THOMAS ENNALLS TO MARYLAND COUNCIL OF SAFETY.

Cambridge, July 2, 1776.

GENTLEMEN: On Saturday, the 29th ultimo, I received information, by express, from Colonel William Travers, (of the corps of the lower part of this County,) that there were five tenders then in Hooper’s Straits; that they had landed on Hopkins’s Island, and had taken upwards of sixty head of cattle from that place, together with two young men, and everything else that was valuable on the Island; that they had committed considerable depredations on the Somerset shore, and thrown that County into the utmost confusion; and he expected they would commit further ravages in this County. In consequence of this information, I ordered Colonel John Ennalls and Major Robert Harrison to go down to that neighbourhood (it being forty miles from this place) to get further information respecting these circumstances, and to take such steps as should appear to them to be necessary on the occasion. They immediately went down; and I am informed by them that on their arrival there they found affairs circumstanced as above related. The tenders had gone down the bay with their plunder a few hours before they arrived; but the Militia of that corps were still upon duty; many of them being much fatigued and anxious to go home, they were all discharged, except about forty who were left to keep a look-out.

In the evening of that day there appeared in Nanticoke Sound one large ship, and seven other vessels supposed to be tenders. This gave the inhabitants great uneasiness and anxiety. They, therefore, ordered such part of the Militia as could readily be collected to assemble to prevent the enemy from committing further damage. I am further informed by them that they found many of the people in that part of the County very lukewarm in their opposition, difficult to be got together, and, when collected, in such bad discipline they are not (in their opinion) to be relied on, they paying but little regard to the instructions of their officers. Things being in this situation, I have thought it advisable to order part of the Militia under my command to march down to their assistance; and I flatter myself we shall be able to prevent their landing in that quarter; but should the enemy continue there a few days, and keep the Militia on duty, numbers of the inhabitants must unavoidably lose a considerable part of their crops, their wheat being now ready to cut.

Captain Woolford is at this time with his company on the borders of Nanticoke, near the mouth of that river, to guard that neighbourhood, where his assistance is much wanted.

I must further beg leave to inform you that our Militia are badly fitted with arms. I am clearly of opinion that not one half of them have effective guns; neither have we sufficient quantity of powder and lead, (particularly the latter,) should we have occasion to make use of those articles.

I have this moment received an express from Hooper’s

eight men wounded. Not one man who was quartered at the beginning of the action on the Bristol’s quarter deck, escaped being killed or wounded. Captain Morris lost his right arm, and received other wounds, and is since dead; the master is wounded in his right arm, but will recover the use of it. I received several contusions at different times, but as none of them are on any part where the least danger can he apprehended, they are not worth mentioning. Lieutenants Caulfield, Molloy, and Nugent, were the Lieutenants of the Bristol in the action; they behaved so remarkably well that it is impossible to say to whom the preference is due, and so indeed I may say of all the petty officers, ship’s company, and volunteers. At the head of the latter I must place Lord William Campbell, who was so condescending as to accept of the direction of some guns on the lower gun-deck. His Lordship received a contusion on his left side; but I have the happiness to inform their Lordships that it has not proved of much consequence. Captain Scott, of the Experiment, lost his left arm, and is otherwise so much wounded that I fear he will not recover.

I cannot conclude this letter without remarking, that when it was known that we had many men too weak to come to quarters, almost all the seamen belonging to the transports offered their service with a truly British spirit, and a just sense of the cause we are engaged in. I accepted of upwards of fifty to supply the place of our sick. The masters of many of the transports attended with their boats, but particular thanks are due to Mr. Chambers, the master of the Mercury.

All the regiments will be embarked in a few days. The first brigade, consisting of four regiments, will sail in a day or two under convoy for New-York; and the Bristol and Experiment will, I hope, soon follow with the remainder.

Sir Peter Parker’s squadron consisted of the following Ships and Vessels: the Bristol, fifty guns, Sir Peter Parker Commodore, John Morris Captain; Experiment, fifty, Alexander Scott; Active, twenty-eight, William Williams; Solebay, twenty-eight, Thomas Symonds; Acteon, twenty-eight, Christopher Atkins; Syren, twenty-eight, Tobias Furneaux; Sphinx, twenty, Anthony Hunt; Friendship, armed vessel, twenty-two, Charles Hope; Ranger, sloop, eight, Roger Wills; Thunder, (bomb,) eight, fames Reid; Saint Lawrence, schooner, . . . . . . Lieutenant John Graves.

WHITEHALL, August 24.—It appears by Lieutenant-General Clinton’s letters to Lord George Germaine, dated July 8, 1776, from the Camp on Long-Island, Province of South-Carolina, that Sir Peter Parker and the General having received intelligence that the fortress erected by the Rebels on Sullivan’s Island (the key to Charlestown harbour) was in an imperfect and unfinished state, resolved to attempt the reduction thereof by a coupe de main, and that, in order that the Army might cooperate with the fleet, the General landed his troops on Long-Island, which had been represented to him as communicating with Sullivan’s Island by a ford passable at low-water; but that he, to his very great mortification, found the channel, which was reported to be eighteen inches deep at low water, to be seven feet deep, which circumstance rendered it impossible for the Army to give that assistance to the fleet in the attack made upon the fortress that the General intended, and which he, and the troops under his command, ardently wished to do.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM A SURGEON IN SIR PETER PARKER’s FLEET, DATED JULY 9, 1776.

