King’s Troops and Indians, and who have, part of them, joined the Army, and cannot now remain neuter, to whom a remove would be entire ruin, as they have large families and no dependance but a promising crop on the ground. I need not add to this, gentlemen, that Ticonderoga is the key of this extensive country, and if abandoned, leaves a very extensive frontier open to the ravages of the enemy, and to continual alarms, which will probably cost more than the expense of repairing and garrisoning it.

I esteemed it my duty, as a servant of the publick, to give you the foregoing hints, and hope the exigence of the times will be a sufficient apology for the liberty I have taken.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, gentlemen, your most obedient humble servant,

BENEDICT ARNOLD, Colonel, &c.

BENEDICT ARNOLD TO THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.

Crown Point, May 29, 1775.

GENTLEMEN: I was equally surprised and alarmed this day, on receiving advice, via Albany, that the Continental Congress had recommended the removing all the cannon, stores, &c., at Ticonderoga, to Fort George, and evacuating Ticonderoga entirely, which being the only key of this country, leaves our very extensive frontiers open to the ravages of the enemy; and if put into execution, will be the entire ruin of five hundred families to the northward of Ticonderoga. I have wrote the Congress, and given my sentiments very freely, with your instructions to me, as I fancy they have had no intelligence of my appointment or orders.

Colonel Allen has entirely given up the command. I have one hundred and fifty men here, and expect in two or three weeks to have my Regiment complete, and believe they will be joined by a thousand men from Connecticut and New-York. I have sent to Lake George six large brass and iron mortars and howitzers, one brass and three iron twelve-pounders, and shall pursue your orders with all the despatch in my power. I am, gentlemen, with great respect, your most obedient humble servant,

BENEDICT ARNOLD.

MASSACHUSETTS CONGRESS TO GOVERNOUR TRUMBULL.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HONOUR: Yesterday, about three of the clock, P. M., this Congress received your Honour’s most kind and friendly letter of the 25th instant, enclosing a resolution of the General Congress, of the 18th instant, relating to Ticonderoga, the order of the General Committee of Association of New-York, for executing the said resolution, and the letter from the Connecticut Delegates at New-York; each of which contain articles of intelligence very important and interesting to all the New-England Governments. But while we are consoled and rejoiced to find that the General Congress is attentive to the safety and general interests of the Colonies, we cannot conceal from the General Assembly of your Colony, that we should be to the last degree agitated, if we really supposed that the said resolution of the General Congress, touching Ticonderoga and said posts on Lake Champlain, was their ultimatum, and that they would not reconsider that resolution. But as we cannot suffer ourselves to doubt of their best intentions and great concern for the liberty and safety of all the Colonies, we assure ourselves, that upon better information, and knowledge more just, they will be fully convinced of the great impolicy of abandoning Lake Champlain, which we conceive they have in effect advised to, although we confess their expressions are not the clearest. But we are confirmed in our construction of the said resolution, by the order taken by the General Committee of New-York to execute the same.

May it please your Honour, permit us to acquaint you, that as soon as possible after we had received advice of the success of our people at Crown Point and St. John’s, and the taking of the armed sloop on that lake, by Col. Arnold’s letter, a copy whereof we have sent you by Col. Henshaw, we sent an express to New-York and to the General Congress, signifying to the General Congress and to the Congress of New-York, in the strongest manner, our opinion of the absolute necessity and great advantages of maintaining the post of Ticonderoga. But as we conceived the reasons and grounds of such an opinion were obvious and generally known, we supposed that a detail of the arguments and proofs was altogether unnecessary. But upon seeing the resolution of the General Congress upon that important matter, we were much surprised and concerned; and in the little time we have had to deliberate on the subject, we have resolved to endeavour to suggest to your Honour and your Assembly the reasons which at present occur to us, which we apprehend make it evident that the maintaining that post is not only practicable, and, under God, in the power of the Colonies, but of inexpressible necessity, for the defence of the Colony of New-York, and all the New-England Colonies; and having enumerated those reasons as they occur, without consulting method or any orderly arrangement, to submit them to your Assembly, most importunately praying you, if your Honours approve them, that you will, with the greatest despatch, communicate them, with many more observations which your better knowledge of facts will suggest, to the General Congress; and, if you should judge it advisable, also to the Congress of New-York; conceiving that, in several respects, they would go from you with more advantage, not only to New-York, but also to the General Congress, than from us. It seems natural to compare the two stations proposed to be maintained, viz: Ticonderoga and William Henry, in the following manner, that is to say, with regard to the benefits and advantages of the two stations which will arise for the purposes of general defence and annoyance of the common enemy, and with regard to the feasibility of maintaining each place.

And, in the first place, as to the advantages of general defence resulting from a post at Ticonderoga, beyond those of William Henry; they are so great and many, that they cannot be enumerated in an ordinary letter. In the view of a post of observation, we beg leave to observe, that all movements from Canada, intended against New-England or New-York, by the way of Lake Champlain, whether by scalping parties or large bodies, whether in the winter or open seasons of the year, may almost certainly be discovered so seasonably as that the blow may be generally warded off; whereas, if the post at William Henry be only kept, it is probable that three-fourths of the attempts on the frontiers of New-York and New-England, by Champlain, will never be known until executed. As to enterprises by any large body by the way of Champlain, it is clear that they may be known much earlier from the former than the latter station; also, if it should become necessary and just that the United Colonies should annoy the inhabitants of Canada, and cause them to feel the grievousness of war on their borders, (as it most certainly will, in case they engage in the war upon us,) the two stations scarcely bear any comparison; for if we abandon the post at Ticonderoga, the enemy will infallibly seize it; and, in that case, what annoyance can we give Canada by the way of Champlain, by means of a fortified post at William Henry? If the enemy hold Ticonderoga, they will effectually command the whole of Lake Champlain. If the United Colonies hold it, they will so far command that lake, as, by the way of it, they will be able to make descents by small parties upon great part of the country of Canada, and infinitely distress them; but from William Henry none can be made without vast difficulty and risk. As to the advantages of subsisting and defending a garrison, and maintaining a post against the efforts of Canada, either at Ticonderoga or Fort William Henry, we conceive that they are much in favour of the former; for as to supplies of victuals for either a garrison or an army stationed at one place or the other, we conceive that, on the whole, they may be more easily and certainly afforded to Ticonderoga than William Henry. We suppose that what should be sent from posts on the westerly side of Hudson’s River, may almost as easily be transported to Ticonderoga as to William Henry; and as to such supplies as would go from posts eastward of Hudson’s River, they may be conveyed to the former place with much more facility than the latter. And as to the speed and certainty of marching succours for the relief of a garrison at one place or the other, in case of an attack, we suppose the advantages of Ticonderoga are vastly superiour