your Honours were not informed of those settlements, which consist of several thousand families, who are seated on that tract of country called the New-Hampshire Grants.

The misfortune and real injury to those inhabitants, by making the south end of Lake George the northernmost point of protection, will more fully appear from the following consideration, namely: It was at the special request and solicitation of the Governments of the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay and Connecticut, that those very inhabitants put their lives into the hand of their Governments, and made those valuable acquisitions for the Colonies. By doing it they have incensed Governour Carleton and all the ministerial party in Canada against them; and provided they should, after all their good service in behalf of their Country, be neglected and left exposed, they will be, of all men, the most consummately miserable.

The south promontory of Lake Champlain and Lake George, as to a southern direction, are near the same, and if we should give up the sovereignty of Lake Champlain, we may as well give up the whole. If the King’s Troops should be again in possession of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and command the lake, the Indians and Canadians will be much more inclined to join with them, and make incursions into the heart of our Country. But the Colonies are now in possession and actual command of the lake, having taken the armed sloop from George the Third, which was cruising in the lake, and also seized a schooner belonging to Major Skene, at South-Bay, and have armed and manned them both for the protection of our Country, and the Constitution and civil privileges and liberties thereof.

By a council of war held on board the sloop, the 27th instant, it was agreed to advance to the Point Aufere, with the sloop and schooner, and a number of armed boats well manned, and there make a stand, and act on the defensive, and by all means command the lake and defend the frontiers, and wait for the special directions of the honourable Continental Congress, and govern ourselves accordingly. We are now almost ready to sail to that station, which is about six miles this side of latitude forty-five degrees north. A small force, with the armed vessels, will at present command the lake, and secure the frontiers.

The Canadians, all except the noblesse, and also the Indians, appear at present to be very friendly to us; and it is my humble opinion, that the more vigorous the Colonies push the war against the King’s Troops in Canada, the more friends we shall find in that country. Provided I had but five hundred men with me at St. John’s, when we took the King’s sloop, I would have advanced to Montreal. Nothing strengthens our friends in Canada equal to our prosperity in taking the sovereignty of Lake Champlain; and should the Colonies forthwith send an army of two or three thousand men, and attack Montreal, we should have little to fear from the Canadians or Indians, and would easily make a conquest of that place, and set up the standard of liberty in the extensive Province of Quebeck, whose limit was enlarged purely to subvert the liberties of America. Striking such a blow would intimidate the Tory party in Canada, the same as the commencement of the war at Boston intimidated the Tories in the Colonies. They are a set of gentlemen that will not be converted by reason, but are easily wrought upon by fear.

Advancing an army into Canada will be agreeable to our friends; and it is bad policy to fear the resentment of an enemy. If we lie easy, and in a supine state, and Governour Carleton exerts himself against us vigorously, as we know he will, and who, by a legal Constitution, can oblige our friends to assist him, he will, by slow degrees, discourage our friends, and encourage our enemies, and form those that are at present indifferent, into combinations against us. Therefore, the possible way to circumvent him and the scheme of the Ministry, is to nervously push an army into Canada. But if the wisdom of the Continent in Congress should view the proposed invasion of the King’s Troops in Canada as premature or impolitick, nevertheless I humbly conceive, when your Honours come to the knowledge of the before-mentioned facts, you will at least establish some advantageous situation towards the northerly part of Lake Champlain, as a frontier, instead of the south promontory of Lake George.

There are many advantages in forming the frontier near the country of the enemy, as, first: it will be in our power to ravage and make inroads into the heart of the enemy’s country, the same as they might easily do, were they in possession and command of Lake Champlain. This advantage will be of the utmost consequence, be it in the hands of which party it will. Though it is now in our hands, to give it up to them would be fatal to the interest of the Colonies, but more particularly to those who were instrumental in the achievement of the supremacy of that lake. But secondly: commanding the northerly part of the lake puts it in our power to work our policy with the Canadians and Indians. We have made considerable proficiency this way already. Sundry tribes have been to visit us, and have returned to their tribes to use their influence in our favour. We have just sent Captain Abraham Nimham, a Stockbridge Indian, as our ambassador of peace to the several tribes of Indians in Canada. He was accompanied with Mr. Winthrop Hoit, who has been a prisoner with the Indians, and understands their tongue. I do not imagine, provided we command Lake Champlain, there will be any need of a war with the Canadians or Indians.

Pray pardon me on account of any impertinency or inaccuracy in this composition, as it is but a rough draught, wrote in great haste, from your Honours’ ever faithful, most obedient and humble servant,

ETHAN ALLEN.

To the Continental Congress.

BENEDICT ARNOLD TO THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS.

Crown Point, May 29, 1775.

GENTLEMEN: Your resolution of the 18th instant, and recommendation of measures to the City of New-York and Albany, in consequence of the taking possession of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, has this moment been delivered me, as commanding officer here, the purport of which induces me to believe the Committee of Safety of the Massachusetts-Bay have not informed you of my appointment, or instructions from them, which I have taken the liberty to enclose; and, in consequence, arrived in the neighbourhood of Ticonderoga the 9th instant, where I met one Colonel Allen, with about one hundred men, raised at the instance of some gentlemen from Connecticut, who agreed we should take a joint command of the Troops. The next morning, at four o’clock, we surprised the garrison and took them prisoners, the particulars of which you have doubtless heard. Some dispute arising between Colonel Allen and myself, prevented my carrying my orders into execution, until the 16th, when, being joined by fifty men of my own Regiment, and a small schooner taken at Skenesborough, which I immediately armed, and sailed for St. John’s, in quest of the sloop. The 17th, being becalmed within ten leagues of St. John’s, I manned out two small batteaus, with thirty-five men, and, after rowing all night, at six o’clock next morning landed at St. John’s, and took a sergeant and his party of twelve men prisoners, the King’s sloop, of seventy tons, mounted with two brass six-pounders, and seven men, and in two hours after left St. John’s, having previously taken on board such stores, &c., as were valuable. Providence remarkably smiled on us, as a few hours’ delay would have ruined our design, a party of one hundred and twenty men, with six pieces of cannon for the sloop, being on their march from Montreal, at only twenty miles distant; add to this a party of forty men on a march from Chamblee, twelve miles distant. Colonel Allen arrived at St. John’s the same evening, with one hundred men, and being attacked the next morning by the Regulars, retreated, and left three men behind, two of which are since arrived.

I have armed the sloop with six carriage and twelve swivel-guns; the schooner with four carriages and eight swivels. I have sent to Lake George one brass twelve-pounder, six large brass and iron mortars and howitzers, and am making all possible preparation for transporting all the cannon here, and as many as can be spared at Ticonderoga, to Fort George.

I must beg leave to observe, gentlemen, that the report of Ticonderoga’s being abandoned, have thrown the inhabitants here into the greatest consternation. There are about five hundred families to the northward of Ticonderoga, who, if it is evacuated, will be left at the mercy of the

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