we find him, with his own hand, affixing the seal of Heaven to what he has before told us the Devil invented, and the Almighty entered his protest against. A strange inconsistency, as well as heterodoxy! For, if Monarchy be from hell, and reprobated by Heaven, how can a succession to it be sanctified by the authority of everlasting goodness?

He finds another curious argument against the English Monarchy, in particular, by tracing it to the rascally original of a French Bastard. Yet, in the estimation of many, this will prove as little against the institution itself, as it would prove against this author’s arguments, or mine, in the present controversy, if both of us were discovered, not only to have sprung from bastards, but to be such ourselves. The family escutcheon that is without a blot, must be but of very fresh date. The rest of his arguments appear nothing better than these, even where he displays his whole force, in laying before us the materials of the English Constitution, under different heads.

“First. The remains of Monarchal tyranny, in the person of the King. Secondly. The remains of Aristocratical tyranny, in the persons of the Peers. Thirdly. The new Republican materials, in the persons of the Commons.” These, he intimates, may be virtuous; but he should have made them as tyrannical as the others, so far as these Colonies are concerned; else what are we contending for against them?

Alas! what more than Augean labour have I undertaken, in attempting to answer a writer, who, under the specious name of Common Sense, is constantly dealing out paradoxes, and setting himself up, not only in contradiction to the sober sentiments of the wisest of mankind, but often in contradiction to himself? Can any man expect credit who will gravely assert that a people, long famed for wisdom and love of liberty, would have employed themselves for a thousand years in compounding and rearing up a Constitution out of the materials of the different simple forms of Government, and, all the while, have selected nothing but the tyrannical remains of each? To reason with such a writer would be lost labour. Some assertions are too absurd for the possibility of refutation. The rules of logick cannot lay hold of them.

In such a case, the best answer that can be given is, to lay before the reader a true account of the English Constitution, the praises of which have adorned and filled the volumes of the greatest men in our own and other countries. In this part of my work, therefore, I shall have little more to do than to copy them; and as the sentiments of foreigners may be deemed more impartial than our own, I shall take one of the greatest of them—the illustrious Montesquieu—for my chief guide. But as this truly enlightened genius, with the dignity of a profound lawgiver, delivers himself almost in the concise style of aphorisms, that he may be more useful to men whose clear and comprehensive understanding renders them fit for the like office themselves, in the service of their country, I shall endeavour to convey the substance of his doctrines, in the most familiar style, retaining, as far as I am able, his sense and spirit. I shall likewise venture sometimes to make a few additions, either for illustration, or to bring his general principles more closely home to the English Constitution.

There is certainly something too venerable in a fabrick built up with so much care by our ancestors, cemented with so much blood, and to which they have adhered for so many ages, to be lightly given up, upon the partial representations, or general invectives of any writer, or number of writers, arguing from the abuse of things against the use of them. We would not lock ourselves out of an old habitation, till we had provided a new and better one; nor part with a common friend upon the passionate accusations of an avowed enemy, without hearing what he could say in his defence, and giving him a fair trial. For, at this rate, we could have nothing of the least stability or permanency upon earth; and our whole lives would bo employed in making and unmaking, building up and pulling down, without ever reaping the smallest fruit of our labours.

The author of Common Sense stands singular in his rage for condemning the English Constitution in the lump, and the administration of it from the beginning. The immortal Sydney himself gives it a different character, and speaks with reverence of the wisdom of our ancestors. “They evidently appear, (says he,) not only to have intended well, but to have taken a right course to accomplish what they intended. This had effect as long as the cause continued; and the only fault which can be ascribed to that which they established is, that it has not proved to be perpetual, which is no more than may be justly said of the best human Constitutions that ever have been in the world. If we will be just to our ancestors it will become us, in our time, rather to pursue what we know they intended, and by new Constitutions to repair the breaches made upon the old, than to accuse them of defects that will forever attend the actions of men.”

Montesquieu himself, in the cool moments of philosophical reflection, unbiased by local prejudices, and remote, both in time and place; from the scenes he describes, has given us an instructive lesson on this head. “A very droll spectacle (says he) it was in the last century, to behold the impotent efforts the English made for the establishment of Democracy or Republican Government. The spirit of one faction was suppressed only by that of a succeeding faction. The Government was continually changing. The people, amazed at so many revolutions, sought everywhere for a Democracy, without being able to find it anywhere. At length, after a series of tumultuary motions and violent shocks, they were obliged to have recourse to that very Government which they had so odiously proscribed.”

Every Government, in order to be complete, must have within itself the power of preserving its being, as well as pursuing its well-being. And such a power necessarily implies three things: 1st, Legislation, or the making laws and regulations for the good of the community; 2d, The execution of these laws; 3dly, The judging when they are duly executed, and punishing offenders. The great object of the whole is political liberty, which Montesquieu defines, “that tranquillity or peace of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite that the Government be so constituted, as one man need not be afraid of another,”* either in respect of his person or property. Every man’s own feelings can tell him that this is a true definition.

But the union of these three powers—the Legislative, the Executive, and Judicial, in one man, or any number of men, is not liberty, but tyranny complete; because there can be no safety for individuals in such a case, unless goodness were always united with power; which is not to be looked for, except under the perfect government of Heaven. “It is a mistake, (says the great Mr. Locke,) to think that this fault (the abuse of power) is proper only to Monarchies. Other forms of Government are liable to it as well as that; for wherever the power that is put into any hands for the government of the people, and the preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it, there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that use it are one or many. Thus we read of thirty tyrants at Athens, as well as one at Syracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri, or ten men at Rome, was nothing better. Wherever law ends tyranny begins.”

Even the union of but any two of these powers, the Legislative and Executive for example, in one man, or body of men, would leave no chance for liberty; because they who make the laws, being also to execute them, they would be led to frame oppressive laws for the sake of the power and wealth which they might derive to themselves by carrying such laws into execution.

Again, there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from both the other powers. For where the same persons who make the laws are either to execute them, or to judge of their execution, the life and liberty of the subject are wholly at their mercy. These principles are general, and they may now be applied to particular examples.

“In Turkey these three powers are united in the Sultan’s person, and therefore the subjects groan under the weight of a most frightful oppression.”

“In the Republicks of Italy, where these three powers are united in a standing body of Magistrates, there is less liberty than in our Monarchies;” meaning those of France, Spain, &c. “Their Government is obliged to have recourse to as violent measures for its support as even that of the Turks.” What a situation must the poor subject be in,

* Montesquieu, B. XI. ch. 6.