supported without a great expense, and standing armies are dangerous to liberty, besides being burdensome to those who pay them.

When these Colonies enjoy an unfettered trade, the profits of it will enable them to equip and maintain a naval force sufficient to guard their coasts and commerce, and this fleet will render a standing Army unnecessary; a well regulated Militia will answer all the purposes of self-defence, and of a wise and just Government. The expense, therefore, of a regular standing Army may be saved without exposing ourselves to danger from a foreign enemy, and the Militia will be able to suppress any internal commotions, excited by factious and discontented men.

What will be the probable benefits of independence?

A free and unlimited trade; a great accession of wealth, and a proportionable rise in the value of land; the establishment, gradual improvement, and perfection of manufactures and science; a vast influx of foreigners, enconraged by the mildness of a free, equal, and tolerating Government to leave their native countries, and settle in these Colonies; an astonishing increase of our people from the present stock. Where encouragement is given to industry; where liberty and property are well secured; where the poor may easily find subsistence, and the middling rank comfortably support their families by labour, there the inhabitants must increase rapidly. To some of these causes we