you knew that I had made a point of bringing General Lee from thence, on account of the distance from his line of command; at least, that he should not sleep there. The same reasons holding good with respect to yourself, I should be glad if you could get some place nearer, as I think it too hazardous to trust the left wing of our Army without a General Officer upon the spot, in cases of emergency. I do not wish you to return to your old house; any other tolerably convenient will satisfy me, and I am sure be pleasing to yourself, as 1 know you would not easily forgive yourself if any thing wrong should happen for want of your presence on any sudden call.

I am, with great esteem, dear sir, your most obedient servant,

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

To Brigadier-General Sullivan.

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO GOVERNOUR TRUMBULL.

Cambridge, February 19, 1776.

SIR: I am grieved to find that, instead of six or eight thousand weight of powder, which I fondly expected to receive from Providence, payable to your letter, I am likely to get only four thousand two hundred and seventeen pounds, including the three thousand weight belonging to this Province, (if to be had.) My situation in respect to this article is really distressing; and, while common prudence obliges me to keep my want of it concealed, to avoid a discovery thereof to the enemy, I feel the bad effect of that concealment from our friends; for, not believing our distress equal to what it really is, they withhold such small supplies as are in their power to give. I am so restrained in all my military movements, for want of these necessary Supplies, that it is impossible to undertake any thing effectual; and whilst I am fretting at my own disagreeable situation, the world, I suppose, is not behind-hand in censuring my inactivity. A golden opportunity has been lost, perhaps not to be regained again this year.

The late freezing weather had formed some pretty strong ice from Dorchester to Boston-Neck, and from Roxbury to the Common, which would have afforded a less dangerous approach to the town than through the lines, or by water. The advantages of this, added to a thorough conviction of the importance of destroying the Ministerial troops in Boston, before they can be reinforced, and to a belief that a bold and resolute assault, aided, in some small degree, by artillery and mortars, might be crowned with success, I proposed the attempt, a day or two ago, to the (General Officers, but they thought, and perhaps rightly, that such an enterprise, in our present weak state of men, (for the Militia are not yet half arrived,) and deficiency of powder, would be attended with too much hazard, and, therefore, that we had better wait the arrival of the last, and then to begin a bombardment in earnest.

This matter is mentioned to you in confidence. Your zeal, activity, and attachment to the cause, renders it unnecessary to conceal it from you. Our real stock of powder, which, after furnishing the Militia, (unfortunately coming in without, and will require upwards of fifty barrels,) and Completing our other troops to twenty-four rounds a man, (which are less, by one-half, than the Regulars have,) and having a few rounds of cannon-cartridges fitted for immediate use, will leave us not more than one hundred barrels in store for the greatest emergency, inclusive of the four thousand two hundred and seventeen pounds from Providence, (if we get it.)

This, my dear sir, is melancholy, but it is a truth; and, at the same time that it may serve to convey some idea of my disagreeable feelings under a knowledge of it, will evince the necessity of vigorous exertions to throw, without delay, every ounce that can be procured into this camp; otherwise, the great expense of sending in the Militia will be entirely sunk, without any possible good resulting from it, but much evil, as they will contribute not a little to the consumption of our ammunition, &c., &c.

For want, perhaps, of better information, I cannot help giving it as my opinion, that, at a time when our military operations are entirely at a stand, for want of powder, principally, and arms, it is inconsistent with good policy to hoard up town stocks of either. Better it is to fight an enemy at a distance than at our door. Prudence, indeed, points out the expediency of providing for private, as well as publick exigencies; but, if both are not to be done, I should think there can be no hesitation in the choice, as the Army now raised, and supported at a considerable expense, can be of little use if it is not sufficient to prevent an enemy from disturbing the quiet of the interior towns of these Governments. I am, &c.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

To Governour Trumbull.

JOSIAH QUINCY TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

Braintroe, February 19, 1776.

MAY it please your EXCELLENCY: Since the sudden and unexpected burning of the houses upon Dorchester-Neck, I have been repeatedly and earnestly solicited, by my distressed friends and neighbours, to make an humble representation to your Excellency, that our habitations are equally exposed to be destroyed by our enemies, whenever their malice shall stimulate them to make us feel the effects of the unrelenting vengeance of the "Royal Brute of England." Could your Excellency have spared time to make us happy in a visit, and taken a view of this part of our harbour, you would have been immediately sensible of the ease with which an excursion may be made from the Castle, either upon Squantum-Neck or the Main, where, before a sufficient force could be collected to repel them, our enemies might rob us of our provision, bum our houses, murder or captivate the inhabitants who could not escape, and retreat again to the Castle, in less than an hour, as it is not distant more than a league. Your Excellency would also have seen two line-of-battle-ships, one frigate, and about fifteen large transports, which have been above six weeks past in Nantasket-Road, besides ten or a dozen armed cruisers which are constantly going out in pursuit of our privateers, or coming in with their captures, or expected transports, under their convoy.

If our Army should take post upon Dorchester-Neck, have we not reason to apprehend the shores will be attacked, from a spirit of revenge ? Certainly, such a fleet can easily spare, and have boats enough to transport, four or five hundred men, who may (and when the irresistible impulses of hunger, or thirst for blood, inspires them with sufficient courage, I fear will) land and ravage along shore for miles, any force we have, at present, to oppose them, notwithstanding. Our circumstances are peculiarly unhappy, and in a very striking manner resemble the deplorable condition of those miserable wretches who, in the last war, inhabited our frontier settlements, where they were every moment exposed to the incursions of a savage and barbarous enemy; with this difference in their favour, that, from early life, they were familiar with want, and inured to hardships: whereas, if we should be reduced to the dreadful necessity of abandoning our habitations, our lands must lie uncultivated, our stocks of cattle and sheep must perish, for want of food and care, and, what will be an aggravation of our misery, we must fly for an asylum to our fellow-citizens, whose houses are already crowded with inhabitants who have fled to them for refuge, and, having charitably supported their suffering brethren, are themselves become poor. Suffer not, therefore, such a misfortune to befall us, if it is in your Excellency's power to prevent it.

I am not only earnestly entreated, but the prayers and tears of my most tender connexions constrain me, to implore your Excellency's immediate protection. Where shall we (indeed, where can we) go for relief, but to you, sir? The whole force of the Continent is under your command, and at your disposal. Let us not, therefore, plead in vain for that help which is no where else to be found. We beseech you to grant us protection before it is too late, which we fear it will be, if not speedily granted.

We are informed that some of the new-raised troops are destitute of barracks. There are barracks at Squantum sufficient for four or five hundred men. Such a guard, we hope, would securely defend us, especially if a number of boats were allowed them to parade in the Bay, when the weather will permit, as such a manoeuvre would probably intimidate the enemy from landing, lest their retreat should be cut off; besides, the same boats would be ready, upon any sudden emergency, to transport them elsewhere.