how ably the whole affair was conducted, but you would have reason likewise to have the most perfect confidence in operations so well planned, and so well directed. The noble Duke supposes the account in the Gazette to contain actual misrepresentations, or a suppression of facts; but I do assure his Grace he is entirely mistaken: it is the business of that paper to state facts, which I contend it has very faithfully, and that the General, as therein set forth, literally took the resolution of quitting the town on the 7th, and actually evacuated it and embarked on board the fleet on the 17th, without any interruption from the Rebels; that he carried off his artillery, military stores, all his baggage, and his very horses; that he took such of the inhabitants as sought his protection on board, with all their most valuable effects, and that species, too, which might have been of the greatest use to the Rebels. The noble Duke supposes that this step will break all our future operations during the present campaign: but I will inform his Grace that it was never intended to begin the war in that quarter, since the great change which has happened in our affairs there. While the spirit of rebellion was confined to the Province of Massachusetts-Bay, it could properly be the only seat of war or coercion; but since the defection became more general, so false an idea never prevailed; in proof of which, I do assure your Lordships that the General, so early as the month of October, received instructions to quit Boston whenever he thought proper; in this light, therefore, the evacuating Boston can appear but a shifting of position, for the purpose of carrying into execution measures already concerted and agreed on: the first object of which is, to secure Halifax against any attack from the Rebels, and whither the fleet and army are now destined. The noble Duke has dwelt greatly on the native prowess and martial disposition of the Rebels. I am not very much inclined to throw out reflections upon bodies of men, or to suppose that any of the subjects of this empire are deficient in courage; but further than that general supposition, I must confess I cannot discover any proofs of superior courage the Rebels have displayed, either on this or any former occasion: they were certainly five times the number of the King’s troops; they enjoyed every advantage of situation; and yet for all that they permitted the troops to embark, and carry off everything they desired, without the least molestation. Their great knowledge in the military art has likewise been loudly trumpeted; but what has been the fruit of it? The expertness of their engineers was such that they threw a bomb into the town, which wounded six persons, two of whom are since dead.

The noble Duke says, that the misconduct of those who negotiated the Hessian treaty was the reason that the Hessians have not sailed from Spithead. I do assure your Lordships that the fact is entirely otherwise; for however willing the Hessian General might be to wait for the arrival of the remainder of the troops which were to serve under his command in America, as soon as he received a message from his Majesty to proceed to the place of his destination, he instantly complied, without expressing the least unwillingness or dissatisfaction. The noble Duke says, there must have been a convention between General Howe and the Rebel commander; which, I do assure his Grace, was by no means the case; no convention, stipulation, concession, or compromise whatever, having been made. The General thought proper to shift his position, in order, in the first instance, to protect Halifax, and after that object was secured, to penetrate by that way into the interior of the country, and pursue his future intended operations, when, instead of a dispirited and enfeebled soldiery, I trust your Lordships will be at once convinced, that the men will exert themselves with the resolution and ardour they have ever manifested in the pursuit of military glory, and that the General will exhibit the most full and satisfactory proofs, that his evacuating Boston was the consequence of a resolution previously taken, on the wisest and best concerted motives.

The Marquis of Rockingham. I was in the country when the Gazette, containing the account now so warmly defended, fell into my hands; and though I had no other information to direct me, I confess it struck me as equally ridiculous and improbable. Is there one of your Lordships, though nothing else had transpired relative to the transaction, can be persuaded to believe that the Provincial General would have ever permitted the evacuation in the manner related, if there had not been an understanding between him and the British Commander-in-Chief? But, my Lords, we are not left to grope our way in order to discover what really happened; conjecture alone, if exercised on such circumstances, would amount to proof positive; but there is no occasion to rely upon conjecture or probabilities; there are several letters from officers on the spot, which all substantially contradict what your Lordships have heard this day; those letters may vary from each other in some particulars, but they all uniformly agree in one thing, which the noble Earl in office seems to be totally ignorant of; that is, that the troops were compelled, by the operations of the enemy, to take the resolution of quitting the town; and that they were afterwards permitted to quit it unmolested, by agreement. If there was no other proof but one, that alone would be decisive to determine my judgment: the one I mean is, that the General and Admiral only waited for a wind to waft them to the place of their destination, when the account came away. Why not destroy the town in pursuance of the general instruction, when they thought proper to shift their position? Or, if compelled to abandon it, why not raise it to the foundations, by way of retaliation? If there was no convention, no treaty or agreement, how will they answer to Government for this disobedience of orders? But, my Lords, there are numerous accounts in town, some of which I have seen myself, from gentlemen of no less veracity than either the General or Admiral. The. account they give is shortly this: That on the morning of the 2d of March, the garrison discovered that a battery had been raised on Dorchester-Heights the preceding evening, which commanded the greatest part of the town; that the next day, (the 3d,) the Provincials continued to fire on the town, and annoyed the garrison and inhabitants extremely; that the situation of the troops now became extremely critical, as the fleet could give them no effectual assistance; that a Council of War was held on the same day, in which it was resolved to attack the Heights of Dorchester, in order to dislodge the enemy, it being universally agreed that the town was no longer tenable, unless that service was effected; and, accordingly, the proper dispositions were made to carry on the attack the next morning, but that the General had been prevented by a very great storm which arose; that on the next day, (the 5th,) the Selectmen went out to General Washington, to treat with him, and that after some messages had passed on both sides, it was agreed, on the 7th, that the King’s troops should evacuate the town, in the manner which afterwards took effect; and that accordingly the troops and such of the inhabitants as chose their protection, embarked on the 17th. If these accounts are true, of which I have very little doubt, your Lordships will perceive, that though possibly there might be no formal convention, no capitulation signed, which, I understood, was avoided by the Generals on both sides, for particular reasons, that in whatever manner the business might have been negotiated, it had every substantial requisite of a treaty or compromise, as much as if it had been ever so solemnly authenticated or subscribed. The troops were permitted to evacuate the town without interruption, because they engaged on the other hand not to burn or destroy it, either previous to their departure, or after they got aboard their ships. The noble Earl tells you that the troops have proceeded to Halifax. I should be glad to know what certainty he has that they can proceed there: I presume the noble Lord is not ignorant how very difficult it is to navigate those seas in that very tempestuous season of the year, just at the time of the equinox, when a constant northwesterly wind sets in. I should have imagined that no man in his senses, so incumbered with military stores, cannon, passengers, troops, &c., would think of such a measure, without he was driven to it by necessity; nor can I be persuaded, that the Admiral would have ever consented to so rash an act, upon mere motives of forwarding the future operations of the campaign. Only consider a minute, my Lords, and you must tremble for the fate of both the Army and Navy: consider how many thousand persons are aboard this fleet, and think what a dreadful circumstance it must be, to have them forced to sea in such a climate, and such a season. I confess I tremble for their fate, and should not be surprised to hear, by the first accounts received from that quarter, that they were either blown away to the West-Indies, or had all