Let the Governour have a Privy Council of seven to advise with, though they should not be members of either House.

Let the Judges of the Courts of Common Law and Chancery be appointed by the Governour, with the advice of his Privy Council, to hold their offices during their good behaviour, but should be excluded a seat in either House.

Let the Treasurer, Secretary, and other great officers of State, be chosen by the lower House, and proper salaries assigned to them, as well as to the Judges, &c.

Let all military officers be appointed by the Governour, and all other inferior civil ones.

Let the different Courts appoint their own Clerks. The Justices in each County should be paid for their services, and required to meet for the despatch of business every three months. Let five of them be authorized to form a Court to hear and determine causes, and the others empowered to keep the peace, &c.

These are the outlines of a Government which would, I think, preserve the principle of our Constitution, and secure the freedom and happiness of the people better than any other.

The Governour will have dignity to command necessary respect and authority, to enable him to execute the laws, without being deterred by the fear of giving offence; and yet be amenable to the other branches of the Legislature for every violation of the rights of the people. If this great officer was exposed to the uncertain issue of frequent elections, he would be induced to relax and abate the vigorous execution of the laws whenever such conduct would increase his popularity. Should he, by discharging his duty with impartiality, give offence to men of weight and influence, he would be liable to all the opposition, threats, and insults, which resentment could suggest, and which few men in such a dependant state would have sufficient resolution to neglect and despise; and hence it would follow, that the apprehensions of losing his election would frequently induce him to court the favour of the great, at the expense of the duties of his station and the publick good. For these, and a variety of other reasons, this office should be held during good behaviour.

The Council of State, who are to constitute the second branch of the Legislature, should be for life. They ought to be well informed of the policy and laws of other States, and therefore should be induced, by the permanence of their appointment, to devote their time to such studies as may best qualify them for that station. They will acquire firmness from their independency, and wisdom from their reflection and experience, and appropriate both to the good of the State. Upon any disagreement between the Governour and lower House, this body will mediate and adjust such difference; will investigate the propriety of laws, and often propose such as may be of publick utility for the adoption of the Legislature. Being secluded from offices of profit, they will not be seduced from their duty by pecuniary considerations.

The Representatives of the people will be under no temptation to swerve from the design of their institution by bribery or corruption, all lucrative posts being denied them. And should they, on any occasion, be influenced by improper motives, the short period of their duration will give their constituents an opportunity of depriving them of power to do injury. The Governour, and the members of the Council of State, should be restrained from intermeddling further in the elections of Representatives than merely by giving their votes.

The internal government and police of the Colony being thus provided for, the next object of inquiry that presents itself is, how a superintending power over the whole continent shall be raised, and with what powers invested. Such a power is confessed on all hands to be necessary, as well for the purpose of connecting the Colonies as for the establishment of many general regulations to which the Provincial Legislatures will not be competent.

Let a Congress, therefore, be appointed, composed of members from each Colony in proportion to their number of souls; to convene at any place that may be agreed upon, as often as occasion may require. Let them have power to adjust disputes between Colonies, regulate the affairs of trade, war, peace, alliances, &c; but they should by no means have authority to interfere with the internal police or domestick concerns of any Colony; but confined strictly to such general regulations as, though necessary for the good of the whole, cannot be established by any other power.

But whether you settle the affairs of Government in this or any other manner, let me recommend to your serious attention the speedy adjustment of all disputes about the boundaries of your Colony, before they rise to such a height as to threaten great uneasiness and inquietude.

The claim of the proprietors of Indiana on one side, and that of the Kentucky on the other, should be fairly and impartially heard and determined, and notice given to the claimants to attend, that ample justice may be done. In the mean time, would it not be proper to give notice, that none of those lands should be sold or settled until it was known to whom they appertain? The claims of the Indiana Company are stated in a pamphlet, (sent for your perusal,) and patronized by the opinions of some eminent lawyers. But this should not prevent a strict and thorough investigation of the matter. Both claims, it is certain, cannot be good. If the treaty of Stanwix should be adjudged valid, and the right given up to the country of Indiana, that same treaty will confirm to the Colony all the lands on this side the Ohio, from its mouth, along the river, up to the Pennsylvania lands, in the direction of the place called Kittaning in that Province; in which bounds are included the lands claimed and settled by Mr. Henderson.

Our Colonial right to those lands being settled, would it not be proper to sell all such as may be unappropriated for the use of the Colony, and apply the moneys to the payment of the vast burden of taxes we shall incur by this war? The sooner you determine this, the more effectually you will frustrate the design avowed by the author of a late pamphlet, of seizing all unappropriated lands for the use of the continent; a design in which, I own, I see as few traces of justice as in many others of his schemes.

Having completed the remarks I intended to make, I hope, whatever reception they may meet with, you will impute them to my zeal for our country’s welfare; the only motive that ever shall induce me to offer my opinion or advice.

I am, gentlemen, with the greatest regard, your devoted friend,

A NATIVE.

MARYLAND COUNCIL OF SAFETY TO LIEUTENANT HARRISON.

SIR: The Convention at their last sitting agreed with Mr. Henry Hollingsworth for a quantity of bayonets at eight shillings each. As soon as they are furnished, which, we imagine, will be shortly, we will take care that you shall be supplied, and therefore would not have you contract for any at a different price.

We are sorry you are so very disagreeably circumstanced, as well as to the situation of your station as the smallness of your quarters. As we are desirous of rendering matters as comfortable as possible for you, request you will inquire whether there is a probability of your being better provided at any other place on the island, and upon what terms, that if we approve them, we may remove you from your present quarters as soon as possible. You shall have osnaburgs as soon as we can spare it; we expect some soon from Baltimore. We are, &c.

To Lieutenant William Harrison.

MARYLAND COUNCIL OF SAFETY TO DELEGATES IN CONGRESS.

GENTLEMEN: We received Mr. Stone’s letter of the 14th instant, and are obliged for the intelligence therein contained. We have heretofore written you by Mr. Stewart, which, doubt not, you have received. The Governour is not yet gone; we expect he will leave the Province in a few days. What interruption the Virginians can or will give him in his passage down the bay, time will discover. We send you enclosed a copy of their resolves, which came by express this day, directed to Charles Carroll, Esq., Chairman of the Convention, and appear to have been fabricated some time after our Convenlion had broke up. You will see clearly the intention is to stir up the people against the powers now in being—Deputies in Congress, Convention,