it is for my purpose to observe that it is established by their laws, and I inquire no further.”

This Constitution and these laws have also been those of Virginia, and let it be remembered, that under them she flourished and was happy. The same principles which led the English to greatness animates us. To that principle our laws, our customs, and our manners, are adapted; and it would be perverting all order to oblige us, by a novel Government, to give up our laws, our customs, and our manners.

However necessary it may be to shake off the authority of arbitrary British dictators, we ought, nevertheless, to adopt and perfect that system which England has suffered to be grossly abused, and the experience of ages has taught us to venerate. This, like almost everything else, is perhaps liable to objections, and probably the difficulty of adopting a limited Monarchy will be largely insisted on. Admit this objection to have weight, and that we cannot in every instance assimilate a Government to that, yet no good reason can be assigned why the same principle, or spirit, may not in a great measure be preserved. But honourable as this spirit is, we daily see it calumniated by advocates for popular Governments, and rendered obnoxious to all whom their artifices can influence or delude. The systems recommended to the Colonies seem to accord with the temper of the times, and are fraught with all the tumult and riot incident to simple Democracy—systems which many think it their interest to support, and without doubt will be industriously propagated among you. The best of these systems exist only in theory, and were never confirmed by the experience even of those who recommend them. I flatter myself, therefore, that you will not quit a substance actually enjoyed, for a shadow or phantom, by which, instead of being benefited, many have been misled and perplexed.

Let us examine the principles they assign to their Government, and try its merits by the unerring standard of truth. In a late pamphlet it is thus stated: The happiness of man, as well as his dignity, consists in virtue: if there be a form of Government, then, whose principle is virtue, will not every sober man acknowledge it better calculated to promote the general happiness of society than any other form? Virtue is the principle of a Republick, therefore a Republick is the best form of Government.

The author, with what design I know not, seems to have cautiously blended private and publick virtue, as if for the purpose of confounding the two, and thereby recommending his plan under the amiable appearance of courting virtue. It is well known that private and publick virtue are materially different. The happiness and dignity of man, I admit, consists in the practice of private virtues, and to this he is stimulated by the rewards promised to such conduct. In this he acts for himself, and with a view of promoting his own particular welfare. Publick virtue, on the other hand, means a disinterested attachment to the publick good, exclusive and independent of all private and selfish interest, and which, though sometimes possessed by a few individuals, never characterized the mass of the people in any state. And this is said to be the principle of democratical Governments, and to influence every subject of it to pursue such measures as conduce to the prosperity of the whole. A man, therefore, to qualify himself for a member of such a community, must divest himself of all interested motives, and engage in no pursuits which do not ultimately redound to the benefit of society. He must not, through ambition, desire to be great, because it would destroy that equality on which the security of the Government depends; nor ought he to be rich, lest he be tempted to indulge himself in those luxuries which, though lawful, are not expedient, and might occasion envy and emulation. Should a person deserve the esteem of his fellow-citizens and become popular, he must be neglected, if not banished, lest his growing influence disturb the equilibrium. It is remarkable that neither the justice of Aristides nor the bravery of Themistocles could shield them from the darts of envy and jealousy; nor are modern times without examples of the same kind.

To this species of Government everything that looks like elegance and refinement is inimical, however necessary to the introduction of manufactures and the cultivation of arts and sciences. Hence, in some ancient Republicks, flowed those numberless sumptuary laws, which restrained men to plainness and familiarity in dress and diet, and all the mischiefs which attend agrarian laws, and unjust attempts to maintain their idol equality by an equal division of property.

Schemes like these may be practicable in countries so sterile by nature as to afford a scanty supply of the necessaries, and none of the conveniences of life; but they can never meet with a favourable reception from people who inhabit a country to which Providence has been more bountiful. They will always claim a right of using and enjoying the fruits of their honest industry, unrestrained by any ideal principles of Government, and will gather estates for themselves and children without regarding the whimsical impropriety of being richer than their neighbours. These are rights which freemen will never consent to relinquish; and after fighting for deliverance from one species of tyranny, it would be unreasonable to expect they should tamely acquiesce under another.

The truth is, that men will not be poor from choice or compulsion, and these Governments can exist only in countries where the people are so from necessity. In all others they have ceased almost as soon as erected, and in many instances been succeeded by despotism, and the arbitrary sway of some usurper, who had before perhaps gained the confidence of the people by eulogiums on liberty, and possessing no property of his own, by most disinterestedly proposing depredations on that of his neighbours.

The most considerable state in which the shadow of Democracy exists (for it is far from being purely so) is that of the United Provinces of Holland, &c. Their territories are confined within narrow limits, and the exports of their own produce very inconsiderable. Trade is the support of that people, and, however said to be considerable, will not admit of luxury. With the greatest parsimony and industry, they, as a people, can but barely support themselves, although individuals among them may amass estates. I own they have exhibited to mankind an example of perseverance and magnanimity that appeared like a prodigy. By the profits of their trade they maintained large armies, and supported a navy equal to the first in their day of warfare; but their military strength, as well as the form of their Government, have long since given way. Their navy has dwindled into a few ships of war, and their Government into an Aristocracy, as unhappy and despotick as the one of which we complain.

The State of Venice, once a Republick, is now governed by one of the worst of despotisms. In short, I do not recollect a single instance of a nation who supported this form of Government for any length of time, or with any degree of greatness; which convinces me, as it has many others, that the principle contended for is ideal, and a mere creature of a warm imagination.

One of the first staples of our country, you know, is esteemed by many to be one of the greatest luxuries in the world, and I fancy it will be no easy matter to draw you into measures that would exclude its culture, and deprive you of the wealth resulting from its exportation.

That I may not tire your patience, I will now proceed to delineate the method in which I would distribute the powers of Government, so as to devise the best code of laws, engage their due execution, preserve the strength of the Constitution, and secure the liberties of the people. It is agreed by most writers on this subject, that this power should be divided into three parts, each independent of, but having connection with each other. Let the people in the first place choose their usual number of Representatives, and let this right return to them every third year.

Let these Representatives, when convened, elect a Governour, to continue in authority during his good behaviour, of which the two Houses of Council of State and Assembly should jointly be the judges, and by majority of voices supply any vacancy in that office, which may happen by dismission, death, or resignation.

Let the Representatives also choose out of the Colony at large twenty-four proper persons to constitute a Council of State, who should form a distinct or intermediate branch of the Legislature, and hold their places for life, in order that they might possess all the weight, stability, and dignity, due to the importance of their office. Upon the death or resignation of any of the members, let the Assembly appoint another to succeed him.

Let no member of either House, except the Treasurer, hold a post of profit in the Government.