by the consequences of their total neglect of every prudent and necessary precaution?

As for the extraordinaries of the land service, some estimate may likewise be made of them, as well as of the naval extraordinaries, or how are they to be provided for? What else is to guide Administration in the execution of their own plan? Does not General Howe inform the Administration, from time to time, what necessaries he may stand in need of? His general letters of requisition, during the last campaign, are now lying upon the table; and the noble Lord has told us that the Ministry do, from time to time, receive letters of more explanatory detail, according as he foresees such or such necessary services. Look at the bill of extras for the last year; are they not classed methodically into heads: of supply to the forces at Boston, at Montreal, Quebeck, &c.; clothing and accoutrements, forage, live stock, vegetables, beer, &c., &c.? Have you calculated any of these, to reduce them within some estimable compass? Or do you merely hold out your measures to the ruinous profusion of commissaries, and the merciless avidity of contractors?

The last estimate of extraordinaries that I apply for is from the Board of Ordnance. Will you tell us that they are still at a loss for their computation? Is their powder not yet shipped? Are their guns not yet cast? Are their scaling-ladders not yet made? Are their baggage-wagons not yet built? Give us the best account you have, if it be but an estimate of the wagons which were reviewed the other day by the Master-General of the Ordnance, in Port-man-Square.

You may give plain and direct answers to these inquiries, if you mean well. It is not a captious or perplexing estimate that I ask for, to an ounce of powder, or a gun-lock, or a handspike; I speak upon the scale of millions. You either cannot give these estimates, or you will not. If you will not, speak out, that we may know what we have to depend upon. If you acknowledge that you cannot, then will you dare to undertake the conduct of that war of which you confess your own inability to form even an idea or an estimate? Will this House, will the publick at large, commit a proposed armament of thirty, forty, or fifty thousand men, with a hundred ships of force, at the distance of three thousand miles, and upon a line of action of fifteen hundred, with the national honour at stake, to the hands of those men who profess their inability to form any estimate but for the emolument of commissaries and contractors?

If the Minister will condescend to lay the true state of the nation fully before Parliament, the question will then be fairly before this House and the publick, whether they will, with their eyes open, enter into a civil war, which in any event must feed upon, and exhaust every vital source of this country, at the certain expense of ten or twelve millions for this year? Whether they will double that expense in the next campaign? And whether they will, in a third year, commit themselves, helpless, exhausted, and defenceless, to the mercy of France or Spain, and of every Power in Europe that can build its future prosperity upon our ruin? Have we forgot that it was the discontent of taxes and anticipations in the last war that brought us down, when in the full career of victory over the hereditary enemies of this country, to become the humble suitors of a timid peace? That it was this want of forecast in the day of our then prosperity, which has entailed upon us that load of millions which both then and since have severely served to quicken the sense of humiliating restitutions, and the regret of victories wantonly thrown away? Then let us be wiser now. The estimates that I call for are not only in the highest degree necessary, but perfectly practicable. To tell us, that the precedent from which I take my example, of the naval estimates delivered in 1772, was in the time of peace, is only saying that it was less necessary then than it is now. My only reason for making this motion now is, because we are not at peace. Nor can the wisest of us all foresee the day, if you proceed a single step farther in these fatal measures, when this country may return to peace again.

I have now explained to the House the substance and view of my motions for estimates, which I fear will not be complied with, as I see no token of consent, or of any disposition on the other side of the House, to depart from their customary secrecy and silence. If the noble Lord, with his better lights and superior abilities, will lay before us the proper estimates and information, my end will be answered. If not, I can only offer to the House (what I could not offer to them as an object of any attention but at a dead lift) my poor services to hunt out these matters of inquiry, upon such lights as are not confined within the pale of official departments.

The whole extent of my proposition is this: either that the noble Lord would lay before this House the best evidence and information upon the case, by authentick estimates; or that he will allow me to offer my conjectural estimates, as a ground for the House to come to some safe opinion upon; or that he will give himself the trouble to point out in what parts he may think them materially erroneous.

Having no wish to misrepresent, and hardly room to exaggerate, I commit myself freely to the candour of the House, in the investigation of those necessary points of information, in which we are not likely to receive any assistance from more authentick estimates. I will endeavour to be as distinct and methodical as I can, at the same time trusting that the noble Lord will not cavil with me for little matters. Points of minute accuracy may be reserved for some other day. A few thousands more or less make no difference in my argument; I speak upon the scale of millions.

To bring the whole question into one point of view, we should state the following particulars:

If the expense of the extraordinaries should exceed the proportion above stated, of which I can have no doubt, if this armament goes on according to its present train, just in the same proportion will this last unprovided sum of twelve millions five thousand pounds be increased. To avoid the least imputation of aggravating matters, I have stated the extras of the three services at no more than five millions three hundred thousand pounds; and I desire that it maybe remembered that this was my reason: We may compute the least possible sum, but the greatest possible amount is incomputable. I will not venture to say what that may be. This is the true state of the question in one view, without aggravation or colouring. Upon the balance of this year there will remain unprovided for, the sum of twelve millions, or perhaps a great deal more.

I will now enter, as shortly as I can, into the detail, to justify the estimates of the several articles as I offer them to the House; always remembering, as I said before, that I speak upon the scale of millions. The twelve millions, which I state as remaining unprovided for, may be fifteen millions; or, if it should possibly prove no more than ten millions, though the latitude seems very great, yet, in my opinion, the argument is not altered; for I hope that neither this House, nor the publick at large, being apprized, and in their sober senses, would be reconciled to saddle themselves at the end of this year with an unprovided sum of ten millions, for a mere possible pittance of revenue from America, to be balanced by the certain destruction of national commerce, and even that poor possible pittance requiring to be collected and maintained by a perpetual standing force and civil war.