Besides the above losses, one batteau, loaded with powder, supposed to contain thirty barrels, and an armed vessel, which the crew were obliged to abandon, were intercepted by one of the enemy’s frigates. We are afraid it will not be in our power to render our country any further services in this Colony. If our Army should maintain possession of any considerable part of this country, it will be absolutely necessary to keep some power to control the military.

With our respects to yourself and the Congress, we have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servants,

To the Hon. John Hancock.

GENERAL THOMAS TO COMMISSIONERS.

Head-Quarters, Point Deschambault, May 7, 1776.

GENTLEMEN: Immediately on my arrival at the camp before Quebeck, which was on the 1st instant, I examined into the state of the Army, and found, by the returns, there were one thousand nine hundred men, only one thousand of whom were fit for duty, including officers; the rest were invalids, chiefly with the small-pox. Three hundred of those effective were soldiers whose inlistments expired the 15th ultimo, many of whom refused duty, and all were very importunate to return home. There were several posts to be supported with this small number, at such distances from each other that not more than three hundred men could be rallied to the relief of any one, should it be attacked by the whole force of the enemy, by means of rivers and other obstructions. In all our magazines there were but about one hundred and fifty pounds of powder, and six days provisions. The French inhabitants were much disaffected, so that supplies of any kind were obtained with great difficulty from them.

Considering these and many other disagreeable circumstances, I thought it expedient to call a council of war; and the council, consisting of Brigadier-General Wooster and all the Field Officers in camp, after mature deliberation, were unanimously of opinion, that as, upon the first arrival of any reinforcement to the enemy, all communication by the river would inevitably be cut off by their armed vessels, it was absolutely necessary, for the safety of the invalids, immediately to remove them in batteaus to the Three Rivers; and to collect the artillery and other stores, in order to remove them and the Army farther up the river, as soon as it could conveniently be done, for the purpose of securing some important posts, where there would be a prospect of resisting with success. This was on the 5th instant, and in the evening of the same day I received certain intelligence of fifteen ships being forty leagues below Quebeck, making up the river. Early next morning five of them appeared in sight, and the wind and tide being favourable, they soon arrived before the city. We were employed at this time in carrying the sick, artillery, &c., on board the batteaus; the enemy, in landing their troops, and, as the event shows, in preparing to make a sally. Our movements were retarded by the change the arrival of these vessels had produced in the dispositions of the inhabitants; for they would neither furnish us with teams nor in any way afford us assistance, but kept themselves concealed.

About one o’clock a considerable body of the enemy attacked our sentinels and main-guard, in consequence of which I instantly ordered the troops under arms, and detached a party to support the main-guard, which was now coming off in good order. By the best judgment I could make, the enemy were one thousand strong, formed into two divisions, in columns six deep, supported with a train of six pieces of cannon. The most that we could collect at this time on the plains to oppose them did not exceed one-quarter of that number, with only one field-piece.

This being our situation, by advice of the Field Officers present I gave orders for the Army to march up the river to this place, where the greater part came up this day. On my arrival I without delay called a council of war; a copy of the determinations of which I have enclosed, as I have of that held in camp before Quebeck. The result of this council is, as you will see, to advance still farther up the river, and is founded on many reasons, some of which I will suggest: The ships of war were hastening forward with all possible despatch, and had already got up as far as Jacques Cartier; we had no cannon to prevent their passing the falls of Richelieu; and if cannon could have been procured, we had no ball, and not more provision than would subsist the Army for two or three days. We should therefore be under the same disadvantages at Point Deschambault as before Quebeck. They could run above us with their men-of-war and cutters, intercept all our resources, and oblige us to decamp.*

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient, humble servant,

JOHN THOMAS.

To the Honourable Committee of Congress.

GENERAL ARNOLD TO GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Montreal, May 10, 1776.

DEAR GENERAL: By this express you will receive from the honourable Commissioners particular information of the arrival of a number of men-of-war, transports, and a reinforcement of troops, at Quebeck, on Monday, the 6th instant. The same afternoon a considerable body of the enemy attacked our encampment, where we were not able to collect a force sufficient to withstand them. Of course a most precipitate and confused retreat ensued, with the loss of all our cannon, ammunition, &c., &c. The store of provisions, and, it is thought, about two hundred of the sick, fell into the enemy’s hands; also, a tender and gondola, with some few batteaus. At a council of war, held at Deschambault, it was concluded to retreat to the river Sorel, and there make a stand. I propose setting out this afternoon for that place, where, I make no doubt, we shall have particular advice of the enemy’s strength and movements. If practicable I shall urge the repossessing ourselves of Deschambault. Without that post is secured, I am of opinion it will not be practicable, if advisable, to keep possession of this part of the country, as our resources of provisions will, in a great measure, be cut off, and with half the number of men necessary to defend this part of the country, we can make a stand at Isle aux Noix, and effectually secure that pass and our own Colonies, if this can be reconciled with the repeated promises of Congress to our friends in this country. With the troops coming on, it will be necessary to forward all the provisions possible.

We have this morning procured about three hundred barrels of flour, and have some expectations of procuring one hundred of pork, which will be forwarded this evening

*NEW-YORK, May 23, 1776.—By an express from our Army in Canada, who left it on the 9th instant, at Point Deschambault, about sixty miles above Quebeck, we are informed of the following further particulars relating to the situation of our affairs in Canada, viz: That the small-pox being in our Army at Quebeck, occasioned so many of them to be sick, and the rest so dispersed at different posts for the convenience of quarters, as that there were but about two hundred effective men at Head-Quarters, where there was no intrenchment, nor breast-work, nor proper tools to erect any, and but about six days’ provisions; that at a council of war it was determined to leave the place in two or three days; and that General Wooster, with his own baggage, Captain Mott, and many others, had set out on the return a day or two before the enemy’s ships and vessels (said to be seven in all) appeared in sight. That it was supposed General Carleton had notice, by spies or deserters, of the resolution to abandon the siege, and the situation of our camp; and, on that information, concluded on the sally which was made on the 6th, (the same morning the ships came up,) with about twelve hundred men and six field-pieces. That, by the dress of the men, they were supposed not to be regulars, but the people from the town; that, on the unexpected appearance of the ships and this force, our people quitted the place with precipitation and confusion, leaving their provision, baggage, cannon, about two hundred sick, and everything else behind them. That the cannon consisted of two twenty-four-pounders and two twelve-pounders, several six and four-pounders, some mortars, cohorns, howitzers, all of brass, with some iron pieces of various sizes. That it was thought that one hundred of the sick went off with the small-pox on them, and that they were generally the better for going out; also, that most of our people from the out-posts escaped and got together. That there was no firing on either side, but that, as our people proceeded up the river on shore, the men-of-war followed, till near the Point Deschambault, where our people made a stand, and the ships went down the river. That, on account of the scarcity of provisions, and to avoid sickness, General Thomas kept with him but about five hundred men, intending to proceed up or down, according to his strength and accommodations; and that the Canadians, in general, were well disposed in our favour. Great numbers of our troops, with provisions, ammunition, &c., were on the way, having been retarded by the badness of the roads, which had been for some time impassable, and prevented the arrival of recruits and necessaries; but that a powerful Army, well appointed and provided, will, this campaign, probably retrieve our affairs, and crown our important enterprise in that country with success.