understand by the noble Lord who presides at the head of that department; all united, give just cause for considering the present question, and adverting to the dangerous consequences which may follow, in case your Lordships should be inclined to give it a negative. I am far from imputing any design in the noble Lord to either mislead or misrepresent. I am persuaded his Lordship has faithfully reported whatever came within his own knowledge; but being obliged to trust, in most of the matters which he has submitted to your Lordships, to the information of others, he has of course been liable to error; and if I have not been grossly misinformed by professional men, his Lordship’s account of the state of the guard-ships, the number of men aboard them, and the facility of procuring them, is indeed very far different from what the noble Lord has asserted. I am informed, for instance, that the Eagle, the very ship in which Lord Howe is to hoist his flag, has not above ninety able seamen aboard her; and that several of the frigates and ships-of-war, destined, or which have sailed for America, have either been obliged to proceed on their respective voyages very indifferently manned, or that alacrity and ardour which the noble Lord told us of, is not founded in fact; for the men who were shipped aboard those vessels destined for immediate service, were obliged to be taken from aboard the guard-ships to complete their complements, which is the very contrary of what his Lordship asserted the last day this matter was made the subject of consideration. This brings me to consider another assertion made by his Lordship, which is, that the deficiency aboard the guard-ships was occasioned by the desire of the seamen to be shipped aboard the men-of-war destined for the American service. How could that possibly be the case, if, in the first instance the complements of these last were to be made up out of the former; and if the drafts, along with the deficiency stated in the complements of the former, were now no greater than before the drafts were made? But, my Lords, I believe neither will be found to be the case. I believe the deficiency aboard the guard-ships will be found to be considerably greater than his Lordship has stated; and further, that the crews are composed of men who should never be entered aboard our men-of-war. If I am rightly informed, small as the numbers are, that is not the worst of it: the crews are composed of landsmen in much too great a proportion, of vagrants, and, I fear, of convicted felons. I should be glad to be set right; but if it be true, it is a most melancholy and alarming circumstance. The navy, my Lords, is our only sure bulwark against our foreign enemies; particularly as we have been obliged to part with the greatest part of our military defence, in order to carry the present proposed measures into execution. If, then, in case of any emergency, an attack should be made on us in our present weak state of internal and naval defence, the consequences might be dreadful. That we have no reason to rest in a state of security, I am well convinced. I have good reason to believe that France and Spain are meditating some blow against us. The matter alluded to by the noble Duke who made the motion, I have reason to think is too true. I heard it above a month ago, and should have imparted it to your Lordships before now, had I not waited to have heard it communicated by Administration. I presumed they would have informed your Lordships of the matter, and either have stated their reasons for paying it no attention, or have told you what steps they had taken in consequence thereof, in order to bring France to an explanation. I would likewise remind your Lordships that great preparations are going on in France and Spain, both by sea and land. It may be said that another attempt is intended to be made on Algiers; or that the disputes subsisting between Spain and Portugal, in South-America, may be the object of this armament. The former may be the case; but if the force now collecting in those countries should be destined against Portugal, your Lordships will please to recollect what was asserted in a former debate by a noble Earl, whom I have in my eye, [Lord Rochford,] not now in office, but who then occupied a high and respectable post in Administration, that if Portugal should be attacked, we must necessarily be made parties in the war, and be bound to afford her every assistance in our power. In short, my Lords, uniting all the causes, circumstances, and probable events which first created, or may be consequent of the present dispute, I am heartily for agreeing with the motion made by the noble Duke; and am for giving the Colonies an opportunity of returning to their duty, both as a security to their constitutional rights, and as a means of preventing the calamities every part of this empire is threatened with, in case we should persist in carrying our present ruinous, unjust, and oppressive designs into execution.

The Earl of Sandwich. I did not intend to trouble your Lordships on the subject of this debate, had I not been particularly called on by the noble Duke who spoke last, and who, I can safely affirm, is either materially mistaken in every fact he has stated, or has drawn conclusions which his Grace was by no means warranted, in every instance where his assertions had any ground or colour of reality to support him. I am extremely sorry that my noble relation, before he hazarded any charges of the nature now brought forward, did not consult me, as I could easily and satisfactorily have set him right, and convinced him that he had been grossly misinformed. I am pretty well satisfied, I may venture to say I know the quarter from which his Grace has had the information he has now stated, and so earnestly urged. The authors are known by their daily writings in the papers, by their speeches in another place, by the general tenour of their discourses, and by the motions they have made; but I will tell the noble Duke what perhaps he is ignorant of, that those men are superficial, uninformed, and that every effort they have made to disparage the conduct of that Board at which I have the honour to preside, has only exhibited proofs of their total ignorance, their rancour, and their personal spleen. The noble Duke says, he has received his information from professional men. I beg, however, that his Grace, previous to his giving trust to such assertions and such reasonings, will send those professional men to me, when I promise to convince them that they know nothing at all of the matter. The noble Duke speaks of the Are-thusa, the Romney, the Eagle, &c., being at present unable to proceed to sea, on account of their being defective in their complements. By the last returns I have received of the state of those ships, I am authorized to say his Grace has been mistaken in point of fact in every one of them. But supposing the facts were true, what would it prove? That, perhaps from the established usage of the service, the men were changed from one ship to another, according as circumstances made such an arrangement necessary; but will it prove the only matter that can possibly deserve discussion or inquiry—that any one ship, since the commencement of the present naval armaments and operations, has been detained a single day for want of hands? The noble Duke says that the Eagle, aboard which ship Lord Howe is to hoist his flag, stands in this predicament. Were the fact strictly true, as he has reported, I make no doubt but the popularity of the noble Lord, and the desire of serving under so able and amiable a commander, would soon procure a number sufficient to make up the deficiency the noble Duke has stated. As to the general assertion on which his Grace has insisted, that the scarcity of seamen is so great that we have been obliged to have recourse to the expedient of supplying it by entering vagrants and convicted felons, I am sure nothing of the kind has happened; and I should be extremely averse to adopting such a scheme, or countenancing any mode of manning our navy under any circumstance of necessity that might lead to the disgusting so useful and brave a set of men; besides, I think it would be very improper on many accounts; it would be the means of corrupting their morals, which, with me, shall always continue to be one of the prime objects of my care to prevent as long as I shall have the honour to remain in my present situation. Our seamen are, in general, men of very commendable conduct, and remarkably good morals, so long as they remain on board. If they are dissipated when on shore, the consequences of their dissipation seldom reach further than spending their money in riot, &c., which has this good effect in respect of the service, that when their money is spent they return to their ships with cheerfulness, their means of living on land being at an end. What, then, would be the probable consequence, should vagrants and felons be permitted aboard his Majesty’s ships-of-war, but that the most profligate of their species would mix with the whole body of seamen, and contaminate their morals; render them remiss and careless in their duty while on board, and when on shore instruct them in their iniquitous modes of obtaining subsistence? All which, whether considered in a political or a moral light, or as being injurious to the service in general, are matters

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