We left Cape-Fear on the 27th of May, and anchored the same evening off the bar. The camp was struck at the same time, and the troops embarked the same evening on board the several transports. All our motions were so languid and so innervate, that it was the 9th of June before the Bristol and Pigot passed the bar of Charlestown; the Bristol in passing struck, which alarmed us all exceedingly; but, as it wanted two hours of high water, she soon floated again. The Prince of Piedmont, a victualling ship, was totally lost on the north breakers of the bar. General Clinton and Lord Cornwallis were both on board when she struck; but as the weather was very fine, they were not in the least danger. By our delays we gave the people every opportunity they could have wished for, to extend their lines, &c., they were not idle—every hour gave us astonishing proofs of their industry. As we anchored at one league distance from Sullivan’s Island, we could see all that was going on with the help of our glasses. The fort on this Island is exceedingly strong, (or rather the battery;) it is built of palm trees and earth, and on it are mounted eighteen of the lower deck guns of the Foudro-yant: I never could distinguish more than seventeen; others imagined they could see nineteen—however, that is immaterial.

The signal for attacking was made by Sir Peter Parker on the 27th of June; but the wind coming suddenly to the northward, the ships were obliged again to anchor. The troops have been encamped on Long-Island since the 15th, and it was intended that General Clinton should pass the neck that divides Long-Island from Sullivan’s Island, and attack by land while Sir Peter attacked by sea. General Lee bad made such a disposition of masked batteries, troops, &c., that it is the opinion of all the officers of the Army whom I have heard mention this circumstance, that if our troops had attacked, they must have been cut off; but this assertion does not satisfy the Navy, for they certainly expected great assistance from the Army. Excuse this necessary digression. On the morning of the 28th, the wind proved favourable; it was a clear fine day, but very sultry; the Thunder, bomb, began the attack at half past eleven, by throwing shells while the ships were advancing. The ships that advanced to attack the battery were the Bristol and Experiment, two fifty-gun ships; the Solebay, Active, Acteon, and Syren, of twenty-eight guns; the Sphinx, of twenty, and the Friendship, an armed ship of twenty-eight guns. With this force what might not have been expected? Unfortunately the bomb was placed at such a distance that she was not of the least service. This Colonel James, the principal engineer, immediately perceived; to remedy which inconvenience, an additional quantity of powder was added to each mortar: the consequences were, the breaking down the beds, and totally disabling her for the rest of the day. The Bristol and Experiment have suffered most incredibly: the former very early had the spring of her cable shot away—of course she lay end on to the battery, and was raked fore and aft; she lost upwards of one hundred men killed and wounded. Captain Morris, who commanded her, lost his arm; the worthy man, however, died a week after on board the Pigot. Perhaps an instance of such slaughter cannot be produced; twice the quarter-deck was cleared of every person except Sir Peter, and he was slightly wounded; she had nine thirty-two pound shot in her mainmast, which is so much damaged as to be obliged to be shortened; the mizzen had seven thirty-two-pound shot, and was obliged, being much shattered, to be entirely cut away. It is impossible to pretend to describe what our shipping have suffered. Captain Scott, of the Experiment, lost his right arm, and the ship suffered exceedingly; she had much the same number killed and wounded as the Bristol. Our situation was rendered very disagreeable by the Acteon, Syren, and Sphinx, running foul of each other, and getting on shore on the middle ground. The Sphinx disengaged herself by cutting away her bowsprit; and, as it was not yet flood-tide, the Sphinx and Syren fortunately warped off. The Acteon was burnt next morning by Captain Atkins, to prevent her falling into the hands of the Provincials, as fine a new frigate as I ever saw. Our ships, after laying nine hours before the battery, were obliged to retire with great loss. The Provincials reserved their fire until the shipping were advanced within point blank shot; their artillery was surprisingly well served, it is said, under the command of a Mr. Masson and DeBrahm; it was slow, but decisive indeed; they were very cool, and took great care not to fire except their guns were exceedingly well directed. But there was a time when the battery appeared to be silenced for more than an hour; the Navy say, had the troops been ready to land at this time, they could have taken possession. How that is I will not pretend to say. I will rather suppose it; but the fire became exceedingly severe when it was renewed again, and did amazing execution after the battery had been supposed to have been silenced. This will not be believed when it is first reported in England. I can scarcely believe what I myself saw on that day—a day to me one of the most distressing of my life. The Navy, on this occasion, have behaved with their usual coolness and intrepidity; one would have imagined that no battery could have resisted their incessant fire.