that ought to be carefully attended to and prevented. On this account I think the preservation of the morals of the seamen is a matter of no small consequence. I have been always attentive to it. I do not believe that any felons or men of notorious bad characters have been entered; I am sure if they have, it has been without my knowledge; nor should I concur in any scheme of the kind, had I been previously consulted. Taking, however, the facts thrown out by the noble Duke in another light, what do they amount to, allowing them to be true? I am within your Lordships’ recollection, that I asserted in a former debate, that the full complement of the twenty guard-ships amounted to six thousand eight hundred men; that there were but six thousand three hundred men actually on the books; that consequently there was a deficiency of five hundred seamen; and that that number could be easily procured, or, in case of emergency, almost instantaneously completed by a press. Do the present facts contradict what I then submitted to your Lordships? I stated a deficiency, I informed your Lordships of the facility of procuring men, of which I have had daily experience, adding, at the same time, that in case of a sudden necessity of sending the ships to sea, a press would furnish me with the means of providing against any possible exigency that could arise. Though I speak of a press, I do not think we shall have any occasion for one. When I spoke last on this subject, I said I believed we should not, nor have I had any reason since to change my opinion; but I did not then bind myself to any positive engagement that press-warrants would not be issued. I am still as far from thinking that they will; but I by no means tie myself down to an unconditional promise that they will not. I repeat what I have said before frequently, that nothing but necessity will oblige me, and that necessity seems as far distant as ever. Pressing, my Lords, is attended with great severity and uncommon hardship; nothing can be more dreadful than to tear a useful member of society from his family and his dearest connexions, when probably his industry and protection is most wanted. I have often turned my thoughts to the subject, and hope in the end to be able to perfect some scheme which will render pressing of seamen entirely unnecessary. I have already had some experience that the usual mode of procuring men is most certainly defective; and while I wish to explain myself, I am glad to have an opportunity of speaking of the worth and merit of two very deserving officers; one of them a near relation to a noble Earl whom I now see in his place, [Lord Abercorn]— the gentleman I allude to is Captain Hamilton; the other, Captain Pownall, who, with a fortune of one hundred thousand pounds, without any temptation to go to sea but what was inspired by a sense of duty and the justice of the cause: both those officers tendered their services unasked, and without any application for assistance from the Admiralty, procured their complements within a few days, so as to be ready to proceed to sea; and that purely by entering men at rendezvous-houses to serve aboard their respective vessels. Such a mode of procuring men creates a confidence between the commanding officer and the seaman. The former is in some measure bound to act humanely to the man who gives him the preference of serving under him; and the latter will find his interest and duty unite, in behaving well under a person from whom he is taught to expect every present reasonable indulgence and future favour. These, and some other instances of a similar nature, which have come to my knowledge, have enabled me to point out one thing, that might, in my opinion, be the means of furthering the naval service; that is, trusting less to the assistance of the Admiralty Board, and giving every possible encouragement to the Captains appointed to the command of ships to complete their own crews. I am sure the happy effects of such a mode of expediting the naval armaments have been felt in the two instances I now allude to, as well as in some others I have forborne to mention. I have only one more word to add on this head before I sit down, and that is, to explain, on a general ground, the little consequence the deficiencies, which have been so pompously magnified, and so seriously insisted on by the noble Duke, can be of to the service. We will suppose a ship is ordered for such a service; while, therefore, she is preparing, her crew may be defective; but as soon as she is under orders for sailing, the deficiency is made up in the manner now mentioned, or taken from the guard-ships, or from other vessels that are not in such a state of forwardness; and so it happens successively as occasion requires, without injuring or impeding the service in any degree whatever.

The noble Duke says, that the foreign troops having marched to the place of embarkation, and not finding die transports ready to receive them, have been obliged to return to their quarters. I believe he has been equally misinformed and misled in this, as in every other instance. I am certain the fact is not so, and will tell his Grace that at no time has the transport-service been more expeditiously conducted; for I am certain it was never known in this country that so many tons of shipping were procured in so short a time; and what rendered this circumstance the more extraordinary was, the extreme severity of the weather, which, by the returns made to me, had put a stop to all work and business for a fortnight, during the time of the frost. The noble Duke who made the motion has founded it on motives of humanity, equity, and sound policy. To the first I shall only say, that the present measures, if steadily pursued, will, to every substantial purpose, answer the ends of humanity, and be the most effectual means of preventing the effusion of human blood. In point of equity, I am sure the motives for rejecting his Grace’s motion are equally strong, unless we consent to surrender the most essential aud sacred rights of the British Legislature. And as to the policy and expediency, I will venture to say that the noble Duke is no less mistaken; for as we have the right, so I trust we have the power to assert that right, and will be able to convince the Americans that our ability will be made no less conspicuous than the justice of our claims, the humanity we have manifested in the manner we have asserted them, and the measures we mean to pursue in their maintenance and support.

The Duke of Richmond. The noble Earl who lately presided at the head of a certain Department [Lord Dartmouth] seems to doubt, or is willing to explain away, the expression alluded to by the noble Duke who made the motion. I recollect his Lordship’s words precisely: I took a note of them at the time, and they were, “that it was the intention of Administration to relax and conciliate, and never by force of arms to subdue America.” This, my Lords, I contend, was the idea thrown out in the speech, and was the ostensible object of the clause the last mentioned noble Duke alluded to; though I perfectly coincide with his Grace, that war alone for the purpose of subduing America lay concealed under that clause, as now manifestly appears. What does the clause import? Does it contain any one specifick provision? Is it not a loose, indefinite jumble of words, meaning nothing, or at least nothing but to vest in the Crown a power of disposing of the rights of Parliament; of leaving Parliament all the odium; and giving his Majesty, should the scheme of coercing America prove impracticable, all the credit of any concession Parliament might hereafter be disposed to agree to? I would desire your Lordships to turn to the clause, and see the condition on which any measure of conciliation is to rest: “whenever any Province, &c., shall show a disposition to return to their duty.“How is this disposition to be known? Not by the Congress, for you have refused to treat with them; not with any particular description of men, for there can be none legally entitled to answer further than themselves are concerned. There are no Assemblies in being. Who, then, can you treat with, but with individuals whom you mean to detach from their countrymen, in order, by holding out offers of pardon, to create divisions; and by effecting that, forwarding your schemes of either simple conquest or unconditional submission? But I do assure your Lordships, that this scheme, however artfully planned, or deeply laid, will meet with the fate of all the rest. The people, so as to answer the ends you propose, will never permit themselves to be duped. It will be received as the proposition made to the Congress by one of the members of Administration in the other House [Sir Grey Cooper] was. This will never effect what the one hundred thousand pounds, offered by that gentleman to the Congress if they would agree to the noble Lord’s conciliatory proposition, failed to do. Every offer, however covertly made, must be disclosed at last. That is the Constitution of the Congress. They were obliged to impart to their constituents, that they refused the money; and that insidious proposition, though short of the system now pursuing, met with that contempt it deserved. But supposing that the Congress had consented, do your Lordships imagine that