grievances they had complained of were contained in acts of Parliament. Lord North had declared very truly, that nobody could have power to negotiate for the repeal of an act of Parliament.

But if the Colonies should incline to put any confidence in the certain influence of Ministry over Parliament, even that grand confidence must fail them; as they cannot tell whether the same Ministers will continue in power; and that even at this very time, no two persons upon the Treasury bench were of the same opinion, on the conduct to be held towards America. Which of those opinions would finally prevail, no man living could divine. That this uncertainty might continue the armed negotiation for several years, to the utter ruin of both countries.

He gave many other equally strong reasons against the scheme; and concluded this part of his speech by observing, that although the mixed plan of war and negotiation could answer no good end in future, it might have a retrospective operation, to justify the Ministers in the use of their forcible proceedings. For force and concession going out together, if peace should be the result, Ministers would attribute the success, not to the concession, but to the force. So that all this delay, bloodshed and expense, was incurred merely to furnish Ministers with an excuse in debate.

After going through the two first plans, he spoke to the third, (his own,) that of a concession previous to treaty.

He observed, that as he put no great trust in any negotiation, and none at all in an armed negotiation, his idea was, to have very little treaty, and that little as short as possible. The House was therefore at that time to judge, whether it was necessary to make any concession to the Colonies: if it should appear to them that such concession was necessary, he was clearly of opinion that they ought to make it immediately, and of their own free grace. This he thought of more dignity with regard to themselves, and of much more efficacy with regard to the quiet of the Colonies, than the concession upon treaty which had been proposed.

He said, that the first ground of treaty must be confidence; and that the Colonies never could confide for the effect of any concession, (as he had shown in examining the foregoing plan) in a less assurance than that of Parliament itself.

He then showed, by a variety of instances, collected from the publick proceedings during the last ten years, how necessary it was that Government should be aided by Parliament in re-establishing that confidence which had been shaken by those proceedings, and that some firm ground should be laid as foundation for future peace.

He was of opinion, that this foundation of confidence was become the more necessary, from the constitution of the present Ministry. That in no time or country, or under any form of Government, was the power of Ministers suffered to survive the success of their counsels, or the same men permitted to inflame a dependant people to arms, and then to appease them by concessions. That the Duke of Alva would be a strange Plenipotentiary to have sent, for making the concessions which King Philip II proposed to the Netherlands. In concession, the credit of a State is saved by the disgrace of a Minister; because it is his counsel alone that is discredited. But when the same Ministers do and undo, in consequence of the resistance they meet, it is the nation itself that submits. Besides, he alleged that all treaty is more easy, and fewer concessions are required by all men, when they have a confidence in those they treat with.

He was convinced, that the mere removal of the offensive acts would have given satisfaction in former times, and from amicable hands. But now things are on another footing; and if more concession is required, it is because injudicious coercion has made it necessary. That he had always wished to preserve the legislative power of this kingdom entire in everything; and that it was with great grief he saw that even an odious and scarcely ever to be exercised part of it, was to be abandoned. But when the maxims of publick counsels are not steady, it is necessary that laws should supply the want of prudence. That it was thus, and for this reason, that limits had been set to absolute power in all countries; and that power (though not absolute) had been preserved, not destroyed by such limitations.

That we are now in a quarrel; and in putting an end to any quarrel, it is necessary to look to its origin; that the origin of this present difference had evidently been upon the subject of taxation. That an arrangement of this question, either by enforcement or concession, was a preliminary essential to peace. That the House ought to estimate the full value of the object to be conceded, before they agree to give it up. If they were of opinion that the taxation of America could repay them their expenses, or compensate their risks, they ought to pursue it. If, on the contrary, it was evident beyond all contradiction, and so evident as to enforce reiterated acknowledgments, that they never could enjoy a moment’s quiet as long as that matter of contention continued—it was then altogether as essential to the preservation of their own authority in all other points, as to the liberty of America and quiet of the whole empire, to gives it up, with such limitations in the concessions, as the rights; of sovereignty required.

That the Parliament of Great Britain were not the representative, but (as Lord John Cavendish had said, some days before, with great truth and propriety) the sovereign of America. That the sovereignty was not in its nature an abstract idea of unity, but was capable of great complexity and infinite modifications, according to the temper of those who are to be governed, and to the circumstances of things; which being infinitely diversified, Government ought to be adapted to them, and to conform itself to the nature of things, and not to endeavour to force them. That although taxation was inherent in the supreme power of society, taken as an aggregate, it did not follow that it must reside in any particular power in that society. That in the society of England, for instance, the King is the Sovereign; but the power of the purse is not in his hands; and this does not derogate from his power in those things in which our Constitution has attributed power to him. If Parliament be the sovereign power of America, Parliament may, by its own act, for wise purposes, put the local power of the purse into other hands than its own, without disclaiming its just prerogative in other particulars.

That formerly, whatever this right might be to it, the Kings of England were in the practice of levying taxes by their own authority upon the people of England; they contended that the Crown, being charged with the publick defence, must be furnished also with the means of providing for it. That it would be absurd to commit a trust into the hands of one person, and to leave the power of executing it to depend upon the will of another. They therefore held, that this power was inseparable from the Crown; and in general they made use of the very arguments in favour of the King’s indefeasible right to tax the people of England, that are now used by the Parliament of England to tax the people of America. Notwithstanding all these arguments, one of the greatest of our Kings, by an express and positive act, cut off from the sovereign power this right of taxing.

This act, which has been the foundation of the unity and happiness of England since that time; that is, the statute 34 Edward I, called Statutum de tallagio non concedendo, Mr. Burke made his pattern; and from thence (if his plan should be adopted) he hoped the same good effects in future. That this pattern statute was absolutely silent about the right, but confined itself to giving satisfaction in future; and that it laid down no general principles which might tend to affect the Royal prerogative in other particulars. That, in all human probability, the preservation of the other branches of the prerogative was owing to the clear and absolute surrender of this.

He then moved that the first, fourth, and fifth chapters of the statute De tallagio non concedendo might be read; which being done, he observed, that, this statute consisted of three capital parts: a renunciation of taxing,—a repeal of all statutes which had been made upon a contrary principle,—and a general pardon. He then read his own bill, and showed its conformity to the spirit of that act, supposing Great Britain to stand in the place of the sovereign, and America in that of the subject. That the circumstances are not indeed in every respect exactly parallel, but that they are sufficiently so to justify his following an example that gave satisfaction and security on the subject of taxes, and left all other rights and powers whatsoever exactly upon the bottom on which they stood before that arrangement had been made.

He then gave his reasons for not adopting the methods which (though not proposed in the House) had been frequently suggested in conversation, by several friends and well-wishers to America.