owe the doubling of our numbers in somewhat more than twenty-five years. If such hath been the progress of population under the former restraints on our trade and manufactures, a population still more rapid may be reasonably expected when these restraints come to be taken off.

Should France and Spain, either from inability to contend with Great Britain, or governed by weak, irresolute, or corrupted counsels, or influenced by the dangerous precedent of countenancing subjects in arms against their Sovereign, refuse to enter into any treaty or alliance with these Colonies, and prohibit their subjects from trading with, them, could the Colonies, by their own strength and internal resources, maintain the war for five or six-years?

It is not at all probable that this war can last so long. If the first efforts of the British Government should prove unsuccessful, the decay of trade, and the consequent distress and ruin brought on the manufacturers and merchants of Great Britain, will occasion great divisions in the nation, perhaps a revolution; such factions and tumults would certainly prevent a full exertion of the British nation's strength. Should the war be protracted to three years, even after that space of time, its operations will become languid and feeble; a smaller force may then be opposed to the enemy, and as we diminish our land army, we may augment our navy; in the Winter we may force, at least a clandestine trade with foreigners, in spite of the British marine; during the war manufactories may be set on foot, and promoted by the respective Legislatures of the several Colonies; we shall be able in eighteen or twenty months to make within ourselves gunpowder, cannon, fire-arms, and all the implements of war; the establishment of such manufactories will find employment for the poor, and be a prodigious saving to the country; a strict economy may lessen our expenses in other particulars; the pay of the Army may, perhaps, hereafter be reduced, and a well disciplined Militia, under proper regulations, might put us in a condition to disband a considerable part of our regular forces. Should the Colonists conduct the war with prudence and success, loans of money may, perhaps, be negotiated among foreigners, and even in England, on easy terms; a contraband trade will enrich some of our merchants, and bring in gold and silver; the procurement of those precious metals is an object of the utmost consequence: a certain proportion will be requisite to give credit to our paper currency. Our country abounds with all the necessaries of life; we have iron, copper, and lead mines, and we already make iron in quantities equal to our consumption, and the increasing demand. Men, convinced of the justice of their cause, animated with the love of liberty and fighting in defence of it, are capable of incredible efforts; conduct, valour, virtue, and perseverance combined, are irresistible; necessity may require the full exertion of all these, but the skilful politician would not wish to see the patriotism of his countrymen put to a severe trial.

Suppose the war to continue six years, and that it will cost us three millions per annum. If victory, at the end of that period, should effect and secure our independence, eighteen millions will not, perhaps, on reflection, be thought any such mighty encumbrance. An unconfined trade will open new sources of treasure; domestick will supply the place of foreign manufactures, and prevent a very great drain of our wealth; foreign luxuries may be subject to high duties; the burden too, as it will be divided among a greater number, will fall the lighter on the rising generation; six millions of people will probably discharge the debt contracted by three; the vacant and ungranted land may be made a fund for paying off part of this debt, by appropriating the purchase money and the reserved quitrents to that purpose. The pernicious consequences of a heavy national debt, so fatal to Great Britain, should teach the Colonies wisdom, and induce them to get rid of the load as quickly as possible. It is not the interest of states, more than of individuals, to be indebted; but as individuals, on some occasions, may contract debts with a view to future gain, so states may prudently, in particular emergencies, anticipate their revenues by borrowing present capitals on the credit of future interests, that the abilities of several years may be cast into one. We cannot pay too great a price for liberty, and posterity will think indepen dnce a cheap purchase at eighteen millions.

COLONEL WAYNE TO PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cheater, February 17, 1776.

SIR: In obedience to the resolve of Congress, of the 12th instant, I have caused a return of my battalion to be made, which is herein enclosed, amounting in the whole to five hundred and sixty, officers included, now in Chester and Marcus Hook; ten commissioned officers are absent with their recruits, what number, I cannot determine, but apprehend the battalion must be complete.

I must beg leave to mention that they are in want of almost every necessary, and I am doubtful there is not that industry used, which is essentially necessary for procuring the same. I beg that the gentlemen appointed for that purpose may be urged to take the most speedy means to supply our people with their proper uniforms, &c., &c.

Interim, I am, with true regard, your most obedient, humble servant,

ANTHONY WAYNE.

To Colonel John Hancock, President of Congress.

A Return of the Fourth Battalion of PENNSYLVANIA Regulars, whereof ANTHONY WAYNE, Esq., is Colonel, CHESTER, FEBRUARY 17, 1776.

Wanted to complete the establishment, one Chaplain, and one Surgeon's Mate.

N. B. Captain Taylor not yet arrived with his company, included in the above. All the officers marked on recruiting, are not yet arrived, nor any return made of the number of the recruits by them inlisted. As to their appointment, it is like that of most all new-raised troops, in want of every article, except about twelve rifles and twenty muskets, without bayonets.

MICHAEL RYAN, Adjutant.

MEMORIAL OF JOHN FRASER TO THE CONGRESS.

[Read February, 1776.]

On my arrival at Albany, from Canada, I waited on General Schuyler, to know whether any, or what charge, was sent against me. On General Schuyler's informing me that Brigadier Wooster had mentioned no particular charge, I then exposed to him the treatment I had met with, the reasons, and the letters that had passed between me and Brigadier Wooster. General Schuyler desired a written account, which, he said, he would send to the Con-