he could not believe there was a man in the nation weak enough to force him to continue in it; and as his Lordship found the office so burdensome, so thorny, and so wretched, he had such an opinion of the good nature and generous disposition of many gentlemen who sat round him, that he did not believe one of them would refuse to ease his Lordship of a charge which he found so disagreeable, and for which nature had never formed his talents. He added, that he might now retire with a great deal of propriety, as he had given the world the most perfect demonstration that he could neither make war, nor establish peace.

Sir George Savile rapidly ran over the whole line of Ministerial misconduct. He challenged their advisers and abettors to show him a readier way of accomplishing the subversion of a great, flourishing, commercial empire, than by ruining her trade, diminishing her revenues, wasting her treasures in fruitless projects, multiplying taxes, discouraging industry by stopping the hands of her manufacturers, spreading corruption, encouraging the enemies of the people to misrepresent the people, discountenancing men of probity and honour, contriving innovations, provoking opposition, dividing the strength of the empire against the strength of the empire, and incensing brethren against brethren; exposing veteran armies raised and maintained for the defence of the State to every species of hardship, and employing them in bloody intestine wars; introducing, at the same time, foreign mercenaries to be spectators of their butchery. If a more certain way to put a period to the envied glory of a great kingdom can be devised, he called upon the King’s friends to point it out. He concluded by predicting disgrace and ruin, if a total change of men and measures did not very soon take place.

Mr. Serjeant Adair. Sir, when I perceive, and, indeed, most sensibly feel, that the patience of this House, and the constitution of its members, are almost as much exhausted in the course of this debate as the treasures and resources of this country are likely to be by the consequences of our Address, 1 shall certainly take up as little of their time as possible. But, sir, I cannot rest satisfied in my own mind, without observing upon some things that have fallen in the course of the debate, and submitting to the House a few short reasons for my most hearty and entire dissent from the proposed Address. The first argument, if it can be called so, that I shall take notice of, I mention with much reluctance; because, sir, if it had not been adopted by so respectable a member as the learned gentleman, (the Attorney-General,) it would have appeared to me unworthy of the wisdom and dignity of this assembly, and an insult on the understanding of every man to whom it was addressed: I mean, sir, the unaccountable attempt that has been made to persuade us that the words of this Address do not convey any kind of approbation of the measure of transporting the King’s Hanoverian troops to the garrisons of Gibraltar and Port-Mahon. It is impossible to use any other argument against this, than an appeal to the common sense of mankind. It does not appear to me to be the subject of reasoning or dispute; strip it of sophistry, of the false colouring with which it hath been varnished; read the clause in question to any plain man, and if he does not say that it expresses an approbation, a thankful admiration of this part of the conduct of his Majesty’s Ministers, I have lost all my ideas of language, all understanding of the import of words. If there is any member of this House who, upon barely reading the words of this Address, entertain a serious doubt upon the meaning of it, his mind must be so differently constituted from mine, that it is impossible any argument I could use could make the least impression on him. But why, sir, are the gentlemen so solicitous upon this point? Why are they so exceedingly afraid that these words should be understood in their plain sense? Are they doubtful of their own measures? Do they wish, by deluding our understanding, to steal from us an approbation of what they dare not themselves defend? Do they themselves think the measure in question legal and proper? If they do, why not approve it? Why not avow the approbation. Why do they not speak out? “The measure is right, it is legal, it is beneficial to this country; the Address does approve it, and it ought to be approved.” Surely, sir, this would be a more rational and manly ground for supporting their Address, than the frivolous attempt to pervert the obvious meaning of words, and sophisticate us out of our senses.

So much has been said of the legality of this measure; the arguments against it have been so fully and ably stated, especially by Mr. Dunning and Governour Johnstone, who sit before me, that I think it necessary to trouble the House with very little upon that subject. I shall content myself, at present, with saying, that I entirely concur in the opinion, that the illegality of employing or supporting foreign forces in any part of the dominions of Great Britain, without the consent and authority of Parliament, is deducible from the same principles of law and the Constitution, from whence our ancestors, who declared the rights and liberties of the subject at the Revolution, inferred the illegality of raising or keeping an army within the kingdom in time of peace without the same authority and consent. The check and control, which the ancient principles of this happy limited monarchy has with so much wisdom and caution established over the power of the Sovereign, would be vain and nugatory indeed, if that sovereign had a right, by his own mere authority, to establish an armed force, either of natives, or much more of foreigners, in any part of the dominions of this Crown, without the consent of the people, expressed in this great council of the nation. The negative of this power, sir, was one of the great privileges which the Bill of Rights declared to be the undoubted right and liberty of the subject. The proposition deduced from the principles of the Constitution is general;it was laid down in the terms in which it appears in that law, because, like everything else that is there declared, it had a reference to the grievances recited in the preamble. Those were the encroachments which the late King Jameshad made on the Constitution of his country. Those were the mischiefs immediately to be remedied by the Revolution; and accordingly, to every clause in the Bill of Rights, the declaration of the right is adapted to, and co-extensive with, the violation complained of. This is the true reason why some of those declarations appear to be limited in their expression; and excludes every inference against the generality of the propositions, which are fairly deducible from the same principles of reason and of law.

But, sir, though I avoid detaining the House, by entering more particularly into the reasonings upon the subject, I cannot dismiss it without taking some notice of a most novel and dangerous doctrine, which has proceeded from so respectable authority that it demands our most serious attention. It has been asserted by the highest law authority in this House, “That the raising or keeping an army even within this kingdom in time of peace, without the authority of Parliament, unconnected with the illegal purposes to which,” he admits, “it had been perverted, was not simply, and in itself unlawful, before the passing of the Bill of Rights at the Revolution; and, therefore, that the clause in that statute, which declares it to be so, created a new law, and did not merely declare an ancient fundamental principle of the Constitution.” If this be true of that clause, sir, it may as well be applied to every other in the Bill of Rights; and the consequence of that doctrine will be, that all the privileges there asserted to be the ancient rights of the subject, were not in truth so, but were new acquisitions, or generous gifts at the Revolution; and that the declarations and provisions of that excellent law are not to be extended beyond the words of it, or applied to other cases deducible from the same principles of the Constitution, which they certainly should be, in the most liberal manner, if it is merely declaratory of the common law and ancient Constitution of the kingdom.

But, independent of all other reasonings, the clear and unambiguous words of the law itself, give the most decisive refutation to so strange a doctrine. If there is any one statute in the whole book which is more clearly and pre-eminently declaratory of the ancient law than all others, it is certainly the Bill of Rights. The preamble recites, “That the late King James, by the assistance of evil counsellors, did endeavour to subvert the laws and liberties of this kingdom,” in several particulars, which are there recited; all which are affirmed to be “directly contrary to the known laws and statutes of the realm.” Contrary to what laws, sir? Surely not to those which they were then going to make, but to those ancient, and, in the words of the act, known laws which existed at the time, and long before the violations complained of. The act then goes on to say, that the Lords and Commons, “for asserting their ancient rights and liberties, do declare” several particulars, and amongst

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