of this country; because, by knowing our ultimatum, they will then have it in their power either to agree to it, or to risk the consequences of resistance. I remember, at the opening of this session, a very different language was held. The idea of taxation was denied or modified. A noble Lord in the other House, who presides at the head of the national finances, disclaimed any such intention. A noble Lord in this House, whom I now see in his place, [Lord Dartmouth,] who then filled a responsible office in Administration, and who, perhaps, for the reason I am going to assign, was not thought so proper a person to carry the designs of Government into execution, repeatedly assured this House that no intention was entertained by Administration of “subduing America.” I would appeal to your Lordships, if the newly-adopted system has not a most unfavourable appearance, an appearance full of mischief, and big with that overruling secret influence, those dark and dangerous designs, which every now and then betray themselves to pub-lick view, and which create the justest jealousies and suspicions in the breast of every man who is not deaf and callous to the feelings and interests of this devoted country. When I framed the motion with which I shall conclude, I avoided all specifications, because I meant it as a general resolution, to be taken up and considered by your Lordships in a committee, in order, if you should think proper or necessary, that you might decide on particulars, agree upon some specifick terms, some ultimatum to be proposed to the Colonies, or determine on some general resolution to be communicated to the other House of Parliament for their concurrence, as a basis for conciliation or concession. By this means America might know what she had to depend on, and decide accordingly. You would remove that cause, which she assigns for her present want of confidence in general assurances, in Ministerial promises, in loose and undefined claims, which every successive Administration have explained their own way, and scarcely any two of the members of the present seem to be agreed in. As the doctrine of unconditional submission is avowed by the noble Lord alluded to; as the same doctrine has been since repeated in this House by persons who, though not in responsible offices, are nearly connected with those in power,—another view I had in submitting the present motion to your Lordships, was, to induce Ministers to speak out, to say fairly whether their long harangues on intended reconciliation and conciliation, their determinations to concede in some particulars, are all forgotten, or laid aside never again to be taken up; and whether they have any measures, short of unconditional submission, to propose. Should they choose to be silent on this head, and in consequence thereof reject this proposition, I shall then understand them as perfectly and clearly as if they had spoken out. I shall then be fully convinced that unconditional submission is what they have ultimately in view; that the bloody conflict, I fear long determined on, will follow; and that the present dispute between both countries is finally to be decided by the force of arms. Before I conclude this head, I should wish to be understood that I cannot pay the least attention to any explanation, purporting that the objects pursued by Administration have been the same from the beginning; that they are still willing to sheath the sword, and listen to the terms of accommodation. Such a conclusion is absurd, and impossible in the nature of things. The speech, I allow, held out this idea; the proposition called the Conciliatory Proposition, framed by a noble Lord in the other House, was, it is plain, short of unconditional submission. The bill for interdicting all commerce with America, known by the name of the Capture Act, had a clause towards the end. of it, which corresponded with the intentions declared in the speech. By this clause a power was vested in the King to appoint Commissioners to treat with the Colonies, to receive submissions, and to grant pardons. I was not present at the time this bill was debated on the second reading; but though the system which appears now to govern Administration was not then openly avowed, it is plain that the person [supposed to mean Lord Mansfield] who advised or framed this clause, and who, I presume, has had the chief hand in directing and advising the present measures from their commencement, by his personal influence, though not called by his office to a participation of this species of power, had a view to that unconditional submission which is now contended for. I was in the country when this act first came to my hands, and on comparing the King’s speech with the clause, I must own I was astonished. What does the clause say? That Commissioners are to be appointed, and that is all. What are they to do? To receive submissions. Does it state what conditions, or, indeed, provide for any condition at all? Have the Commissioners the least shadow of power by this act to make any concession whatever? None; the alternative is resistance or unconditional submission; an eternal war and resistance on one hand, till both or either party are destroyed; or that America shall instantly disarm, surrender, and submit. On this ground, my Lords, I thought it proper to give an opportunity to your Lordships to effectuate his Majesty’s gracious intentions declared in his speech; and the great ostensible object of the Capture Bill, which was to coerce America by destroying her trade, if she obstinately persisted not to agree to such terms of accommodation as the British Parliament, in conjunction with his Majesty, might think most conducive to the securing the claims of this country, the subordinate constitutional rights of America, and the future permanent happiness and interests of both. It is solely to obtain those very desirable objects, that I have this day troubled your Lordships. If your Lordships should not think proper to propose any ultimatum, my motion will have this very salutary effect: it will furnish America with an opportunity of preventing the present calamities, which they must in all events unavoidably feel; it will give them an opportunity of averting that cloud which hangs suspended over their heads, and threatens them with destruction; it will be but a fair and equitable experiment, by way of warning. And if they should refuse to offer any proposition, or tender such only as are inconsistent with the dignity and rights of this legislature, and the interests of the empire at large, it will produce this other very beneficial and most important consequence: it will unite this country in support of measures which are far from being universally approved, and vindicate the justice and honour of the nation, not only in the opinion of its own subjects, but in that of all Europe.

As to the policy of the present conflict, I shall say very little, having before so frequently expressed myself on the subject. But I think Administration should have the most full and unequivocal proofs of the disposition of foreign Powers before they blindly rush into a civil war. I have been a considerable time conversant in matters of this kind. I know the stress that ought to be laid on the language usually held by Ambassadors. I know what credit ought to be given to the general assurances of foreign courts. I am convinced that they are very little to be relied on, if not accompanied by confidential engagements, and a thorough knowledge of the state and condition of those countries from which we have most to dread: not from their pacifick declarations so much as from their known inability to injure. The former may serve, nay, experience in all ages has proved too frequently has served, only to amuse and deceive. The latter, therefore, in my opinion, can only promise that kind of security which a wise Minister will always demand before he undertakes any measure which may expose or render the nation vulnerable to its natural enemies. The Powers, my Lords, which I allude to, are those of France and Spain. None of your Lordships can be ignorant that they are now collecting a great naval and military force to be employed somewhere; and I think it my duty to state to your Lordships a piece of information which I have little reason to doubt, and which, if true, must be the subject of great and just alarm to your Lordships, and point out the caution and reserve with which any general assurances received by our Ministers ought to be depended on or trusted to. The information, my Lords, is shortly this: that two French gentlemen, towards the close of last summer, went to America, and had a conference with General Washington at the Provincial camp, who referred them to the Continental Congress, whither they immediately repaired. On the whole, my Lords, whether you consider the present measures in the light of humanity, equity, or sound policy, I trust your Lordships will agree with me, that the means of conciliation are still within our reach, and that nothing but the most urgent necessity should compel us to imbrue our hands in the blood of our fellow-subjects, at the risk of our ruining our commerce, and of