begged leave to remind his Grace, and call to the recollection of the House, the conduct of some other noble Lords, when a bill of indemnity was offered, and at length forced on them, in the year 1766, for stopping up the ports, to prevent the exportation of corn. Then his Majesty was made to justify the act of suspending an act of Parliament, by the mere virtue of his Royal authority; then it was, that one noble Lord said, in mitigation of such a gross violation of the Constitution and the laws, that at most the proclamation was but a forty days’ tyranny; it was then that another noble Earl, [Chatham,] who was at that particular period supposed to have the conduct of the affairs of this country, argued strenuously against the propriety or necessity of the bill, though he at length consented to it; and it was then another noble Lord [Camden] high in office, contended, to the very last, that the measure was justifiable, and refused to concur in a vote for its passing.

The Earl of Dartmouth confessed, that he had been one of the advisers of the measure for sending Hanoverian troops to take possession of Gibraltar and Minorca. He denied any or the least intention of bringing the Russians into Great Britain, nor was it, he said, determined to employ them in any manner; at the same time, if a necessity should arise, which he hoped would not, he could discover no impropriety in employing them in the manner in which they might be rendered most capable of carrying into execution the measures which the wisdom of Parliament might deem necessary, in pursuit of the just exertion of its constitutional claims directed to the general interests of the empire.

Lord Camden pressed the illegality of the measure which the noble Lords in office had so fully and repeatedly avowed their having advised. He said it was not necessary, in order to decide on a question of such high importance, to send for a lawyer from Westminster-Hall, and produce him at their Lordships’ bar, with a label in his mouth, to declare what was the law of the land; for the law now under consideration, he contended, was of a very different nature, and would admit in its interpretation of very few of the distinctions and technical modes of exposition, which were found necessary to come at the true construction of a matter of mere law; yet even on that ground, if the question was to be solely determined on it, he had not a single doubt but he should be able, against its warmest adversaries, whether in private or publick, to prove that it was one of the most clear and decisive points that ever had half an hour’s argument spent on it, or, indeed, the clearest which chance, ignorance, or obstinacy, ever brought into legal controversy. After elucidating in the most satisfactory manner, the literal and obvious meaning of the clause in the Bill of Rights; after adverting to the spirit of that law, as applying to the grievance which was then to be remedied; after pointing out the true construction of the letter and spirit united, as interpreted for a series of almost ninety years, and during the reigns of four Princes, besides the present, three of whom were foreigners, (no slight matter of consideration,) he drew this obvious conclusion, that no foreign troops could be brought into the dominions of the Crown of Great Britain, without the previous consent of Parliament. His Lordship observed, that distinctions had been made between a time of peace and a time of war; but he was certain, that neither the law nor any usage justified any such interpretation. It was true, that the word “foreigners”was not mentioned in the law; but would any one infer from that, that though it was not permitted to keep a standing army of natives, it might be wise, constitutional, and legal, to keep on foot a standing army of foreigners? He said he was ashamed to dwell on such puerile distinctions, were it not that such great stress seemed to have been laid on them by one or two Lords on the other side. He next entered into a view of the general question; and dwelt particularly upon two points. The first was, in relation to the charge made against him by the last noble Lord who spoke, relative to the Bill of Indemnity passed in 1766. His Lordship said, that he always understood it to be a received maxim in politicks, that the salus populi was the suprema lex; when, therefore, the then Lord Mayor of London informed the Privy Council that the crop of bread corn was extremely short, not much above a third of the annual consumption, that the calamity was universal and threatened all Europe, and that consequently every means would be used to drain the country of its scanty stock, so as by such means to threaten a famine,—he thought, for his part, and ever would continue to think so, that the maxim of salus populi suprema lex was never more applicable. It is true, it was against an act of Parliament, but he was still of opinion, with that great philosopher Mr. Locke, that there were cases of necessity, neither provided for nor foreseen, which fully justified a departure from the mere letter of the law. That was his opinion then; so much so, that he could never be prevailed on to think that he wanted a bill of indemnity, that he wanted a pardon, for concurring with the rest of his Majesty’s Ministers, in preventing the dreadful consequences of a famine, perhaps in saving the lives of some millions of his fellow-subjects. But what kind of affinity or similarity there was between the necessity of that day and the necessity of this, was what he could not possibly discover. Here it was only to give directions to have the troops ready to embark, to have the transports in the harbour, to assemble Parliament a few days earlier, and to procure a vote of both Houses, by which means every proposed end would be effectually answered. He doubted much if a single day would be lost, nay, he was convinced the whole might be managed in such a manner as to avoid the loss of a single hour. The other matter he dwelt on was, the consequences that were to be dreaded from the measures meant to be carried into execution. Those he feared would turn out to be exactly similar to what happened to the Athenians, in their contest with their Colonies planted in the Island of Sicily. They were a great maritime nation, they planted Colonies, they increased their riches, power and maritime strength by this plantation; they grew at length mighty and overbearing, tyrannical to their dependencies, and jealous of liberty in any part of the Athenian dominions, beyond the confines of Attica. They had triumphed over their neighbours, the Republick of Sparta, who were in some measure to them what France is to us, their superior on land, and their continual rival in power and greatness. What was the consequence? Intoxicated with their increase of power and opulence, they began to oppress their Colonies; the Colonies took arms; four Generals of great note were sent from Athens to subdue them; the Athenians were defeated; more troops were sent, reinforcement followed reinforcement; at length they were totally expelled that Island; not a General, nor scarce a man, ever returned to relate the circumstances of their successive defeats. Thus, deprived of every foot of land they possessed in Sicily, and divided among themselves, they shortly after fell a prey to their ambitious and inveterate enemies, the Republick of Sparta.

The Earl of Denbigh insisted that it was not the Ministry that deceived or misled that House; but it was a set of men in the country who flattered themselves they would be enabled thereby to force themselves into power and office. Unfortunately for both countries, those incendiaries had been too successful. It was, therefore, necessary to convince such men that they could draw no advantage from such arts; by which means those delusions would be dispelled by which the people of America had been unhappily misled; or if they should pertinaciously adhere to their errors, they must be convinced that no subject of the British empire can appeal to any other mode of decision, or be safe under any species of protection whatever, but such as the laws and Constitution afford. His Lordship entered fully into the construction of that paragraph in the Bill of Rights which immediately applied to the question before the House, and contended that that paragraph by no means reached the present case; for neither Gibraltar nor Minorca could be said to be described in the words “within the kingdom,”that phrase manifestly having a retrospect to the very circumstance which made it necessary to declare the sense of the whole nation on the matter, namely: James II keeping up a standing army “in time of peace, within the kingdom, without the consent of Parliament.”

The Duke of Richmond observed, that it was usual with the noble Lords in Administration, when they found themselves pressed in argument, to fly for sanctuary to their usual topick of imputing factious motives to their antagonists. Such a conduct answered one end: that of drawing off the attention of their Lordships from the question. But it was, however, not without its advantages in a contrary direction; for it showed the dispassionate part of the House that the argument on every true, sound, relative ground,