way, some desert. But I will suppose the remnant landed on the American shore: will conquest immediately follow? Impossible to expect it. If the Generals know their duty, (and we have no reason to doubt it,) the first employment they must have will be to secure a post, in case of disaster, to establish a place of arms, to endeavour to form magazines; else whence can this army be supplied with provisions? Is it from England? From the English fleet? The fleet cannot sail within the land—cannot go up the rivers; so that the army, without magazines, cannot possibly quit the coast, and great part of the campaign must be spent in preparations. My Lords, we must look upon this war as a war of conquest. It is too late to treat the Americans as Rebels, that the dignity of Government requires to be punished. They are a powerful nation, a formidable enemy. The army must be divided, for many are the forces with whom they are to engage. Are we certain that even the troops proposed to be employed will not be opposed by greater numbers? Can we conceive one campaign can end the war?

My Lords, there is another very material consideration, on which I will touch but gently, for I wish not to add to embarrassments: Are Ministers certain they are prepared for the expenses of the war? The great annual outgoings (the publick debt) were, at the close of the last war, thought a sufficient reason for accepting a peace, certainly inadequate to the glories of the war. In thirteen years’ peace, some saving has been made; the expense of the ensuing campaign promises to swallow up the whole of that saving. Thus, in point of revenue, are we in the situation we were at the end of the war? But we have lost the American trade without an equivalent. The trade of the last year, to supply the Spanish flota and the demands through Russia, will be no lasting resource. The one is over; the other, I am informed, declines. The additional tax laid upon land, will, it is supposed, not pay the expense of the conveyance of the troops. If Ministers should be obliged to anticipate the taxes; if the Bank should be induced to lend the assistance of their credit; if the taxes should fall short; if any unforeseen calamity should happen,—might not the publick credit receive as rapid a shock as within these few years befel the India Company? In short, my Lords, the difficulties are so numerous, that one should be inclined to think some fatal evil influence confounded the wisdom of our counsellors. My Lords, I read in Holy Writ, that when Ahab, for his sins, was devoted to destruction, the host of Heaven was assembled before the Lord, and the Lord said, “Who will persuade Ahab to go up and war against Ramoth Gilead, that he may fall there? And an evil spirit said, I will go forth and persuade him. And the Lord said, Go, and thou shalt persuade him.” I shall not, I hope, be thought irreligious, if I apply this allegory to the British nation. It does seem as if, in punishment for their offences, they were condemned to go and war against their brethren in America, and to “fall there.” I wish the application may not prove just; and yet, my Lords, everything gives it the appearance of truth. No measures taken to bring the war to a conclusion; no plan effective to force the Americans to accept the terms we are pleased to prescribe; a war of detail, of partisans, that can lead to nothing but to perpetuate rancour and animosity. I am informed, by the late despatches from Virginia, that the Governour, who has long quitted the residence of his Government, to hold his state aboard a cruizing ship, has had the notable success of firing the town of Norfolk, the largest in Virginia. I make no doubt he has a commission for what he does— I do not mean his commission of Governour, for that is a commission to protect those over whom he is appointed to preside—but a commission to destroy, to burn the towns, to ravage the plantations, drive off the slaves, and to kill those that resist. These are the warlike achievements of the Governour of Virginia. But as I do not doubt he has orders for what he does, far be it from me to condemn an absent man; but I cannot think well of those who from hence command this wanton ruin, this unnecessary ravage, this useless desolation.

My Lords, I must further take notice of one extraordinary particular: that this town was supposed to contain many friends of Government; and yet such is the determined vengeance, that even friends are fired upon in hopes of hurting the enemies intermixed, and all are involved in one complicated destruction. Can Ministers think that, after this proceeding, one friend to Government will remain in America? Can they expect that any one, blessed with common sense, will espouse their cause, when they do not protect those who mean obedience? My Lords, I am, for these reasons, a hearty supporter of the noble Duke’s motion, and particularly because it leads to that peace that all must allow desirable. I am the more earnest, as I am convinced it is still to be attained. Provoked as the Americans have been, they wish for reconciliation. They dread to be forced into independency. They would even buy that peace, not at the price of their liberty—that must be secured to them; their purse and property must be their own;—but I have good grounds to think, could they be certain of being dealt with by people who were sincere—whom they could trust—they would submit to all necessary regulations of commerce; nay, more, they would assist the State with a revenue: but they must raise it themselves; they must not be taxed from hence. My Lords, when men are in such a disposition, I will add no more but that if we blindly reject them, we do not know the value of that people we thus forever wantonly cast from us.

The Earl of Effingham. My Lords, I shall take up much less of your Lordships’ time than I expected to do, on the exorbitant terms of the treaties, as the noble Duke, who moved the address, has already sufficiently proved the unreasonableness of them. I shall only make one observation on the subject, which is, that if these seventeen thousand men have the effect we are promised they shall, of subduing the Americans in one campaign, their pay, together with the subsidy, and the excess of the levy money above what is ever allowed in England, would furnish the pay and clothing of forty thousand men, with their proper officers.

On the legality of these treaties, I shall trouble your Lordships a little longer.

The first and most striking point is, the administration of justice being reserved to a foreign Prince, within the dominions of the Crown of Great Britain; the better to effect which, an executioner, with servants, is part of the Hessian establishment to be levied by Great Britain; and no exception or limitation of this illegal power seems to have been thought of, even in case the civil Government should be restored in America.

The second great consideration is, the probability of a foreign General commanding in America; for though it has been said that the commission of Commander-in-Chief will entitle our young Major-General to the command, yet it will not, I believe, make a senior officer of spirit serve under him, though it may make him retire from the army. But, in the Hessian treaty, there is, besides the Lieutenant and Major-Generals, a General commandant. How are these two Sosias to settle the matter? I confess it appears to me liable to great confusion.

With regard to the stipulation of assisting Hesse, if attacked, it is not a just war alone which we have engaged to enter into for the protection of the Landgraviate; for a case may happen, in which, by a decree of the Imperial Chamber, the Directors of the Circle are ordered to march into the country, to compel the Landgrave to some act of justice or restitution; in which case he will be, according to the eleventh article, “actually attacked by force of arms, without having first used open force against him who attacks him;” and we must either excuse our breach of the treary by our Minister’s ignorance of the Imperial Constitutions, or else enter into a war like that in America—not to maintain, but to subvert the liberties of the Germanick body.

With regard to the latter part of the motion, for suspending hostilities, I should think myself unpardonably tedious were I to go over again all the arguments which show the inexpedience of the war. I shall only state to your Lordships, in addition to what I and many others have said before, some information which I have received from the best authority, respecting the resources of the Provincials, and which I should think it my duty to lay before the House, even if it did not come immediately within the subject of our present debate. The first of our great mistakes seems to be in the number of their people. When the General Congress had ordered returns of the number of inhabitants in each Province, an idea prevailed that these returns were to be the measure of their quotas. It was proved at Boston,