tion to, and compliance with, my request for the row-galleys. They are not yet arrived, that I know of.

I wrote Congress by the return express that brought yours, respecting Colonel Ward's regiment, and as the post comes in every day, it is probable I shall soon have their answer. The result I will transmit you by the first opportunity, and would recommend that the regiment be put under marching orders, that they may proceed without loss of time whatever way Congress shall direct.

The orders you have given to your armed cruisers for stopping provision vessels, appear to me extremely necessary. I have mentioned the matter to Congress, and shall warmly recommend it to the consideration of the Convention of this State, If it should be attended with inconvenience to individuals, yet necessity and publick utility ought to be first considered, and outweigh everything else: but it cannot; there is nothing but what they can readily dispose of for the use of the Army and for ready cash; so that every ground of objection must be nugatory. I am, &c.

GO. WASHINGTON.

To Governour Trumbull.

New-York, Wednesday, July 24, 1776.

The men-of-war that lately went up the North-River, lie in Haverstraw-Bay. Their tenders cruise about, and last Saturday one of them went near the Fort; upon which our people fired a thirty-two pounder at her, which went through her quarter, when she tacked about and stood down the river. Some time after, they landed a party of their men at Peekskill, set fire to a wheat field, and burnt the house of Mr. John Lilly. A number of the Militia were soon collected, who attacked and killed seven of them, without any loss on our side.

GENERAL GREENE TO GENERAL, WASHINGTON.

Camp on Long-Island, July 24, 1776.

SIR: Colonel Hand reports nothing new; everything remains in much the same situation as they were yesterday. I am, your most obedient, humble servant,

N. GREENE.

GENERAL SCHUYLER TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

German Flats, July 24, 1776.

DEAR SIR: Your Excellency's favour of the 17th instant was last night delivered me by Mr. Bennet.

If I had with me the remonstrance of the Field-Officers against quitting Crown-Point, I should attempt to point out the insufficiency of each of the several reasons they give against the removal of the Army to Ticonderoga, and which would at the same time show on what I founded my opinion of the propriety of the measure; but as the paper was left at Albany, I shall cursorily enter into some observations. The little time I have for reflecting on the subject, the constant interruptions from the Indians, indisposition of body, and my inability to convey my ideas with that perspicuity the subject merits, I hope will plead for the inaccuracies which you will discover.

Crown-Point is a peninsula which projects from the west side of Lake Champlain, and runs down and almost parallel to both sides of it. The east side of the peninsula is bounded by the waters of that part of the Lake which flow from Skenesborough and Lake George, passing by Ticonderoga in their way; and the northeast corner of the peninsula is distant from the east shore of Lake Champlain about half a mile, or something better, but under three-quarters of a mile. The northwest corner of it is nearly, if not quite, two miles distant from the western shore of the Lake. If the enemy should have a naval superiority, our armed vessels must retire to the southward of Crown-Point, between that and Ticonderoga, or take shelter under any fortifications we might have there. In either case the enemy may go along the western shore, land in the bay that forms the peninsula, and attack any force that may be at Crown-Point from the rear, or they may land on the east side of the Lake, below Crown-Point; and as the country is flat, and in some parts improved, they may possess themselves of the east shore, between Crown-Point and Ticonderoga, without any great difficulty, however strong any fortification on the east side, opposite to Crown-Point, might be; and hence all supplies must be cut off, unless our force at Crown-Point should embark in batteaus, and be sufficiently strong to land and repulse them. And there is little prospect that such an attempt would succeed, considering how infinitely better they are provided than we, and what advantages they would receive from the works they might throw up.

Besides the last considerations, permit me to subjoin, that such is the nature of the ground at Crown-Point, (the Point faces to the north, fronts the Lake, and is indented with small bays, and about one mile broad on a straight line from the northeastern to the northwestern point,) that the fort which General Amherst erected there was so exposed, from the grounds about it, that it required three or four strong redoubts to cover it—redoubts that were in themselves very considerable fortifications, and built at much expense on account of the scarcity of earth, insomuch so, that all the fortifications ten thousand men could make in the course of the campaign, would be far from formidable.

At Ticonderoga we are not exposed to these dangers or difficulties. The Lake between the fort and the intended encampment on the east side of it, does not exceed half a mile in breadth. Let us now suppose that the enemy are capable of forcing our armed vessels to seek shelter at Ticonderoga: nothing then is to obstruct their coming to that place. Being come, let us suppose that they would land on the east side of the Lake: the intended camp is defended on the north by a large creek and sunken country, which effectually prevents any approaches from that quarter; they must therefore take a tour of several miles to head the sunken country, before they can get into our rear. If they do, are our supplies cut off? No; for we have the communication by Lake George open. Can they drive us out of the strong camp on the east side? I think not. I think it impossible for twenty thousand men to do it, ever so well provided, if the camp consists of less than even a quarter of that number, indifferently furnished, such is the natural strength of the ground. But let us suppose that the enemy should land on the west side and attempt to drive us thence: here we fight on an equal footing, (except what advantages our lines and fortifications may give us,) and we can oppose nine-tenths of our Army to them; for they cannot prevent the junction of our troops either way, whenever they please to join. Let us suppose the worst: they drive us from the ground; we lose our cannon; but they cannot prevent such as do not fall in the engagement, from retiring to the strong camp. A bare inspection of a good map, if I had one to send your Excellency, would, I hope, convince you of the weight of these observations.

But if we are obliged to retreat from Ticonderoga, will not their vessels pass our strong camp and get between that and Skenesborough? I think it impossible for them to pass. The passage is narrow; the channel more so; our vessels lying in line of battle on the south side of the camp; theirs obliged to come up by two at a time at most, exposed to our cannon in getting there, and when there, at once attacked by our vessels and our batteries within point-blank shot.

But if the enemy have possession of Ticonderoga, will they not cut off our supplies? Yes, effectually, any supplies attempted to be sent by the way of Lake George, but not those sent by the way of Skenesborough, or through the towns lying in this Colony on the east side of Lake Champlain, between the camp and New-Hampshire, and the northern parts of the Massachusetts.

But cannot the enemy, when in possession of Ticonderoga, penetrate into this Colony by the way of Lake George, and leave our Army in the strong camp? Yes, provided they take their boats, provisions, &c, out of Lake Champlain, on the north side of Ticonderoga, and convey them by land into Lake George—the distance between three and four miles; but as they cannot do this without our knowledge, we can move any part of our Army by the way of Skenesborough to Fort George, before they can reach it; but as we have no naval force on that Lake, nor any strong fortifications, and if they are superior, and our Army not reinforced by Militia, (which I should hope would not be the case,) we can retire from thence to some place in the vicinity of Fort Edward, and bring away all the carriages from the few inhabitants that live there; and I conceive that they would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to move only such of their boats and necessaries as they cannot dispense with, over a fifteen-mile land-carriage, even if they