or in the morning to our Army. The gondola, heavy cannon, and mortars, which came last, are safe. I make no doubt you will take such measures as the exigency of our affairs require. Every information will be forwarded you as early as possible.

I am, with great respect and esteem, dear General, your obedient and humble servant,

BENEDICT ARNOLD.

To General Schuyler.

GENERAL THOMAS TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

Head-Quarters, Point Deschambault, May 8, 1776.

SIR: Immediately on my arrival at the camp before Quebeck, which was on the 1st instant, I examined into the state of the Army, and found by the returns there were one thousand nine hundred men. Of this number, only a thousand were fit for duty, officers included; the remainder were invalids, chiefly confined with the small-pox. Three hundred of the effective were soldiers whose inlistments expired on the 15th ultimo, many of whom peremptorily refused duty, and all were very importunate to return home; and two hundred others, engaged for the year, had received the infection of the small-pox by inoculation, and would in a short time be in the Hospitals. Several posts were necessary to be supported by the small number able to do duty, at such distances from each other that, by means of rivers and other obstructions, not more than three hundred men could be rallied to the relief of any one post, should it be attacked by the whole force of the enemy. In all our magazines there were but one hundred and fifty pounds of powder, nor more than six days’ provisions; the French inhabitants (as I hinted in my last) much disaffected, so that supplies of any kind were obtained with great difficulty from them.

Considering these and many other disagreeable circumstances, I thought it expedient to call a council of war; and the council, consisting of Brigadier-General Wooster and all the Field Officers in camp, after mature deliberation, were unanimously of opinion that as, upon the first arrival of any reinforcement to the enemy, all communication by the river would inevitably be cut off by their armed vessels, it was absolutely necessary for the safety of the invalids immediately to remove them to the Three Rivers, and to collect the artillery and other stores, in order to move them and the Army further up the river as soon as it could conveniently be done, to secure some posts where there would be a prospect of resisting with success. This was on the 5th instant, and in the evening of the same day I received certain intelligence of fifteen ships being forty leagues below Quebeck. Early the next morning five of them appeared in sight, and the wind and tide being favourable, they soon arrived before the city. We were at this time employed in carrying the sick on board the batteaus, removing the artillery, &c.; the enemy, in landing their troops, and, as the event shows, in preparing to make a sally. Our movements were retarded by the change the arrival of these vessels produced in the inhabitants, for they would neither furnish us with teams nor afford us the least assistance, but kept themselves concealed.

About one o’clock a considerable body of the enemy attacked our sentries and main-guard, in consequence of which I instantly ordered the troops under arms, and detached a party to support the main-guard, which was now coming off in good order. By the best judgment I could make, the enemy were a thousand strong, formed into two divisions, in columns six deep. The most that we could collect at this time on the plains did not exceed a quarter of that number, with one field-piece; whereas the enemy were supported with a train of six pieces of cannon.

No intrenchments had been thrown up, nor any lines formed which would serve for a cover; we had no place of retreat, if we had been overpowered with numbers; and a defeat would have been decisive against the whole Army in this encampment, and victory would have given us no considerable advantages, as the enemy might securely have retreated to their garrison, and their shipping entirely commanded the river. This being our situation, rather than contend on so unequal ground, with so little probability of reaping emolument by the contest, by advice of the Field Officers present I gave orders for the Army to march up the river as far as this place, where the greater part came yesterday. On my arrival, I without delay called a council of war, a copy of the determinations of which I have enclosed, as I have of that held in camp before Quebeck. The result of this council was, as your Excellency will see, to advance still farther up the river, and was founded on several reasons, some of which I will suggest: The ships of war were hastening forward with all possible despatch, and had already got up to Jacques Cartier, between two or three leagues distant from hence; we had no cannon to prevent their passing the falls of Richelieu, (the only advantageous post to fortify for this purpose;) our provisions would not more than subsist the Army for two or three days; we should, therefore, labour under the same disadvantages at Deschambault as before Quebeck; the men-of-war would run up the river, intercept all our resources, and soon oblige us to decamp. I shall, however, send the invalids forward, and remain here myself with about five hundred men, until I receive advices from Montreal, whether such supplies can be despatched immediately as will enable me to defend this post. The cannon in the batteaus were taken; and near two tons of powder, which General Schuyler had forwarded by Lieutenant-Colonel Allen, were unfortunately intercepted by a frigate before it reached the camp.

I hope my conduct in these transactions will meet with your Excellency’s approbation. I have kept the importance of the cause in view, and acted according to the best of my understanding. I do not mean to reflect on any gentleman who has had the command in this department; but, in my ideas of war, as there was nothing which promised success in the issue, it would have been highly proper to have made this movement some weeks past.

I am, with great respect, your Excellency’s most obedient humble servant,

JOHN THOMAS.

To His Excellency General Washington.

Camp before Quebeck, ss.

At a Council of War, held at Head-Quarters, May 5th, 1776—Present:

Major-General Thomas, President.

Members.

Agreed unanimously, That, considering the strength of the garrisons of Quebeck and the considerable force that is probably in it; considering also the state of the Continental Army before the city, not exceeding two thousand in number, a great proportion of which being confined with the small-pox, it is not prudent to attempt the city by escalade.

Agreed unanimously, That it is necessary for the safety of the invalids in camp, that they be removed immediately to the Three Rivers.

Agreed unanimously, That the cannon at Point Levi and other posts be embarked in the boats as soon as possible, and removed to some tenable place up the river.

A true copy. Attest:

JOSEPH THOMAS, Secretary.

Camp at Deschambault, ss.

At a Council of War, held at Head-Quarters, May 7th, 1776—Present:

Major-General Thomas, President.

Members.

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