and if the objection could be removed on the ground that France was perfectly acquainted with the present state and condition of the national force now within the kingdom, that would be another good reason that nothing respecting our means of defence should be concealed. He then said, that the whole of our military force, now within this kingdom, consisted of the foot-guards, composed of sixty-four companies, amounting to two thousand five hundred men, one thousand of which were destined for America; three regiments of horse and body-guards, of about one thousand five hundred men; four battalions returned from America, with officers only, at about one hundred each; ten regiments of dragoons, of two hundred men each; and three complete battalions of infantry,—the whole amounting, (allowing for the one thousand men drafted from the guards,) to about seven thousand men. Supposing, then, that three thousand of those were put into the garrisons of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Chatham, the remainder fit to take the field, after a sufficient number was left to guard London, allowing one thousand for each place, would not be above three thousand; which, he contended, would be totally inadequate to any military operation, should France and Spain think proper to take an advantage of our defenceless state. He said, indeed, that a Militia was to be raised, in order to supply this deficiency; but however constitutional that mode of national defence might be, he insisted that it would never answer any purpose of repelling a powerful enemy, while it continued to be so disgracefully and improperly conducted as it was at present, when unqualified officers were admitted on one hand, and substitutes on the other, Besides, though the Militia had been officered and manned much better, it could not be expected that they could face a veteran army, superior in numbers and discipline. And as for the invalids, every man among them almost fit for real service, had been already drafted: so that, on the whole, the picture which such a scene of internal weakness, joined with a few ships not half manner, presented, was most dreadful. It was, however, necessary to bring it forward, to see if anything could stimulate our Governours to provide for our national safety, and prevent us from falling a prey to our dangerous and ambitious neighbours.

The Earl of Suffolk. I cannot say, my Lords, that the noble Duke who made the motion has stated one solid objection to the present treaties, or pointed out a single instance in which our former treaties with those Princes have been materially departed from. His Grace has taken great pains to swell the account by several items, which, according to my apprehension, do not properly belong to it; but if they did, they would not prove a tittle relative to the comparative dearness or cheapness of the terms on which the troops have been procured. The tenour of the treaties themselves are no other than what has been usual on former occasions. The present, it is true, is filled with pompous, high-sounding phrases of alliance; but I will be so ingenuous as to confess to the noble Duke, that I consider them merely in that light; and, if he will, I allow that the true objects of those treaties is not so much to create an alliance, as to hire a body of troops, which the present rebellion in America has rendered necessary. I will likewise give this general answer to his Grace, relative to the comparative expense, that should the war be terminated in one year, the bargain will be manifestly advantageous, because we shall pay but one year’s double subsidy, which is equal to two years single subsidy. If the war should continue two years, in that event we shall neither gain nor lose, because two years double subsidy will be equal to four years single, the usual term stipulated in former treaties; and if the war should continue longer, I confess that the terms would, in that event, be disadvantageous. But, my Lords, though the terms were really as disadvantageous as the noble Duke has endeavoured to represent them, if we wanted the troops, we should have been obliged to acquiesce. The proper question is, Whether we do want them? I must declare for one, that I think we do; and as such, am happy that we were able to procure them on such easy and beneficial terms; for all circumstances considered, such as the very short notice, the disagreeableness of the service at such a distance from home, to be transported across the Atlantick Ocean, induce me to be surprised, not that we were obliged to pay so dear for them, but rather serve to astonish me how we were able to procure them so cheap. Besides, the noble Duke seems to forget, that even on his own principles foreigners are much more proper to be employed in this war than natives; for if the war be just, of which I have no doubt, and that troops must be employed, and that foreigners can be more easily had than natives, the measure will follow of necessity, and can be fairly justified on that ground. The noble Duke, alluding to a passage in the Hessian treaty, says, that the troops being under the command of a senior officer, the supreme command of the whole army will naturally devolve on him, when the British Commander-in-Chief happens to be a junior officer. I do not pretend to speak from my own knowledge, but I would appeal to any noble Lord in this House acquainted with military matters, whether the commission given a Commander-in-Chief does not supersede any other; and whether of course a young Major-General, acting in that character, will not thereby have an absolute and supreme command over every officer in that service, be his rank what it may. The noble Duke says we brought over Ethan Allen in irons to this country, but were afraid to try him, lest he should be acquitted by an English jury, or that we should not be able legally to convict him. I do assure his Grace, that he is equally mistaken in both his conjectures: we neither had a doubt but we should be able legally to convict him, nor were we afraid that an English jury would have acquitted him; nor, further, was it out of any tenderness to the man, who, I maintain, had justly forfeited his life to the offended laws of his country. But I will tell his Grace the true motives which induced Administration to act as they did: we were aware that the Rebels had lately made a considerable number of prisoners, and we accordingly avoided bringing him to his trial from considerations of prudence—from a dread of the consequences of retaliation; not from a doubt of his legal guilt, or a fear of his acquittal by an English jury. The noble Duke has quoted one instance to show that the expense of foreign troops has been increased, because they were double officered. I do not pretend to speak directly as to the necessity of such an arrangement; but I have no doubt but it is agreeable to the usage of the Hessian service, and, as such, is no more than what has been agreed to by former treaties.

The Earl of Coventry. I do not rise to speak expressly to the present treaties, further than they relate to the measures now pursuing relative to America, which, for the reasons so often urged by me, I shall ever continue to think impolitick and unwise, and, as such, shall declare my hearty disapprobation of them; not that I think the wisest or best concerted measures that were ever planned can avert the destruction which, from the nature of the increasing power, wealth, and population of the Colonies, is, in my opinion, inevitable. It is in the body politick as in the natural body, the seeds of dissolution are contained in the first vital principles of both. Sooner or later the event must happen; and the greatest stretch that human wisdom can effect is no more than to prolong the duration of one, as the greatest care and attention, joined with the best native constitution, may do to prolong the other. If you look on the map of the globe, and view Great Britain and North-America, and compare the extent of both; if you consider the soil, the harbours, rivers, climate, and increasing population of the latter, nothing but the most obstinate blindness and partiality can prevail on any man to entertain a serious opinion that such a country will long continue under subjection to this. The question is not, therefore, how we shall be able to realize such a delusive scheme of dominion, but how we shall make it their interest to continue faithful allies and warm friends. Surely that can never be effected by fleets and armies. On the contrary instead of meditating conquest, and exhausting our strength in an ineffectual struggle, we should vote a thanksgiving, and wisely abandoning all wild schemes of coercing that country, we should leave America to itself, and wish to avail ourselves of the only substantial benefit we can ever expect to derive from it, the profits of an extensive commerce, and the strong support of a firm and friendly alliance for mutual defence and assistance. It has been my misfortune, when I have formerly spoken on this subject, to be misunderstood by a learned and noble Lord I now see in his place, [Lord Mansfield.] His Lordship supposed, that I wished for a separation of the two countries, purely to convince America of her weakness and inability to subsist without us, and that with an expectation of her