the nomination to the vacant employments, as also the administration of justice; moreover, his Britannick Majesty will cause orders to be given to the commander of the army in which this corps shall serve, not to exact any extraordinary services, or such as are beyond their proportion with the rest of the army; and when they shall serve with the English troops, or with other auxiliaries, the officers shall command (as the military service requires of itself) according to their military rank and the seniority of their commissions, without making any distinction of what corps the troops may be with which they may serve. This corps shall take the the oath of fidelity to his Britannick Majesty, without prejudice to that they have taken to their Sovereign.

ART. XI. Their pay shall commence fifteen days before the march of this body of troops; and from the time the troops shall have quitted their quarters, in order to repair to the place of their destination, all the expenses of march and transport, as well as the future return of the troops into their own country, shall be at the charge of his Britannick Majesty.

ART. XII. His Britannick Majesty will grant to the Most Serene Prince, during all the time that this body of troops shall be in the pay of his Majesty, an annual subsidy of twenty-five thousand and fifty crowns Banco. His Majesty shall cause notice of the cessation of the aforesaid subsidy to be given a whole year before it shall cease to be paid: provided that this notice shall not be given till after the return of the troops into the Dominions of his Most Serene Highness. This Treaty shall be ratified by the high contracting parties, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged as soon as possible.

In witness whereof, we, the undersigned, in virtue of our full powers, have signed the present Treaty, and have thereto put the seals of our arms.

Done at Hanau, the 5th of February, 1776.

Thursday, February 29, 1776.

Lord North moved, That the copy of the Treaty between his Majesty and the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, signed at Cassel, the 15th of January, 1776, and Translation, be referred to the Committee of the Whole House, to whom it is referred to consider further of the Supply granted to his Majesty.

He urged the necessity of the measure, and the great effects he expected from it. He said, no questions could arise upon it but three, all of which were too plain to require much elucidation. Whether the troops proposed to be hired were wanted? Whether the terms on which they were procured, were advantageous? and, Whether the force was such as might be deemed fully adequate to effect the operations for which it was intended? As to the first point, he said that reducing America to a proper constitutional state of obedience being the great object of Parliament, the best and most speedy means of effecting so desirable a purpose was the motive which induced Administration to adopt the measure, because men could be readier had, and upon much cheaper terms in this way than we could possibly recruit them at home. On the second, he observed, that not only in the view of comparative cheapness with home levies, but as referring to former times, the present troops would cost us less than (taking all the circumstances together) we could have expected. And, lastly, that the force which this measure would enable us to send to America would be such as, in all human probability, must compel that country to agree to terms of submission, perhaps without any further effusion of blood.

Lord John Cavendish reprobated the measure in all its parts. He observed, that the present was the first alarming consequence of the American war. Britain was to be disgraced in the eyes of all Europe; she was to be impoverished; nay, what was, if possible, worse, she was compelled to apply to two petty German States in the most mortifying and humiliating manner, and submit to indignities never before prescribed to a crowned head presiding over a powerful and opulent kingdom. 1. The troops were to enter into pay before they began to march—a thing never known before. 2. Levy money was to be paid at the rate of near seven pounds ten shillings a man. 3. Not satisfied with this, those petty Princes were to b subsidized. 4. They have had the modesty to insist on a double subsidy. 5. The subsidy is to be continued for two years in one instance, and one year in the other, after the troops have returned to their respective countries. And, lastly, a body of twelve thousand foreigners are to be introduced into the dominions of the British Crown, under no control of either King or Parliament; for the express words of the treaty are, “that this body of troops [Hessians] shall remain under the command of their General, to whom his Most Serene Highness has intrusted the command.”

Mr. Cornwall assured the House that he had a better opportunity of knowing the means of treating with German Princes, and of procuring troops, than any man in it. That his situation for many years, as Clerk in the German Pay-Office last war, gave him this opportunity; and that he was astonished to hear any gentleman, conversant with German connections, call the present terms disadvantageous. He contended that the two months previous pay allowed to the Duke of Brunswick, was no more than a douceur; and insisted that they were all had on lower terms than was ever known before, especially if the business should be effected within the year, of which he had no reason to doubt.

Lord Irnham. I am to ask your pardon for appearing so solicitous to give you my sentiments just at this period of time; but it is to answer the honourable gentleman of the Treasury Bench, who is, I know, a perfect master of the German affairs, and to submit to him, in this stage of the business, my doubts as to the competency of the Landgrave of Hesse and the Duke of Brunswick to make such treaties as are now under our consideration. That gentleman knows that before the peace of Westphalia the feudatories of the empire had no confirmed legal right to engage, without leave of the Emperour, in offensive and defensive alliances with foreign Princes, which might require sending troops out of the empire. But the weakness of the House of Austria, and the dread of the Swedish arms, obtained, after a long discussion, that extraordinary privilege, on the pretence of the interest of religion, and the inability of the head of the empire, from being often engaged in war with the Turks, to defend the frontiers, which made such a concession beneficial to the empire; always presuming that the troops of those Princes so contracting should, in case of the empire being attacked, return to its defence, as the allegiance of those Princes to the Emperour and empire of Germany, by the nature of their feudal tenure, especially required. Now, sir, if this is the true state of the privilege those Princes now enjoy, can it be fairly inferred from thence that they can, merely for lucre and pecuniary considerations, transport their vassals to the East or West-Indies, nine parts in ten of whom will hardly ever return? and thus, by depopulating their territories, deprive their Lord paramount of the succour which he has a right to expect from them, and of the advantage which an inhabited and settled territory affords, in comparison of one stripped of all the men able to bear arms; to support a cause in no shape whatever connected with the empire, and which must render it vile and dishonourable in the eyes of all Europe, as a nursery of men reserved for the purposes of supporting arbitrary power, whenever grasped at by those who have more money, though not more justice and virtue, than the others whom they can pay for oppressing. I shall say little to the feelings of those Princes who can sell their subjects for such purposes. We have read of the humourist Sancho’s wish: that, if he were a Prince, all his subjects should be blackamoors, as he could, by the sale of them, easily turn them into ready money; but that wish, however it might appear ridiculous and unbecoming a Sovereign, is much more innocent than a Prince’s availing himself of his vassals for the purpose of sacrificing them in such destructive wars, where he has the additional crime of making them destroy much better and nobler beings than themselves. As to the defensive part of the treaty, which is looked upon as of no consequence, on supposition that we shall never be called upon to fulfil it,—I beg leave to insist on the contrary position; for the Emperour may not only show his resentment of this proceeding of his vassals, by a military execution in their territories, but may thereby give them a right to call upon us for that indemnification in money, which is the only means in our power for making them amends, and to which we are by these treaties bound. Besides, the King of Prussia, who is at their door, will infallibly

*