different conditions, what will be the consequence, but that goods shipped under the faith of the two Restraining Acts will be liable to confiscation and seizure from not knowing that the law has been altered by the present bill? To remedy this evil, this unprecedented hardship and injustice, what I would suggest to your Lordships would be, to change the commencement of the operation of this bill from the 1st of January to the 1st of March, by which means the people and merchants concerned in the West-India trade will have timely notice of the alteration made by this bill, and by that means will have it in their power to prevent the confiscations and seizures which must otherwise be the inevitable consequence of their ignorance and want of information. On the whole, my Lords, if any relief be really intended to be given to the trading and mercantile part of this country, no possible objection can be raised to the indulgence now desired; if not, and that the property of the merchants, planters, and others, concerned in the West-India trade is to be confiscated, contrary to the faith of two solemn acts of Parliament, the effects of such a procedure must indeed be terrible; and the innocent as well as the guilty will then have good cause to be alarmed, finding themselves suffering under the pressure of such a weight of power, breaking into acts of the most wanton violence and most unjustifiable oppression.

The Earl of Suffolk. It is somewhat extraordinary that this bill should, in this stage, meet with an opposition, after having been so fully before debated, and every objection to it fairly and fully obviated. For my part, I think despatch is now become necessary; and, for that reason, I shall not be for admitting any further delay. As to the petition the noble Marquis now offers to present, I take it to be entirely irregular. His Lordship should have offered it before the bill was read a third time. The question now before your Lordships cannot relate to any particular clause or amendment in the bill; those are already decided on.

Viscount Weymouth. The question cannot be postponed, though we were ever so desirous. It is, in my opinion, to tally irregular, in this stage of the bill, to offer any matter whatever but what may go to the total rejection of the bill. The matter now urged should have been offered on the report. It is now too late, and, consequently, I shall be for having the question now before the House strictly adhered to.

The Earl of Sandwich. I differ extremely from the noble Marquis in the construction of the clause alluded to. No bill ever passed both Houses in a more deliberate manner than the present. It was very maturely considered and debated in the other House. That House showed every possible inclination to render it as palatable as was consistent with the principle of it; and admitted several alterations in order to render it innoxious to all those against whom it was not immediately directed. I took the liberty to propose some amendments myself to render it still less liable to objections which might be made by such as imagined their property to be affected; yet, after all this candour and concession, to come in this stage to offer fresh clauses and amendments is, I confess, my Lords, what I did not at all look for or expect. I am clearly of opinion, that if the amendment suggested were to take place, it would, in a great measure, totally defeat the intentions of the bill, because the notice given by the amendment would enable all the parties to ship such quantities of goods under that indulgence, that every substantial operation of the bill would be prevented. If, however, any captures or seizures should happen on account of want of information, it will be a good ground for obtaining such redress as the circumstances of the case may deserve; but as to making any amendment, which might open the door to collusion, or for evading the principle or different provisions of this bill, I must fairly own I am totally against it. Besides, if the reasons for the proposed amendment of the noble Marquis were much stronger, or would be productive of the consequence I have pointed out, yet, by the established rules and orders of this House, it is now too late to make any motion for altering or amending any of the clauses of the bill.

The Earl of Shelburne. The indulgence your Lordships showed me on a former occasion would have prevented me from again troubling you on the subject. I should have thought myself precluded from opposing the bill in this stage, after having so fully expressed my sentiments on the second reading, if I had not considered myself called on to inform your Lordships of a particular circumstance which has come to my own knowledge, as well as to state an objection or two to the bill which did not occur to me when first I delivered my sentiments on this subject. The fact is, that a merchant, whom I never saw before, applied to me, and told me that a great number of vessels were now loading, under the express provisions of the Restraining Act of last year; that the proprietors of those vessels and cargoes would be liable to have them seized and confiscated: this he represented as a grievous hardship, as the merchants in America, Great Britain, and the West-Indies, were brought into this very predicament by the confidence they had in a British act of Parliament. I told the gentleman he would have acted much more properly to have applied to your Lordships for redress: but I nevertheless thought it my duty to mention it, as a matter well deserving your Lordships’ consideration.

On a former occasion I spoke very fully to this bill; but I cannot avoid mentioning one part of it, the concluding clause, which authorizes the Crown to delegate to others the power of pardoning; and I understand, since I last delivered my thoughts on this subject, an amendment has been made to prevent any doubt which might hereafter arise, by the penning of the clause, of such a right being inherent in the Crown. I have, my Lords, consulted several very able and respectable lawyers on the subject, and not one of them has acceded to the doctrine in its full extent. I have looked into several great authorities, as they lie scattered in books, concerning this doctrine, and not one of them comes up to the language of this bill. One of them, in particular, lays great stress on the statute passed in the reign of Henry VIII, which takes away this delegated power from the Lords Marchers, and vests it “forever solely” in the Crown. In short, after the best inquiries I have been able to make, I am not satisfied that this claim of delegating the power of pardoning in the lump is at all inherent in the Crown. Some are of opinion that this power may be given by his Majesty to individuals, others in the lump, others in America only; but not one that it is inherent in the Crown generally and unconditionally. Informed as I am, I speak with all possible diffidence on a subject of such a nature, and with all possible deference to the judgment of the noble and learned Lords present who declared, when this subject was last under discussion, clearly in support of this power; but yet, after all, I trust the noble Lords will excuse me for expressing a wish that a point of such magnitude, a legal question involving in it such important consequences, were not hurried till an opportunity were given to consider this matter more fully, at which time a noble Lord, whose state of health will not permit him at present to attend, [Lord Camden,]may probably be able to deliver his opinion, and this House, and the nation at large, be satisfied that an improper power is not vested in the Crown by this bill. The Greeks and Romans had some wars of the kind that is now carrying on against America by this country. They never gave them the name of Rebellions, nor acted against them as alien enemies. The latter, in one of a similar nature, called it the Social War. I call this a Constitutional War. I say this bill is fraught with innumerable mischiefs. Instead of exacting obedience, it declares nothing but a wish for separation; it meditates open destruction, not coercion. It goes not to the punishment of Rebels and the protection of the innocent. It is made contrary to every rule observed in commotions of this kind. Instead of being directed against individuals who are the supposed authors of this rebellion, it is carried on as if against foreign enemies; war is made on the community at large. In fine, the principle of the bill is to punish the innocent as well as the guilty. But if the principle of the bill be bad, the provisions of it are still worse. To carry it into execution, what are you to do? The framers of the bill, in order to stifle and hide the fixed aversion the people in general entertain for the service, have provided that the plunder shall be shared among the captors, by way of encouragement. What is this but sacrificing the merchant to the seaman? Again, the glaring cruelty and injustice of such a procedure have induced the friends of the bill to admit some clauses in order to soften the unexampled rigour of the hardships complained of. Thus the seaman in turn is sacrificed to the merchant. In such a state of uncertainty, what are we to conclude from this heterogeneous mixture of indulgence and severity, by which