should be able to bring a considerable number of carriages from Canada, for it will take one hundred carriages, each carrying four barrels of pork or flour, (and they can bring no carriages that will convey more,) to transport one day's provision for ten thousand men, and the carriages can only complete a trip in two days.

Upon the whole, I do not only think Ticonderoga infinitely-preferable to Crown-Point for a stand to be made, but so happily situated for us, that I have very little apprehension of General Burgoyne's being able to succeed in that quarter, unless there should be too great a disparity of numbers in his favour.

I had almost forgotten to observe that your Excellency, from the information you have had, seems to entertain an idea that the situation of Crown-Point "is of the utmost importance, especially if we mean to keep the superiority and mastery of the Lake;" and that "if it is abandoned by us, it is natural to suppose the enemy will possess it; and if they do that, then our vessels will be in their rear, and it will not be in our power to bring them to Ticonderoga, or the post opposite to it."

Your Excellency will pardon me for a few remarks on that passage of your letter.

Crown-Point lies about forty-three miles from the extreme south part of Lake Champlain, which is at Skenesborough, and about one hundred from the northern extreme, which is at St. John's. The part of the Lake south of Crown-Point is seldom, in any place, above two miles wide. From Crown-Point to about eighteen miles north of it, it may be at a medium about three and a half miles, three and four being the extremes; beyond that, for about fifty-six miles, it is seldom less than six, or more than fourteen or fifteen; but a chain of islands, running nearly parallel to the sides of the Lake, lie in the broadest part, on and nearly in the middle, so that the width on each side is about six miles.

Let us now suppose our Navy to be in any part of the Lake to the northward of; and out of the reach of the cannon that may be at Crown-Point, and there attacked by the enemy: What assistance can it receive from any fortification at the Point? None, surely; and, if worsted, it must fly to the south side of Crown-Point for shelter, and the enemy have the entire mastery of the Lake. If Crown-Point was totally abandoned, and if the Navy was attacked and worsted in any part to the northward of Ticonderoga, whether in sight of that place, or towards the north end of the Lake, the consequences are exactly the same. It must retire to the south of where the Army is. If we abandon Crown-Point, that the enemy will possess themselves of it is certain, if they can do it; but if we suppose they can, we must not only suppose that they can and will pass our fleet, although theirs should be inferior, or that they must have a naval superiority. If they can pass our fleet anywhere beyond Crown-Point, their Army can attack ours at Crown-Point, if it is there, or at Ticonderoga, if there: in either case our ships will be in their rear.

But supposing they could and would, by some means or other frustrate our intentions in having a Navy in the Lake, (which intention appears to be to prevent any boats coming up,) and pass by it, although superior to theirs; is it probable they will do it? Will they risk the danger they may run if a fair wind should enable our ships to get up with them? Will they risk an interception of their supplies, and a prevention of retreat in case of a repulse? I think not; but if their Navy is superior, the keeping possession of the Lake is impossible; and then the question recurs, where is the best place to make a stand with the greatest prospect of advantage to us? I think that place to be Ticonderoga and the grounds opposite to it. I may be mistaken. The only view I had in giving my opinion for removing the Army to these places was, that 1 thought it would there most advance the interest of the cause we are engaged in. Although I do not recollect that in the resolution of the General Officers to move the Army from Crown-Point, that it is observed that a small post was to be kept there, from whence our vessels might be supplied more readily than from Ticonderoga, yet that was determined on.

I have always deprecated jealousies and contentions in the Army. I believe the officers that have served under me will do me the justice to acknowledge it. I shall invariably continue in that line of conduct, and, if seconded by the inferior officers, I hope the evil will soon vanish.

Your Excellency's conclusion is too just, "that the most lavish and extravagant waste has been made of provisions." The difficulties I experienced last campaign on this account are incredible; and I was in hopes that the orders I had issued to the officers, and the directions I had given to the Commissaries in the course of the winter, would have been effectual, and have put a stop to many infamous practices. On this side of Canada I experienced the good effects; such of the Commissaries appointed by the Colonies at the beginning of the struggle as were then employed, and were found incompetent, were removed as soon as it could be done without giving umbrage to particular Colonies. This removal took place last fall, and things have been carried on regularly since that time. But otherwise in Canada; a return was asked of such as were employed; and the orders by which they, as well as the officers, were to govern themselves, were transmitted to the commanding officer in February last, with a request to publish them. I am informed they were never made publick, nor was any return sent of who were employed, and the Deputy-Commissary could not tell, as they were appointed in Canada, and acted independent of him. When Mr. Price was appointed Deputy Commissary-General for Canada, I gave him a copy of these orders; copy of which, and a copy of my instructions to him, I think I transmitted to your Excellency. I never received a single line from him during the time he was in Canada; and I am informed by Mr. Swart, whom Mr. Livingston sent into Canada as his deputy, that the soldiers have been permitted to go to the barrels and take what they liked, and that this was by general orders. On my last arrival at Crown-Point, I found the provisions lying in parcels on different parts of the beach, exposed to the weather and to be stolen. I ordered it, and did see it, put into the stores, and then found much less than I had expected, although I had supposed that great waste and loss had taken place in the retreat from Canada. When I observed that fresh beef was not to be had, I conceived that it could not be immediately procured in sufficient quantities, as all stall-fed beef was expended, and the grass-fed then hardly fit for killing; nor was I much mistaken, although a few days after I found that Mr. Livingston, by his exertions, and with borrowed money, had made shift to engage such a number that my apprehensions on that score are at an end. But Mr. Trumbull was certainly ill-informed in supposing that fresh meat could be easily procured at the time alluded to. If Mr. Livingston had been less industrious than he was, we should have experienced a scarcity of provisions, both from the then scarcity of beef, and money to purchase it with. I am, however, still uneasy on account of pork, lest any accident should hereafter be occasioned by not having a sufficient quantity in store.

Before General Sullivan's brigade arrived at Albany, the troops were contented with the Continental allowance; and when only bread, pork, and peas, could be got, they had a pound of each of the two former, in lieu of all the other articles; but a regiment of his brigade refusing to draw less than eighteen ounces of pork, and General Sullivan assuring me that the additional ounces had been allowed them since December last, in lieu of milk, I ordered the Commissary to issue it, taking receipts for the quantities delivered. This extra-allowance has not only made the calculation I sent you some time ago extremely erroneous, but will greatly distress us.

I am so well convinced of the difficulties you labour under to procure the necessary supplies of every kind for the Army, that I have only asked for such things as could not be procured at Albany or in the neighbouring country, and have written to Committees and employed persons in every quarter of the County. I tried, but in vain, to procure the articles for the gondolas; but as the navigation is since interrupted, I hope to be able to get them, and shall write immediately to Albany on that head.

I shall, immediately on my return, give out in orders that no double commissions are to be held, except by the officers you mention. I hope your Excellency will approve of my leaving it to the choice of the officers what commission to keep.

I believe I forgot to mention that General Thomas and I concluded that it was highly necessary to have an active Deputy Quartermaster at St. John's and Chambly. I mentioned Lieutenant-Colonel Buell, of Burrell's regiment as